| name | analyzing-cyber-kill-chain |
| description | Analyzes intrusion activity against the Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain framework to identify which phases an adversary has completed, where defenses succeeded or failed, and what controls would have interrupted the attack at earlier phases. Use when conducting post-incident analysis, building prevention-focused security controls, or mapping detection gaps to kill chain phases. Activates for requests involving kill chain analysis, intrusion kill chain, attack phase mapping, or Lockheed Martin kill chain framework.
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| domain | cybersecurity |
| subdomain | threat-intelligence |
| tags | ["kill-chain","Lockheed-Martin","MITRE-ATT&CK","intrusion-analysis","defense-in-depth","NIST-CSF"] |
| version | 1.0.0 |
| author | team-cybersecurity |
| license | Apache-2.0 |
| nist_csf | ["ID.RA-01","ID.RA-05","DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02"] |
Analyzing Cyber Kill Chain
When to Use
Use this skill when:
- Conducting post-incident analysis to determine how far an adversary progressed through an attack sequence
- Designing layered defensive controls with the goal of interrupting attacks at the earliest possible phase
- Producing threat intelligence reports that communicate attack progression to non-technical stakeholders
Do not use this skill as a standalone framework — combine with MITRE ATT&CK for technique-level granularity beyond what the 7-phase kill chain provides.
Detection Gaps & Validation
- Phases 1-2 are invisible: recon and weaponization happen off your network, so a "no detection" verdict there reflects missing external telemetry (passive DNS, OSINT), not adversary inactivity. Do not score these as defensive failures.
- Single-phase tunnel vision: mapping one EDR alert to Installation while ignoring un-logged Delivery/Exploitation creates a false "stopped at Phase 5" narrative. Mark phases "unknown" (not "not reached") where telemetry is absent, and back each verdict with a named log source.
- Beaconing false negatives: jittered or long-interval C2 evades frequency analysis; absence of beaconing evidence is not absence of C2.
- Non-linear paths: insiders and reused implants skip phases -- a missing earlier phase does not disprove a later one.
To validate the analysis: walk a known incident (or a purple-team exercise) through the phase matrix and confirm each detection point matches where the control actually fired; for every phase marked "completed undetected," cite the specific data source that should have caught it and confirm whether the gap is missing logging vs. a missing rule. Map each phase to its ATT&CK tactic (TA0001, TA0002, TA0003, TA0011, ...) and check Navigator coverage so "detected" reflects a real, tested detection.
Prerequisites
- Complete incident timeline with forensic artifacts mapped to specific adversary actions
- MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise matrix for technique-level mapping within each kill chain phase
- Access to threat intelligence on the suspected adversary group's typical kill chain progression
- Post-incident report or IR timeline from responding team
Workflow
Step 1: Map Observed Actions to Kill Chain Phases
The Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain consists of seven phases. Map all observed adversary actions:
Phase 1 - Reconnaissance: Adversary gathers target information before attack.
- Indicators: DNS queries from adversary IP, LinkedIn scraping, job posting analysis, Shodan scans of organization infrastructure
