Investigate USB device connection history from Windows registry, event logs, and setupapi logs to track removable media usage and potential data exfiltration.
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Investigate USB device connection history from Windows registry, event logs, and setupapi logs to track removable media usage and potential data exfiltration.
When investigating potential data exfiltration via removable storage devices
During insider threat investigations to track USB device usage
For compliance audits verifying removable media policy enforcement
When correlating USB connections with file access and copy events
For establishing a timeline of device connections during an incident
Detection Gaps & Validation
Most-missed artifacts: USBSTOR alone is incomplete. Also parse the USB\ key (VID/PID for non-mass-storage and MTP/PTP phones that USBSTOR omits), MountedDevices, per-user MountPoints2, SYSTEM\...\DeviceClasses\{GUID}, the SOFTWARE-hive ...\Windows Portable Devices\Devices and EMDMgmt (volume serial + first/last timestamps), setupapi.dev.log (first insert), and Microsoft-Windows-Partition%4Diagnostic.evtx (capacity/serial, useful for sizing exfil).
First vs last connect, and per-user attribution: the USBSTOR key LastWrite is only the last event for that device - get the first connection from setupapi.dev.log and per-session connects from DriverFrameworks-UserMode / Partition-Diagnostic event logs. A device in USBSTOR proves it touched the machine, not which user used it - tie it to a user via that user's MountPoints2 volume GUID.
Anti-forensics that defeats this analysis: registry keys and setupapi.dev.log can be deleted or the log rotated/truncated. Recover prior state from Volume Shadow Copies, SYSTEM.LOG1/2 transaction logs, and RegBack. A wiped USBSTOR with surviving MountPoints2/EMDMgmt entries is itself an indicator.
Validate exfiltration with a second source: a connection alone is not data theft - corroborate with $UsnJrnl/$LogFile writes to the drive's volume, LNK/Jump List targets carrying the device's volume serial, Prefetch for archiving tools (7z/rclone), and Shellbags for folders browsed on the removable volume.
Interpretation pitfalls (false positives): sanctioned devices (corporate encrypted drives, keyboards/mice, charging phones) appear identically; some cheap devices share or fake serials (a serial second character of & indicates a bus-assigned, non-unique ID); registry timestamps are UTC while event logs may render local - confirm timezone and clock skew before timelining.
Prerequisites
Forensic image or extracted registry hives and event logs
Access to SYSTEM, SOFTWARE, and NTUSER.DAT registry hives
SetupAPI logs (setupapi.dev.log)
Windows Event Logs (System, Security, DriverFrameworks-UserMode)
USBDeview, USB Forensic Tracker, or RegRipper
Understanding of USB device identification (VID, PID, serial number)
# Extract USBSTOR entries from SYSTEM hive
python3 << 'PYEOF'
from Registry import Registry
import json
reg = Registry.Registry("/cases/case-2024-001/usb/SYSTEM")
# Find current ControlSetselect = reg.open("Select")
current = select.value("Current").value()
controlset = f"ControlSet{current:03d}"# Parse USBSTOR
usbstor_path = f"{controlset}\\Enum\\USBSTOR"
usbstor = reg.open(usbstor_path)
devices = []
print("=== USBSTOR DEVICES ===\n")
for device_class in usbstor.subkeys():
# Format: Disk&Ven_VENDOR&Prod_PRODUCT&Rev_REVISION
class_name = device_class.name()
parts = class_name.split('&')
vendor = parts[1].replace('Ven_', '') if len(parts) > 1 else'Unknown'
product = parts[2].replace('Prod_', '') if len(parts) > 2 else'Unknown'
revision = parts[3].replace('Rev_', '') if len(parts) > 3 else'Unknown'for instance in device_class.subkeys():
serial = instance.name()
last_write = instance.timestamp()
device_info = {
'vendor': vendor,
'product': product,
'revision': revision,
'serial': serial,
'last_connected': str(last_write),
}
# Get friendly name if available
try:
friendly = instance.value("FriendlyName").value()
device_info['friendly_name'] = friendly
except:
pass
# Get device parameters
try:
params = instance.subkey("Device Parameters")
try:
device_info['class_guid'] = params.value("ClassGUID").value()
except:
pass
except:
pass
devices.append(device_info)
print(f"Device: {vendor} {product}")
print(f" Serial: {serial}")
print(f" Last Connected: {last_write}")
print(f" Friendly Name: {device_info.get('friendly_name', 'N/A')}")
print()
# Save results
with open('/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/usb_devices.json', 'w') as f:
json.dump(devices, f, indent=2)
print(f"\nTotal USB storage devices found: {len(devices)}")
PYEOF
Step 3: Extract Drive Letter Assignments and User Associations
# Parse MountedDevices from SYSTEM hive
python3 << 'PYEOF'
from Registry import Registry
import struct
reg = Registry.Registry("/cases/case-2024-001/usb/SYSTEM")
mounted = reg.open("MountedDevices")
print("=== MOUNTED DEVICES (Drive Letter Assignments) ===\n")
for value in mounted.values():
name = value.name()
data = value.value()
if name.startswith("\\DosDevices\\"):
drive_letter = name.replace("\\DosDevices\\", "")
if len(data) > 24:
# USB device - contains device path string
try:
device_path = data.decode('utf-16-le').strip('\x00')
if'USBSTOR'in device_path or 'USB#'in device_path:
print(f" {drive_letter} -> {device_path}")
except:
pass
else:
# Fixed disk - contains disk signature + offset
disk_sig = struct.unpack('<I', data[0:4])[0]
offset = struct.unpack('<Q', data[4:12])[0]
print(f" {drive_letter} -> Disk Signature: 0x{disk_sig:08X}, Offset: {offset}")
PYEOF
# Parse user MountPoints2 (which user accessed which devices)
python3 << 'PYEOF'
from Registry import Registry
import os, glob
print("\n=== USER MOUNT POINTS (MountPoints2) ===\n")
for ntuser in glob.glob("/cases/case-2024-001/usb/NTUSER*.DAT"):
try:
reg = Registry.Registry(ntuser)
mp2 = reg.open("Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\MountPoints2")
print(f"User hive: {os.path.basename(ntuser)}")
for key in mp2.subkeys():
guid = key.name()
last_write = key.timestamp()
if'{'in guid:
print(f" Volume: {guid} | Last accessed: {last_write}")
print()
except Exception as e:
print(f" Error parsing {ntuser}: {e}")
PYEOF
Step 4: Extract First Connection Timestamps from SetupAPI
# Parse setupapi.dev.log for USB device first-install timestamps
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import re
print("=== SETUPAPI USB DEVICE INSTALLATIONS ===\n")
with open('/cases/case-2024-001/usb/setupapi.dev.log', 'r', errors='ignore') as f:
content = f.read()
# Find USB device installation sections
pattern = r'>>>\s+\[Device Install.*?\n.*?Section start (\d{4}/\d{2}/\d{2} \d{2}:\d{2}:\d{2}).*?\n(.*?)<<<'
matches = re.findall(pattern, content, re.DOTALL)
usb_installs = []
for timestamp, section in matches:
if'USBSTOR'in section or 'USB\\VID'in section:
# Extract device ID
dev_match = re.search(r'(USBSTOR\\[^\s]+|USB\\VID_\w+&PID_\w+[^\s]*)', section)
if dev_match:
device_id = dev_match.group(1)
usb_installs.append({
'first_install': timestamp,
'device_id': device_id
})
print(f" {timestamp} | {device_id}")
print(f"\nTotal USB installations found: {len(usb_installs)}")
PYEOF
# Parse Windows Event Logs for USB events# Event IDs: 2003, 2010, 2100, 2102 (DriverFrameworks-UserMode)# Event IDs: 6416 (Security - new external device recognized)
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import json
from evtx import PyEvtxParser
try:
parser = PyEvtxParser("/cases/case-2024-001/usb/System.evtx")
print("\n=== SYSTEM EVENT LOG USB EVENTS ===\n")
for record in parser.records_json():
data = json.loads(record['data'])
event_id = str(data['Event']['System']['EventID'])
# USB device connection eventsif event_id in ('20001', '20003', '10000', '10100'):
timestamp = data['Event']['System']['TimeCreated']['#attributes']['SystemTime']
event_data = data['Event'].get('UserData', data['Event'].get('EventData', {}))
print(f" [{timestamp}] EventID {event_id}: {json.dumps(event_data, default=str)[:200]}")
except Exception as e:
print(f"Error: {e}")
PYEOF
Step 5: Build USB Activity Timeline and Report
# Compile all USB evidence into a unified timeline
python3 << 'PYEOF'
import json, csv
timeline = []
# Load USBSTOR data
with open('/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/usb_devices.json') as f:
devices = json.load(f)
for device in devices:
timeline.append({
'timestamp': device['last_connected'],
'source': 'USBSTOR Registry',
'device': f"{device['vendor']} {device['product']}",
'serial': device['serial'],
'event': 'Last Connected',
'detail': device.get('friendly_name', '')
})
# Sort chronologically
timeline.sort(key=lambda x: x['timestamp'])
# Write timeline CSV
with open('/cases/case-2024-001/analysis/usb_timeline.csv', 'w', newline='') as f:
writer = csv.DictWriter(f, fieldnames=['timestamp', 'source', 'device', 'serial', 'event', 'detail'])
writer.writeheader()
writer.writerows(timeline)
print(f"USB Timeline: {len(timeline)} events written to usb_timeline.csv")
# Print summaryprint("\n=== USB DEVICE SUMMARY ===")
for entry in timeline:
print(f" {entry['timestamp']} | {entry['device']} | {entry['serial'][:20]} | {entry['event']}")
PYEOF
Key Concepts
Concept
Description
USBSTOR
Registry key storing USB mass storage device identification and connection data
VID/PID
Vendor ID and Product ID uniquely identifying USB device manufacturer and model
Device serial number
Unique identifier for individual USB devices (some devices share serials)
MountedDevices
Registry key mapping volume GUIDs and drive letters to physical devices
MountPoints2
Per-user registry key showing which volumes a user accessed
SetupAPI log
Windows driver installation log recording first-time device connections
DeviceContainers
Registry key in SOFTWARE hive with device metadata and timestamps
EMDMgmt
Registry key tracking ReadyBoost-compatible devices with serial numbers and timestamps
Tools & Systems
Tool
Purpose
USB Forensic Tracker
Specialized tool for USB device history extraction
USBDeview
NirSoft tool listing all USB devices connected to a system
RegRipper (usbstor plugin)
Automated USB artifact extraction from registry hives
Registry Explorer
Interactive registry analysis for USB-related keys
KAPE
Automated collection of USB-related artifacts
Plaso/log2timeline
Timeline creation including USB connection events
FTK Imager
Forensic imaging including removable media
Velociraptor
Endpoint agent with USB device history hunting artifacts
Common Scenarios
Scenario 1: Data Exfiltration by Departing Employee
Extract USBSTOR entries to identify all USB devices ever connected, correlate device serial numbers with MountPoints2 to confirm user access, cross-reference timestamps with file access logs and jump list recent files, check for large file copy patterns in USN journal.
Scenario 2: Unauthorized Device on Secure System
Audit all USBSTOR entries against approved device list, identify unauthorized devices by VID/PID not matching corporate-approved hardware, determine when the unauthorized device was first and last connected, check if any data was transferred.
Scenario 3: Malware Delivery via USB
Identify USB device connected just before malware execution (Prefetch timestamps), extract the device serial and vendor information, check if autorun was enabled for the device, look for executable launch from the removable drive letter in Prefetch and ShimCache.
Scenario 4: Tracking a Specific USB Drive Across Multiple Systems
Search for the same device serial number in USBSTOR across all forensic images, build a map of which systems the drive was connected to and when, identify the chronological path of the device through the organization, correlate with network share access logs.
Output Format
USB Device History Analysis:
System: DESKTOP-ABC123 (Windows 10 Pro)
Total USB Storage Devices: 12
Analysis Sources: USBSTOR, MountedDevices, MountPoints2, SetupAPI, Event Logs
Device Inventory:
1. Kingston DataTraveler 3.0 (Serial: 0019E06B4521A2B0)
First Connected: 2024-01-10 09:15:32 (SetupAPI)
Last Connected: 2024-01-18 14:30:00 (USBSTOR)
Drive Letter: E:
User Access: suspect_user (MountPoints2)
2. WD My Passport (Serial: 575834314131363035)
First Connected: 2024-01-15 20:00:00
Last Connected: 2024-01-15 23:45:00
Drive Letter: F:
User Access: suspect_user
Suspicious Findings:
- Kingston drive connected 15 times during investigation period
- WD Passport connected only once, late evening (unusual hours)
- Unknown device (VID_1234&PID_5678) connected 2024-01-17, no matching approved device
Timeline: /cases/case-2024-001/analysis/usb_timeline.csv
