lisa-sonarcloud-access

name	lisa-sonarcloud-access
description	Vendor-neutral access layer for SonarQube Cloud/Server. Sonar triage skills MUST delegate through this skill rather than calling the SonarQube MCP tools directly. Preferred substrate: the official SonarQube MCP server (mcp__sonarqube__*), authenticated headlessly from SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN (+ SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG for Cloud, SONARQUBE_CLI_SERVER for Server); the Sonar Web API, authenticated with the same token, is the sanctioned fallback when the MCP is not wired on this surface.
allowed-tools	["Bash","Read","Skill"]

SonarCloud Access: $ARGUMENTS

Single chokepoint for Sonar quality and security data. Caller skills MUST NOT invoke mcp__sonarqube__* tools directly; they ask for data by operation name and this skill owns the tool selection.

Substrate

The preferred substrate is the official SonarQube MCP server, provided by the sonarqube plugin and launched by the sonar CLI (sonar run mcp). It authenticates headlessly from environment variables — no browser, no OS keychain — so it is the same substrate on a developer machine and in a headless cloud routine. Prefer it because it owns the tool selection this skill exists to centralise.

It is not the only sanctioned substrate. The Sonar Web API, authenticated with the same token, is a sanctioned fallback for read-only operations when the MCP is not wired on this surface. An earlier revision of this file said otherwise — that the MCP was "the only sanctioned substrate" and a missing MCP was "not a reason to curl the Web API" — and that was wrong on its face: .github/workflows/quality.yml already reads api/ce/task with a token to turn an opaque failed scan into an operator-readable one. A rule the shipping repository contradicts is documentation, not a constraint.

The distinction that does hold: a token-authenticated MCP is the configured-provider substrate under credential-substrate-precedence (it is not browser-OAuth), so there is no interactive tier to demote here. That is a statement about tier ORDER, not about exclusivity. Identity-match against the configured org remains mandatory on either substrate.

• SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN — required (Sonar user/analysis token).
• SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG — required for SonarQube Cloud.
• SONARQUBE_CLI_SERVER — required for a self-hosted SonarQube Server.

These are the SonarQube CLI variable names (SONARQUBE_CLI_*), which the sonar run mcp wrapper forwards into the MCP container — verified against a live SonarQube Cloud org. Do not substitute the raw MCP-image names (SONARQUBE_TOKEN/SONARQUBE_ORG/SONARQUBE_URL): those are read only when running the Docker image directly, and the sonar CLI ignores them (auth exits non-zero). The CI scan gate's SONAR_TOKEN is a third, separate name.

Where those variables come from

The sonar CLI reads them from the environment only — it has no provider integration of its own — so on a surface that deliberately materializes nothing to disk the credential can be provisioned and unreachable at the same time. Resolve it through lisa-secrets-access and export it into the launching process, exactly as the shared sonar-secrets.sh hook already does. The bare $SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN in the environment is the documented fallback rung, not the only one:

# Preferred: the one sanctioned reader. Without this rung a project keeping its
# credentials in Bitwarden, Doppler, or AWS cannot authenticate the MCP at all,
# and Sonar access degrades to "run `sonar auth login` in a browser" — dead in
# cron, CI, and cloud sessions. See `credential-substrate-precedence`.
read_sonar_secret() {
  local name="$1"
  [ -n "${!name:-}" ] && { echo "${!name}"; return; }
  #
  # Ordered across trusted machine-managed substrates, ending at the installed
  # package. Checkout-local paths are deliberately absent: a familiar generated
  # destination is still repository-controlled executable code. The plugin
  # rungs are the floor: `resolve-secret.mjs` ships beside this skill, so a rung
  # pointing at it is reachable from anywhere the plugin itself is installed.
  # Without one, a consumer repository that vendors none of the leading paths
  # never reaches a resolver at all — the ladder exits without having asked
  # anything, which is what pushed agents into improvising their own credential
  # lookups. This LADDER is identical in every skill that resolves a credential
  # and `credential-resolver-ladder` fails if any copy diverges. Only what
  # happens AFTER the ladder may differ between them.
  # Execute only machine-managed plugin/package resolvers. Checkout-local
  # candidates are repository-controlled code, not trusted merely by path.
  local candidates=()
  if [ -n "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT:-}" ]; then
    candidates+=("$CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs")
  
   [ -n  ]; 
    candidates+=()
  
  
  
  candidates+=(node_modules/@codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/resolve-secret.mjs)

   resolver
   tried=()
   resolver  ; 
    tried+=()
     [ -f  ]; 
       via_lisa
      via_lisa=$(node  get  2>/dev/null) \
        && [ -n  ] && {  ; ; }
      
    
  
  
  
  
  
    >&2
    >&2
     >&2
   1
}



SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN=$(read_sonar_secret SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN) &&  SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN
SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG=$(read_sonar_secret SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG) &&  SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG

sonar-secrets.sh runs the same resolution with two differences that belong to a hook rather than to a skill: it anchors every candidate at $repo_root (a hook fires from whatever directory the agent happens to be in) and it wraps the resolve-secret.mjs call in a timeout, because it sits in front of every prompt. Use its search order verbatim when this skill runs inside a hook.

This paragraph used to claim the hook searched a longer path than the ladder above. It did — the ladder above stopped after .agents/, so in a checkout that vendored neither leading path it reached no resolver at all and returned without a word. The two now cover the same layouts, and the fix that closed that gap is guarded by credential-resolver-ladder.

Wiring is performed once by /lisa:setup:sonar (which drives sonar integrate <agent>); this access layer assumes the MCP is already wired. This is distinct from the CI SONAR_TOKEN secret that authenticates the SonarCloud scan job in quality.yml — that gate is separate and unchanged.

Probe (tool-access-gate)

Prove access with a cheap read-only MCP call before relying on it — the sonar CLI being on PATH is not access. Probe by searching projects (the projects toolset is always enabled):

• If a mcp__sonarqube__* project-search tool returns, access is proven.
• If no mcp__sonarqube__* tool is present on this surface, that is a demotion, not a blocker. Fall back to the Sonar Web API with the same resolved token for the read-only operation at hand.
• Only when neither substrate can prove access — no MCP tool and no usable token — is this a terminal tool-access-gate failure. Say so, and do not improvise a third route:

Error: no SonarQube access. Run /lisa:setup:sonar (or `sonar integrate <agent>`), and set SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN (+ SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG for Cloud / SONARQUBE_CLI_SERVER for Server).

The distinction matters because the two cases have different remedies. An absent MCP on a surface that holds a valid credential is a wiring gap the agent can work around; treating it as terminal manufactures a tool-access failure on a surface that has access.

Operation → toolset map

Consumers pass a coarse, vendor-native operation; resolve it with the matching mcp__sonarqube__* tool from the named toolset and return parsed JSON in a <result> block.

Operation	SonarQube MCP toolset
gate-status	quality-gates
issues	issues
hotspots	security-hotspots
rule-detail	rules
source-snippet	cag (context augmentation) / component source
coverage	coverage
duplication	duplications
dependency-risks	dependency-risks
projects	projects

Pass the project key through the tool's projectKey argument (or rely on a server-configured SONARQUBE_PROJECT_KEY); pass branch / pullRequest where the tool accepts them.

Mutation boundary

Every operation in the map above is read-only — quality, coverage, and security data. So the credential-substrate-precedence guarded fallback for mutating operations (write, read back, assert the tenant from the response, roll back on mismatch) is not engaged here, because nothing in the map writes. The Web API fallback is sanctioned for READS only; it does not open a mutation path. A future operation that mutates Sonar state — marking a hotspot safe, changing an issue's status — is a write and MUST reconcile by read-back before any retry.

Invariants

• The official SonarQube MCP is the preferred substrate, not the only one. The Sonar Web API with the same token is a sanctioned read-only fallback, and a missing MCP is a demotion rather than a terminal failure.
• SONARQUBE_CLI_* values are resolved through lisa-secrets-access and exported in-process, with the bare environment variables as the documented fallback. Never write them to a dotfile or a .env on a local surface.
• Auth is env-var only (SONARQUBE_CLI_TOKEN [+ SONARQUBE_CLI_ORG | SONARQUBE_CLI_SERVER]); never the interactive sonar auth login keychain flow inside a factory.
• Sonar host access requires the host (sonarcloud.io, sonarqube.us, or the Server URL) in any custom remote-network allowlist.
• Consumers ask for data by operation name; this skill owns tool selection.