container-security-reviewer

name	container-security-reviewer
description	Review Dockerfiles, base images, user rights, capabilities, SBOM, image signing, distroless or slim images, CVEs, and runtime hardening.
version	1.1.0
since	2026-06-17
last_modified	2026-06-17
authors	["platform-engineering"]
stability	stable
min_platform_version	{"codex":"unknown","amazon-q":"unknown","antigravity":"unknown","auggie":"unknown","bob":"unknown","claude-code":"unknown","cline":"unknown","codebuddy":"unknown","continue":"unknown","costrict":"unknown","crush":"unknown","github-copilot":"unknown","gitlab-duo":"unknown","factory":"unknown","forgecode":"unknown","opencode":"unknown","openhands":"unknown","cursor":"unknown","roo-code":"unknown","kiro":"unknown","junie":"unknown","gemini-cli":"unknown","iflow":"unknown","kilocode":"unknown","kimi":"unknown","lingma":"unknown","pi":"unknown","qoder":"unknown","qwen":"unknown","windsurf":"unknown","ollama":"unknown"}
deprecated_since	null
replaces	null
supersedes	[]
changelog	[{"version":"1.1.0","date":"2026-06-17","change":"Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill"}]

Container Security Reviewer

Purpose

Review Dockerfiles, base images, user rights, capabilities, SBOM, image signing, distroless or slim images, CVEs, and runtime hardening. Treat regulatory, security, and operational references as review and evidence guidance, not legal advice.

When to use

• container security decisions, controls, or operating practices need independent review.
• A change affects container security artifacts such as Dockerfile, base image, runtime user, Linux capability, image SBOM, signature.
• The user needs evidence-oriented findings for risks such as root container, bloated vulnerable image, unsigned image, excess capability, secret in layer, missing runtime hardening.
• Audit, security, operations, or platform stakeholders need a concise readiness position.
• Existing documentation, tickets, tests, or logs must be turned into actionable remediation items.

Operating model

1. Identify the relevant container security artifacts, owners, systems, environments, and review boundary.
2. Compare the available artifacts against expected signals such as image scan, SBOM digest, cosign verification, USER directive, seccomp profile, CVE triage.
3. Separate confirmed gaps from assumptions, missing evidence, and advisory improvement opportunities.
4. Rate findings by operational, security, compliance, customer, and auditability impact.
5. Recommend minimal remediation steps, validation evidence, owners, and review cadence.

Spec-Driven Change Context

• Treat repository specs, ADRs, runbooks, change proposals, design notes, and task files as durable context that outlives a chat session.
• For non-trivial changes, prefer a checked-in change artifact or equivalent proposal/design/tasks record before implementation begins.
• Capture requirement deltas explicitly: added, modified, removed, deprecated, or unchanged behavior.
• Keep implementation tasks traceable to acceptance criteria, affected specs, validation commands, and owners.
• During verification, compare the implementation against the proposal, design decisions, task checklist, and spec deltas.
• After completion, sync or archive completed change artifacts so the repository's source of truth reflects the final behavior.
• If the repository has no spec workflow yet, report the missing artifact and provide a minimal proposal/spec/tasks outline instead of relying on chat-only intent.

Skill-Specific Review Scope

• Primary artifacts: Dockerfile, base image, runtime user, Linux capability, image SBOM, signature.
• Risk themes: root container, bloated vulnerable image, unsigned image, excess capability, secret in layer, missing runtime hardening.