Conducts penetration testing of iOS and Android mobile applications following the OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG) to identify vulnerabilities in data storage, network communication, authentication, cryptography, and platform-specific security controls. The tester performs static analysis of application binaries, dynamic analysis at runtime, and API security testing to evaluate the complete mobile attack surface. Activates for requests involving mobile app pentest, iOS security assessment, Android security testing, or OWASP MASTG assessment.
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Conducts penetration testing of iOS and Android mobile applications following the OWASP Mobile Application Security Testing Guide (MASTG) to identify vulnerabilities in data storage, network communication, authentication, cryptography, and platform-specific security controls. The tester performs static analysis of application binaries, dynamic analysis at runtime, and API security testing to evaluate the complete mobile attack surface. Activates for requests involving mobile app pentest, iOS security assessment, Android security testing, or OWASP MASTG assessment.
Testing mobile applications before release to identify security vulnerabilities and data protection issues
Conducting compliance assessments against OWASP MASVS (Mobile Application Security Verification Standard) levels L1 and L2
Evaluating the security of mobile banking, healthcare, or government applications handling sensitive data
Testing mobile apps that interact with backend APIs to assess the end-to-end security of the mobile ecosystem
Assessing mobile application resistance to reverse engineering, tampering, and runtime manipulation
Do not use against mobile applications without written authorization from the application owner, for distributing modified or repackaged applications, or for testing apps on the public app stores without a separate test build.
Most Often Missed & How to Confirm
Backend API testing through the app — the mobile client is often just a thin shell; the real BOLA/BFLA/mass-assignment bugs live in the API. Bypass pinning, then test every endpoint the app calls with another user's IDs and a lower-privilege token. Don't treat "the API was tested separately" as coverage.
Certificate pinning bypass before declaring network analysis done — if traffic won't proxy, that is pinning, not a secure app. Hook with Frida/Objection (and test second-layer pinning, e.g. Flutter/OkHttp custom trust managers) before concluding TLS is fine.
Local artifact storage — SharedPreferences/NSUserDefaults plists, unencrypted SQLite/Realm/Core Data, Keychain/Keystore misuse, logcat output, clipboard, and screenshot caching on backgrounding. Pull the app data dir after exercising sensitive flows.
Client-side control bypass via runtime hooking — root/jailbreak detection, biometric callbacks, and feature flags hooked to return success; these are not real security boundaries and should be demonstrated as bypassable.
Exported components and deep links (Android) — exported activities/services/providers/receivers and custom URL schemes reached via adb am start or crafted intents can skip auth or leak data.
How to confirm: capture the artifact directly — a decrypted DB row containing a token, a plist with credentials, a Burp request/response showing pinning bypassed and victim data returned, or the Frida script + screenshot proving the biometric/root check was defeated. Don't conclude data-at-rest is safe until you have dumped the app sandbox after login; don't conclude pinning is enforced until you have tried both a system-CA bypass and a Frida hook.
Prerequisites
Target application IPA (iOS) and APK (Android) files or access to download from a private distribution channel
Rooted Android device or emulator (Genymotion, Android Studio AVD) with Frida, Objection, and Magisk installed
Jailbroken iOS device or Corellium virtual device with Frida, Objection, and SSL Kill Switch installed
Burp Suite Professional configured as proxy for intercepting mobile app traffic with CA certificate installed on the test device
Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.
Workflow
Step 1: Static Analysis
Analyze the application binary without executing it:
Android Static Analysis:
Decompile the APK: jadx -d output/ target.apk to obtain Java/Kotlin source code
Review AndroidManifest.xml for exported components (activities, services, receivers, content providers), permissions, and debuggable flag
Search for hardcoded secrets: grep -rn "api_key\|password\|secret\|token\|aws_" output/
Identify insecure data storage patterns: SharedPreferences with sensitive data, SQLite databases without encryption, files in external storage
Check for WebView vulnerabilities: setJavaScriptEnabled(true), addJavascriptInterface(), and loading untrusted content
Run MobSF automated scan: python manage.py runserver and upload the APK for automated static analysis
iOS Static Analysis:
Extract the IPA and locate the Mach-O binary
Use otool -L <binary> to list linked frameworks and identify third-party libraries
Analyze with Ghidra or Hopper for hardcoded URLs, API endpoints, and embedded credentials
Check Info.plist for App Transport Security (ATS) exceptions that allow insecure HTTP connections
Review embedded entitlements for excessive capabilities
Step 2: Network Security Testing
Intercept and analyze all network communications:
Configure Burp Suite as proxy on the test device and install the Burp CA certificate
Exercise all application functionality while Burp captures API traffic
SSL/TLS validation: Verify the app validates server certificates properly. If the app fails to connect through the proxy, it may implement certificate pinning.
Inspect SQLite databases and Core Data stores for unencrypted sensitive data
Check for data leaking through screenshots (iOS captures screenshots during app backgrounding)
Verify data protection class: sensitive files should use NSFileProtectionComplete
Step 4: Authentication and Session Management
Test mobile-specific authentication controls:
Biometric bypass: Test if biometric authentication can be bypassed by hooking the authentication callback with Frida to always return success
Token storage: Verify that authentication tokens are stored in the Keychain (iOS) or Android Keystore, not in SharedPreferences or files
Session timeout: Verify that sessions expire after a reasonable idle timeout and that tokens are invalidated server-side on logout
Root/jailbreak detection bypass: Test if the app detects rooted/jailbroken devices and if the detection can be bypassed with Frida or Magisk Hide
Deep link abuse: Test if custom URL schemes or universal links can be used to bypass authentication or access restricted functionality
Step 5: Runtime Manipulation
Test the application's resistance to runtime attacks:
Frida hooking: Use Frida to hook and modify application functions at runtime:
Bypass root detection: hook the detection function to return false
Modify return values of authentication checks
Intercept encryption functions to capture plaintext data before encryption
Bypass certificate pinning by hooking SSL verification
Method swizzling (iOS): Use Frida to replace Objective-C method implementations
Intent manipulation (Android): Send crafted intents to exported components: adb shell am start -n com.target.app/.InternalActivity -e "user_id" "admin"
Tampering detection: Modify the APK/IPA (add code, change resources), re-sign, and install. Verify whether the app detects tampering.
Key Concepts
Term
Definition
OWASP MASTG
Mobile Application Security Testing Guide; comprehensive manual for mobile app security testing covering both iOS and Android platforms
Certificate Pinning
A mobile security control that restricts which TLS certificates the app trusts, preventing man-in-the-middle attacks through proxy interception
Frida
Dynamic instrumentation toolkit that allows injection of JavaScript into running processes to hook functions, modify behavior, and bypass security controls
Root/Jailbreak Detection
Application-level checks to detect if the device has been modified to grant root access, typically blocking app usage on compromised devices
Android Keystore
Hardware-backed credential storage on Android that protects cryptographic keys and secrets from extraction even on rooted devices
App Transport Security (ATS)
iOS security feature that enforces HTTPS connections by default; ATS exceptions may indicate insecure network communication
Deep Links
URL schemes that open specific screens within a mobile application, which may bypass normal navigation and authentication flows if not properly validated
Tools & Systems
Frida / Objection: Dynamic instrumentation tools for hooking functions, bypassing security controls, and manipulating application behavior at runtime
MobSF (Mobile Security Framework): Automated static and dynamic analysis platform for Android and iOS applications
jadx: Android decompiler that converts APK bytecode to readable Java source code for manual code review
Burp Suite Professional: HTTP proxy for intercepting and modifying mobile app API traffic after bypassing certificate pinning
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Mobile Banking Application Security Assessment
Context: A bank is launching a new mobile banking app for iOS and Android. The app handles account viewing, fund transfers, bill payment, and check deposit. OWASP MASVS L2 compliance is required due to the financial data handled.
Approach:
Static analysis of the Android APK reveals API endpoints, a hardcoded staging server URL, and an AWS API key in a configuration file
Certificate pinning is implemented but bypassed with Frida SSL pinning bypass script
API traffic analysis reveals that the balance check endpoint returns all account numbers associated with the user, not just the requested account
Local data storage analysis finds that the app caches the last 10 transactions in an unencrypted SQLite database
Biometric authentication bypass: Frida hook on the biometric callback always returns success, granting access without fingerprint
Root detection is present but bypassed with Magisk Hide module, allowing the app to run on a rooted device with full data access
Pitfalls:
Testing only on an emulator and missing hardware-specific security features (Android Keystore hardware backing, iOS Secure Enclave)
Not testing both iOS and Android versions, as they may have different implementations and different vulnerabilities
Ignoring the backend API security because it was "tested separately" when the mobile app may call API endpoints differently than the web app
Failing to test certificate pinning bypass, resulting in an incomplete network analysis
Output Format
## Finding: Biometric Authentication Bypass via Frida Instrumentation
**ID**: MOB-003
**Severity**: High (CVSS 7.7)
**Platform**: Android and iOS
**OWASP MASVS**: MASVS-AUTH-2 (Biometric Authentication)
**Description**:
The mobile banking app's biometric authentication can be bypassed using Frida
dynamic instrumentation. The authentication callback function accepts a boolean
result from the biometric API, which can be hooked and forced to return true
without presenting a valid fingerprint or face scan.
**Proof of Concept (Android)**:
frida -U -f com.bank.mobileapp -l bypass-biometric.js --no-pause
// bypass-biometric.js
Java.perform(function() {
var BiometricCallback = Java.use("com.bank.mobileapp.auth.BiometricCallback");
BiometricCallback.onAuthenticationSucceeded.implementation = function(result) {
console.log("[*] Biometric bypassed");
this.onAuthenticationSucceeded(result);
};
});
**Impact**:
An attacker with physical access to an unlocked device can bypass biometric
authentication and access the victim's bank accounts, initiate transfers,
and view financial data without biometric verification.
**Remediation**:
1. Implement server-side biometric verification using Android BiometricPrompt
CryptoObject tied to a Keystore key
2. Require the biometric operation to decrypt a server-side challenge, making
client-side bypass ineffective
3. Add runtime integrity checks to detect Frida and other instrumentation frameworks
4. Implement step-up authentication for high-risk operations (transfers > threshold)
