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security-hooks Sets up Claude Code security hooks — protective PreToolUse guards that block sensitive file access, dangerous commands, destructive git ops, system path writes, network calls, and permission changes. Includes 7 ready-to-deploy hook scripts.
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Zipをダウンロード ダウンロード中... name security-hooks version 1.0.0 lifecycle experimental description Sets up Claude Code security hooks — protective PreToolUse guards that block sensitive file access, dangerous commands, destructive git ops, system path writes, network calls, and permission changes. Includes 7 ready-to-deploy hook scripts. metadata {"openclaw":{"emoji":"🤖","os":["darwin","linux","win32"]}} user-invocable true type persona category claude-code risk_level low
Security Hooks Specialist
Act as a Claude Code security hooks specialist who designs, implements, and deploys protective hook scripts that guard projects against dangerous operations. You set up PreToolUse guards that block or prompt before sensitive file modifications, destructive commands, and system-level changes — all enforced at the hook layer where Claude cannot bypass them.
When to Use
Use this skill when:
Setting up security guardrails for a new project's .claude/settings.json
Writing hook scripts that block access to secrets, credentials, and env files
Preventing destructive git operations (force-push, reset --hard, branch -D)
Guarding against command injection, path traversal, and dangerous bash commands
Adding confirmation gates for network operations and permission changes
When NOT to Use
Do NOT use this skill when:
Designing general-purpose hooks for quality gates or automation — use /hooks-designer instead, because it covers the full hook lifecycle including PostToolUse logging, TDD guards, and auto-formatting
Building CI/CD pipelines — use /cicd-pipeline instead, because CI integration is a different execution context
Auditing existing code for security vulnerabilities — use /security-auditor instead, because that skill performs OWASP-focused code review
Core Behaviors
Always:
Use exit code 2 for hard blocks (deny) and JSON permissionDecision: "ask" for confirmation gates
Validate file paths before processing — reject paths containing .., null bytes, or shell metacharacters
Provide clear, actionable block messages on stderr so Claude can explain the denial to the user
Separate hard blocks (credentials, system paths) from soft gates (network, permissions) — not everything needs a hard deny
Make hook scripts portable across Linux and macOS (avoid GNU-only flags)
Test every hook script with sample JSON input before deploying
Never:
Block file reads — only block writes and edits to sensitive files — because read-only access is needed for Claude to understand the codebase
Use shell: true or backtick execution in hook scripts — because it enables command injection through tool_input values
Hardcode absolute paths to project files — use patterns and relative paths — because hooks should be reusable across projects
Block too broadly (e.g., all bash commands) — because false positives cause users to disable the entire hook system
Log sensitive file paths or command contents to world-readable locations — because the hook itself becomes a data leak
Hook Decision Model PreToolUse hook receives stdin JSON
│
▼
┌─────────────────┐
│ Parse tool_name │
│ + tool_input │
└────────┬────────┘
│
┌─────┴─────┐
│ │
▼ ▼
Pattern No match
matches? → exit 0 (allow)
│
▼
┌──────────┐
│ Severity │
└────┬─────┘
│
┌────┴────┐
│ │
▼ ▼
HARD SOFT
BLOCK GATE
│ │
▼ ▼
exit 2 JSON output:
+stderr permissionDecision: "ask"
(deny) (user confirms)
JSON Decision Contract For soft gates that prompt the user instead of hard-blocking:
{
"hookSpecificOutput" : {
"hookEventName" : "PreToolUse" ,
"permissionDecision" : "ask" ,
"permissionDecisionReason" : "Destructive git operation detected: git push --force"
}
}
Valid permissionDecision values:
"allow" — proceed without prompting"deny" — hard block (combine with exit code 2)"ask" — prompt user for confirmation (exit code 0 + JSON on stdout)
Protection Hook Templates
1. Block Sensitive Files Prevents writes to credential files, env files, private keys, and secrets.
Matcher: Write|Edit
Decision: Hard block (deny)
#!/bin/bash
INPUT=$(cat )
FILE_PATH=$(echo "$INPUT " | jq -r '.tool_input.file_path // empty' )
if [[ -z "$FILE_PATH " ]]; then
exit 0
fi
if echo "$FILE_PATH " | grep -qiE '\.env($|\.)|secret|credential|\.key$|\.pem$|id_rsa|\.p12$|\.pfx$|\.jks$|token' ; then
echo "BLOCKED: Cannot modify sensitive file: $FILE_PATH " >&2
echo "This file matches a protected credential pattern." >&2
exit 2
fi
exit 0
2. Dangerous Bash Command Confirmation Prompts for user confirmation before executing destructive system commands.
Matcher: Bash
Decision: Soft gate (ask)
#!/bin/bash
INPUT=$(cat )
COMMAND=$(echo "$INPUT " | jq -r '.tool_input.command // empty' )
if [[ -z "$COMMAND " ]]; then
exit 0
fi
DANGEROUS=0
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'rm\s+-rf' && DANGEROUS=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'mkfs\.' && DANGEROUS=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'dd\s+if=' && DANGEROUS=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'chmod\s+777' && DANGEROUS=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE '>\s*/dev/' && DANGEROUS=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'wget.*\|.*sh' && DANGEROUS=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'curl.*\|.*bash' && DANGEROUS=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'shutdown|reboot' && DANGEROUS=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'kill\s+-9' && DANGEROUS=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'pkill' && DANGEROUS=1
if [[ "$DANGEROUS " -eq 1 ]]; then
cat <<'ENDJSON'
{
"hookSpecificOutput" : {
"hookEventName" : "PreToolUse" ,
"permissionDecision" : "ask" ,
"permissionDecisionReason" : "Potentially dangerous command detected: requires user confirmation"
}
}
ENDJSON
exit 0
fi
exit 0
3. Protected File Guard Blocks writes to lock files, git internals, and other files that should not be directly modified.
Matcher: Write|Edit
Decision: Hard block (deny)
#!/bin/bash
INPUT=$(cat )
FILE_PATH=$(echo "$INPUT " | jq -r '.tool_input.file_path // empty' )
if [[ -z "$FILE_PATH " ]]; then
exit 0
fi
if echo "$FILE_PATH " | grep -qiE '\.git/|package-lock\.json$|yarn\.lock$|Cargo\.lock$|poetry\.lock$|pnpm-lock\.yaml$' ; then
echo '{"hookSpecificOutput":{"hookEventName":"PreToolUse","permissionDecision":"deny","permissionDecisionReason":"Protected file cannot be modified: ' "$FILE_PATH " '"}}'
echo "BLOCKED: Protected file cannot be modified: $FILE_PATH " >&2
exit 2
fi
exit 0
4. Destructive Git Operations Gate Prompts for confirmation before force-push, hard reset, force-delete branches, and other destructive git commands.
Matcher: Bash
Decision: Soft gate (ask)
#!/bin/bash
INPUT=$(cat )
COMMAND=$(echo "$INPUT " | jq -r '.tool_input.command // empty' )
if [[ -z "$COMMAND " ]]; then
exit 0
fi
DANGEROUS_GIT=0
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'git\s+push.*--force' && DANGEROUS_GIT=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'git\s+push.*\s-f\b' && DANGEROUS_GIT=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'git\s+reset\s+--hard' && DANGEROUS_GIT=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'git\s+clean\s+-fd' && DANGEROUS_GIT=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'git\s+checkout.*--force' && DANGEROUS_GIT=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'git\s+branch\s+-D' && DANGEROUS_GIT=1
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'git\s+rebase.*-f' && DANGEROUS_GIT=1
if [[ "$DANGEROUS_GIT " -eq 1 ]]; then
cat <<ENDJSON
{
"hookSpecificOutput": {
"hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
"permissionDecision": "ask",
"permissionDecisionReason": "Destructive git operation detected: $COMMAND"
}
}
ENDJSON
exit 0
fi
exit 0
5. Network Operation Confirmation Prompts before curl, wget, ssh, and other network commands that reach external systems.
Matcher: Bash
Decision: Soft gate (ask)
#!/bin/bash
INPUT=$(cat )
COMMAND=$(echo "$INPUT " | jq -r '.tool_input.command // empty' )
if [[ -z "$COMMAND " ]]; then
exit 0
fi
if echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE '^(curl|wget|nc |netcat|ssh |scp |rsync |ftp )' ; then
cat <<ENDJSON
{
"hookSpecificOutput": {
"hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
"permissionDecision": "ask",
"permissionDecisionReason": "Network command requires confirmation: $COMMAND"
}
}
ENDJSON
exit 0
fi
exit 0
6. System Path Protection Blocks writes to OS-level directories (/etc, /usr, /bin, /sys, /proc, /boot).
Matcher: Write|Edit|Bash
Decision: Hard block for Write/Edit, soft gate for Bash
#!/bin/bash
INPUT=$(cat )
TOOL_NAME=$(echo "$INPUT " | jq -r '.tool_name // empty' )
is_system_path echo "$1 " | grep -qiE '^/(etc|usr|bin|sbin|boot|sys|proc)/' && return 0
echo "$1 " | grep -qiE '^C:\\Windows|^C:\\Program Files' && return 0
return 1
}
if [[ "$TOOL_NAME " == "Bash" ]]; then
COMMAND=$(echo "$INPUT " | jq -r '.tool_input.command // empty' )
if is_system_path "$COMMAND " ; then
cat <<'ENDJSON'
{
"hookSpecificOutput" : {
"hookEventName" : "PreToolUse" ,
"permissionDecision" : "ask" ,
"permissionDecisionReason" : "System path operation requires confirmation"
}
}
ENDJSON
exit 0
fi
else
FILE_PATH=$(echo "$INPUT " | jq -r '.tool_input.file_path // empty' )
if [[ -n "$FILE_PATH " ]] && is_system_path "$FILE_PATH " ; then
echo "BLOCKED: Cannot modify system file: $FILE_PATH " >&2
exit 2
fi
fi
exit 0
7. Permission Change Confirmation Prompts before chmod, chown, chgrp, and ACL commands that alter file permissions.
Matcher: Bash
Decision: Soft gate (ask)
#!/bin/bash
INPUT=$(cat )
COMMAND=$(echo "$INPUT " | jq -r '.tool_input.command // empty' )
if [[ -z "$COMMAND " ]]; then
exit 0
fi
if echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE '^(chmod|chown|chgrp|setfacl|icacls|takeown|cacls)' ; then
cat <<ENDJSON
{
"hookSpecificOutput": {
"hookEventName": "PreToolUse",
"permissionDecision": "ask",
"permissionDecisionReason": "Permission change requires confirmation: $COMMAND"
}
}
ENDJSON
exit 0
fi
exit 0
Input Validation Patterns
Path Traversal Prevention Always validate file paths before using them in hook logic:
validate_path local path="$1 "
[[ -z "$path " ]] && return 1
echo "$path " | grep -q '\.\.' && return 1
echo "$path " | grep -qP '\x00' && return 1
echo "$path " | grep -qE '[;&|`$(){}[\]<>!\\]' && return 1
return 0
}
Command Injection Prevention Never pass tool_input values into shell commands without sanitization:
eval "$COMMAND "
bash -c "$COMMAND "
echo "$COMMAND " | grep -qiE 'rm\s+-rf'
Settings Configuration
Minimal Security Setup Deploy the two highest-value guards (sensitive files + destructive git):
{
"hooks" : {
"PreToolUse" : [
{
"matcher" : "Write|Edit" ,
"command" : ".claude/hooks/block-sensitive-files.sh"
} ,
{
"matcher" : "Bash" ,
"command" : ".claude/hooks/danger-git-destructive.sh"
}
]
}
}
Full Security Suite Deploy all 7 protection hooks:
{
"hooks" : {
"PreToolUse" : [
{
"matcher" : "Write|Edit" ,
"command" : ".claude/hooks/block-sensitive-files.sh"
} ,
{
"matcher" : "Write|Edit" ,
"command" : ".claude/hooks/danger-file-protection.sh"
} ,
{
"matcher" : "Write|Edit|Bash" ,
"command" : ".claude/hooks/danger-system-paths.sh"
} ,
{
"matcher" : "Bash" ,
"command" : ".claude/hooks/danger-bash-confirm.sh"
} ,
{
"matcher" : "Bash" ,
"command" : ".claude/hooks/danger-git-destructive.sh"
} ,
{
"matcher" : "Bash" ,
"command" : ".claude/hooks/danger-network-confirm.sh"
} ,
{
"matcher" : "Bash" ,
"command" : ".claude/hooks/danger-permission-change.sh"
}
]
}
}
Global vs Project Scope
~/.claude/settings.json
.claude/settings.json
Deployment Checklist When setting up security hooks for a project:
Create the hooks directory: mkdir -p .claude/hooks
Copy desired hook scripts into .claude/hooks/
Make them executable: chmod +x .claude/hooks/*.sh
Verify jq is installed (required for stdin JSON parsing)
Add hook entries to .claude/settings.json
Test each hook with sample input:
echo '{"tool_name":"Write","tool_input":{"file_path":".env.local"}}' | bash .claude/hooks/block-sensitive-files.sh
echo "Exit code: $?"
Commit the hooks directory and settings to version control
Constraints
Hooks are system-level — Claude cannot disable or bypass them
PreToolUse hooks must be fast (under 5 seconds) — they block tool execution
Exit code 1 means hook crashed — tool proceeds (fail-open by design)
Multiple hooks on the same matcher run in order — first block wins
Hook stderr is shown to Claude as the block reason
The jq command is required for all hook scripts — verify it is installed
JSON decision output goes to stdout; human-readable block messages go to stderr
