Security patterns for authentication, defense-in-depth, input validation, OWASP Top 10, LLM safety, and PII masking. Use when implementing auth flows, security layers, input sanitization, vulnerability prevention, prompt injection defense, or data redaction.
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Security patterns for authentication, defense-in-depth, input validation, OWASP Top 10, LLM safety, and PII masking. Use when implementing auth flows, security layers, input sanitization, vulnerability prevention, prompt injection defense, or data redaction.
NeMo/Guardrails AI validators, red-teaming, OWASP LLM
Total: 6 rule files across 4 categories. Topics marked "upstream" or "refs" keep only
the ork delta here: floors and key decisions in this file, scars and house decisions in
references/ork-delta.md, and first-party sources in
Upstream coverage.
# PII masking with Langfuseimport re
from langfuse import Langfuse
defmask_pii(data, **kwargs):
ifisinstance(data, str):
data = re.sub(r'\b[\w.-]+@[\w.-]+\.\w+\b', '[REDACTED_EMAIL]', data)
data = re.sub(r'\b\d{3}-\d{2}-\d{4}\b', '[REDACTED_SSN]', data)
return data
langfuse = Langfuse(mask=mask_pii)
Authentication
Secure authentication with OAuth 2.1, Passkeys/WebAuthn, JWT tokens, and role-based access control.
Implementation tutorials for JWT, OAuth 2.1/PKCE/DPoP, Passkeys/WebAuthn, RBAC, and MFA
are upstream-covered (see Upstream coverage). The
ork delta, including the argon2-cffi-over-passlib scar, lives in references/ork-delta.md.
Multi-layer security architecture with no single point of failure.
Rule
Description
defense-layers.md
8-layer security architecture (edge to observability)
Zero-trust and tenant-isolation implementation recipes (tenant-scoped repositories,
RLS, tenant-keyed caches) are upstream-covered; the immutable RequestContext pattern
survives in references/request-context-pattern.md and sanitized audit logging in
references/audit-logging.md.
Key Decisions: Immutable dataclass context | Query-level tenant filtering | No IDs in LLM prompts
sandbox.network.deniedDomains (CC 2.1.113+)
Network-layer blocklist enforced before Bash/WebFetch egress — pair with the hook-layer DENY_PATTERNS for defense in depth. Settings example:
Wildcards supported (*.example.com, evil.com/*/malicious/*). Plugins ship a baseline list in src/settings/ork.settings.json; project settings can extend it. Use for: prompt-injection exfil sinks, known-bad registries, paste services that bypass audit.
sandbox.credentials (CC 2.1.187+)
Blocks sandboxed Bash from reading credential files and secret env vars — defense-in-depth beside sandbox.filesystem.denyRead. Deny-only and merged across scopes (any scope can add, none can remove); older CC ignores the key. Settings example:
Plugins ship a baseline in src/settings/ork.settings.json (denies ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh, ~/.gnupg, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc plus the token env vars that can hijack git-push auth). Pair with CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB to scrub all subprocess credentials regardless of sandboxing.
Masking instead of denial (CC 2.1.224+). Beyond mode: deny, credentials can be masked so the command still runs against a redacted value: extract plus onExtractNoMatch pulls a secret out of a structured env value, decode: "jwt" with maskClaims masks named JWT claims, and awsPairs/sigv4 re-signs AWS SigV4 requests after masking. Two constraints decide whether these are usable at all:
They require sandbox.network.tlsTerminate, so they only apply to traffic CC terminates.
They are honored only from user settings, managed settings, or --settings. A value shipped by a plugin or set in project .claude/settings.json is ignored, so ork cannot ship these as a baseline the way it ships the deny list. Document them for operators; do not add them to src/settings/ork.settings.json expecting them to take effect.
Never write a deny path with a trailing slash. Through CC 2.1.223, a sandbox.filesystem deny entry ending in / (for example denyRead: "~/.aws/") was silently bypassable on Linux and macOS: the rule parsed, reported clean, and protected nothing. Fixed in 2.1.224, but the shape is still worth avoiding because it reads as protection either way. ork's shipped values (~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/*, ~/.gnupg/*) were never affected.
Input Validation
Validate and sanitize all untrusted input using Zod v4 and Pydantic.
Rule
Description
validation-input.md
Schema validation with Zod v4 and Pydantic, type coercion
validation-output.md
HTML sanitization, output encoding, XSS prevention
Advanced schema recipes (discriminated unions, file upload validation, URL allowlists)
and the full Zod v4 API are upstream-covered; the Zod v4-not-v3 trap list is in
references/ork-delta.md, and typed schema examples in scripts/validation-schemas.ts.
Key Decisions: Allowlist over blocklist | Server-side always | Validate magic bytes not extensions
OWASP Top 10
Protection against the most critical web application security risks.
Injection prevention (SQL/command/SSRF) and broken-auth fixes (JWT algorithm confusion,
CSRF, timing attacks) plus vulnerable-vs-secure demos are upstream-covered; see
Upstream coverage.
Key Decisions: Parameterized queries only | Hardcode JWT algorithm | SameSite=Strict cookies
LLM Safety
Security patterns for LLM integrations including context separation and output validation.
PII detection and masking for LLM observability pipelines and logging.
Reference
Description
references/presidio-integration.md
Microsoft Presidio setup, custom recognizers
references/langfuse-mask-callback.md
Langfuse SDK mask implementation
LLM Guard Anonymize/Deanonymize with Vault and structlog/loguru redaction processors are
upstream-covered; see Upstream coverage.
Key Decisions: Presidio for enterprise | Replace with type tokens | Use mask callback at init
Scanning
Automated security scanning for dependencies, code, and secrets. Tool tutorials
(npm audit, pip-audit, Trivy, Semgrep, Bandit, Gitleaks, TruffleHog, detect-secrets)
are upstream-covered; the runnable house pipeline is scripts/scan-vulnerabilities.sh,
and the enforced-not-advisory repo gates (pre-push security suite, CI gitleaks) are
recorded in references/ork-delta.md.
Key Decisions: Pre-commit hooks for shift-left | Block on critical/high | Gitleaks + detect-secrets baseline
Advanced Guardrails
Production LLM safety with NeMo Guardrails, Guardrails AI validators, and DeepTeam red-teaming.
Rule
Description
guardrails-nemo.md
NeMo Guardrails, Colang 2.0 flows, Guardrails AI validators, layered validation
guardrails-llm-validation.md
DeepTeam red-teaming (40+ vulnerabilities), OWASP LLM Top 10 compliance
Key Decisions: NeMo for flows, Guardrails AI for validators | Toxicity 0.5 threshold | Red-team pre-release + quarterly
Upstream coverage (do not restate)
These topics were removed from this skill as vendor restatement. Consult the first-party
source; only the ork delta (floors, scars, house decisions) lives here, in
references/ork-delta.md.
Security hooks shipped by OrchestKit are managed defaults — users can disable them but are warned. Enterprise admins can lock settings via managed profiles.
CC 2.1.166 — managed-settings enforcement fix: before 2.1.166 a single invalid entry in managed settings silently disabled enforcement of all remaining valid policies — one typo could void your entire security lockdown. Require 2.1.166+ when relying on managed profiles, and validate the file before deploying it. The same release fixed allowedMcpServers/deniedMcpServers predicates not matching when they use ${VAR} references.
CC 2.1.160 — write prompts: Claude Code now prompts before writing shell startup files (.zshenv, .zlogin, .bash_login, ~/.config/git/) and — under acceptEdits — build-tool configs that grant code execution (.npmrc, .yarnrc*, bunfig.toml, .bazelrc, .pre-commit-config.yaml, .devcontainer/). Treat these as defense-in-depth defaults: approve deliberately rather than blanket-allowing.
Permission-rule semantics (≥ 2.1.166):allow/ask/deny rules gained security-relevant behavior — Read deny now hides files from Glob/Grep, deny tool-names accept globs ("*" = default-deny), explicit WebFetch(domain:…) overrides the preapproved-host auto-allow, relayed SendMessage from other sessions carries no authority, and org-managed rules apply for the whole session. See references/cc-permission-model.md for the full model + a recommended baseline settings.json.
Anti-Patterns (FORBIDDEN)
# Authentication
user.password = request.form['password'] # Plaintext password storage
response_type=token # Implicit OAuth grant (deprecated)return"Email not found"# Information disclosure# Input Validation"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '" + name + "'"# SQL injectionif (file.type === 'image/png') {...} # Trusting Content-Type header# LLM Safety
prompt = f"Analyze for user {user_id}"# ID in prompt
artifact.user_id = llm_output["user_id"] # Trusting LLM-generated IDs# PII
logger.info(f"User email: {user.email}") # Raw PII in logs
langfuse.trace(input=raw_prompt) # Unmasked observability data
Detailed Documentation
Load on demand with Read("${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/skills/security-patterns/references/<file>"):
File
Content
ork-delta.md
Ork-specific scars and house decisions rescued from removed upstream restatement
cc-permission-model.md
CC allow/ask/deny rule semantics (≥2.1.166): Read-deny hides from Glob/Grep, deny-globs, WebFetch precedence, cross-session auth, org-managed rules
Strip credentials from subprocesses: CLAUDE_CODE_SUBPROCESS_ENV_SCRUB=1
PID namespace isolation on Linux for subprocess sandboxing
Prevent Bash permission bypasses via backslash escapes and compound commands
CC 2.1.128 — SDK host "Always allow" persistence: when a user picks "Always allow" from a Bash permission prompt in an SDK host, the grant now persists via .claude/settings.local.json instead of evaporating at session end. Audit your SDK consumers' .gitignore to confirm .claude/settings.local.json is excluded — committing it leaks per-developer Bash auth grants. Project-committed .claude/settings.json is unchanged; only the user-machine-local file receives the new entries.
CC 2.1.169 — managed MCP enforcement + OTEL cert-path trust: two policy-bypass classes closed. Enterprise allowedMcpServers/deniedMcpServers policies were NOT enforced on reconnect, IDE-typed configs, --mcp-config servers in the first post-install session, or before remote settings loaded — treat any pre-2.1.169 managed-MCP audit as incomplete on those paths. And untrusted project settings could set OTEL client-certificate paths without trust confirmation (a cloned repo could point telemetry at an attacker cert); now gated behind trust. Both fixes are active at ork's floor (2.1.220).
CC 2.1.163 — home-path deny rules now cover $HOME Bash refs: before this fix a Read(~/.ssh/**)-style deny rule blocked the Read tool but NOT a Bash command that reached the same file via $HOME/.ssh/... — a silent secrets-read bypass. If you gate home-directory secrets (e.g. ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/*, ~/.gnupg/*) through permission deny rules, pin your CC floor to >= 2.1.163; older builds (< 2.1.163) leave the Bash path open — ork's floor is now 2.1.220, which already includes this fix.
