authentication-client

# Authentication Client ## Ownership `pkg/authclient` is the importable consumer of `pkg/apiauth` JSON login types. It owns `Config`, `Client`, `Options`, `PromptFunc`, `Credentials`, and `FileTokenStore`. It sends only `POST <base_url>/login`; authentication does not require `enable admin api`. Keep server handlers in `pkg/authn` and management operations in `cmd/authdbctl`. Read [references/integration.md](references/integration.md) when embedding the client, choosing credential paths, or changing the CLI adapter. Public contracts also live beside the exported Go declarations and in `pkg/authclient/doc.go`. The reusable package does not discover config, select application directories, read terminal input, log credentials, or dispatch CLI commands. Do not add `urfave/cli`, `term`, or application-name defaults to it. Applications own prompt presentation, config loading, user-agent identity, and credential persistence. ## Protocol Invariants - `NewClient` validates a copy of configuration. `Authenticate(ctx)` starts a fresh exchange, returns credentials, and has no token-file side effects. - Keep each response newly decoded. Missing sandbox fields must not inherit previous response values. Continue only with a sandbox ID, sandbox secret, and next challenge; success requires a nonempty usable access token. - Keep the ten-request bound, response-size limit, context propagation, and refusal to follow redirects, including with an injected HTTP client. - Configured password/TOTP values avoid input prompts. `PromptMFA` returns `totp` or `webauthn`; the CLI translates numbered choices. Without a prompt, a configured TOTP secret can answer a combined MFA challenge directly. - `APIKey` selects a separate, single-request login with `Realm`; reject mixed username/password/TOTP configuration. Send the key only in the JSON body, never in the URL. Do not fall back to challenges or prompt after key rejection. The portal derives the identity using its existing proxy API key verifier. Keys are independent credentials, including for accounts enrolled in MFA. They do not satisfy password/TOTP/WebAuthn checkpoints; configured challenge requirements or an explicit saved flow preference can therefore deny key login. Key login issues an access token only, sets no cookies, and cannot create a refresh family. `refresh_transport: body` is rejected for this mode. - TOTP uses raw secret bytes and SHA-1, matching `identity.MfaToken` and existing authdbctl config. Do not silently interpret the secret as base32. Defaults are six digits and thirty seconds; accepted digits match the portal's four-to-eight range and the period must be positive. - U2F/WebAuthn assertion handling remains unsupported. Return `ErrUnsupportedChallenge` without echoing server challenge payloads. Missing input uses `ErrInputRequired`; HTTP failures expose a status via `HTTPError`. - Each login returns only its new credentials. Never merge an old refresh token into a fresh result. Token syntax checks are not JWT verification. Server API key handling lives in `pkg/authn/handle_json_api_key_login.go` and dispatches from the JSON login handler before sandbox/refresh processing. Keep disabled/expired-key and disabled-account checks in the shared identity lookup so every consumer enforces them. For password/TOTP checkpoints, retain the canonical sandbox subject after resolving a username or email; never replace it with the caller's alias before comparing the completed identity. ## Credential Files and CLI Compatibility `FileTokenStore` takes an explicit path; constructing it performs no filesystem IO. Preserve the legacy JSON keys in `Credentials`, including optional token name, refresh token, and `created_at`. Missing files remain inspectable with `errors.Is(err, os.ErrNotExist)`; malformed files fail instead of being silently replaced. Save through a private temporary file and rename, with 0700 new folders and 0600 files on Unix. Do not truncate the destination before success. Legacy files have no portal/identity binding. The application must choose the correct store per portal and identity. File replacement is not cross-process refresh rotation coordination. Renewal/logout remain separate features; this client performs only initial/fresh login and credential persistence. ## Login Transport and Configuration `Config.RefreshTransport` selects `RefreshTransportCookie` (`cookie`, the omitted default) or `RefreshTransportBody` (`body`). Carry it through the initial request and every sandbox/password/TOTP checkpoint. Cookie mode preserves the legacy access-only JSON login contract and browser jar behavior. Omit `refresh_transport` from the wire in cookie/default mode: v1.1.41's strict request decoder rejects this newer field. Body mode sends it explicitly on every exchange. Keep the legacy-schema unit test and real TLS password/TOTP wire-envelope E2E alongside native-mode tests. In a refresh realm its metadata-only success returns `ErrNativeTransportRequired`, with no credentials and no automatic retry. The server may already have authenticated the browser; do not retry ambiguously completed logins on the caller's behalf. Body mode opts into native access plus refresh credentials. The portal must select the realm and enable `body transport enabled`; otherwise initial login returns `HTTPError` with status 400. A successful body response must contain an access token, refresh token, and session ID. This is not a separate native access-only mode. API key login remains access-only and rejects body mode. Refresh-disabled password/TOTP portals continue to use the default mode. `NewClient` copies the supplied HTTP client and sets its Jar to nil in body mode, without reading or updating a shared browser jar. Each request is fresh and carries no Cookie, Origin, or Fetch Metadata. Injected transports remain trusted application dependencies; they must not inject browser headers. Native responses do not establish OIDC/browser sessions or expose browser cookies. Keep cookie-mode responses credential-free in JSON for refresh realms. `pkg/authclient/parser.NewAuthenticationClientConfigFromDirectives` returns `*authclient.Config`. It takes encoded block-body statements without braces or a header, uses `cfgutil.DecodeArgs`, and calls `Config.Validate`. Single-value settings are `base url`, `username`, `realm`, `password`, `api key`, `totp secret`, `totp code length`, `totp code lifetime` (seconds), `access token name`, and `refresh transport`. Each occurs once. Empty configuration fails required URL/identity checks; unknown, duplicate, malformed, multiline, empty, and invalid settings return nil and redacted errors. Host adapters own tokenization and placeholder expansion and reject empty tokens before encoding. Parsing performs no filesystem/network work. Callers pass the result to `NewClient`; JSON/XML/YAML field names and existing credential-file fields remain stable. `cmd/authdbctl/Config` embeds the authentication config with YAML inline fields. Keep `token_path`, legacy `cookie_name`, `AUTHDBCTL_*` flags/env names, and the `~/.config/authdbctl` defaults in the CLI. YAML `token_path` wins over the flag; a cached token name wins over the flag fallback, and a returned portal token name wins for newly acquired credentials. `connect` always performs fresh login. Management commands reuse the loaded credentials and own their reauthentication and retry decisions. Requests with access-token attachment disabled never trigger reauthentication; exhausted retries do not start an unused login. ## Validation Use `pkg/authclient/client_test.go` for login-only HTTP exchanges, portal-compatible TOTP, TLS client injection, malformed or oversized responses, sandbox isolation, redirect refusal, request limits, and canceled input/HTTP. Token-store tests exercise legacy JSON, application path isolation, private replacement, failure cleanup, and readers during atomic saves. `example_test.go` compiles and runs as an external consumer. CLI tests verify unchanged YAML/flag wiring, login without admin endpoints, cache use, and management reauthentication. Its separate `cmd/authdbctl/e2e_test.go` builds and runs the executable against a real portal; keep those executable tests alongside the external-consumer package E2E suite. `e2e_test.go` uses the external `authclient_test` package and a real `authn.Portal` served over local TLS, backed by a temporary local identity database. Keep these tests in the default suite without build tags or external-service requirements. They cover configured/prompted passwords and TOTP, email and mixed-case usernames, combined MFA, API keys, root/subpath mounts, custom token names, and rejected or missing credentials. API key cases include wrong secrets with a valid prefix, unknown/malformed keys, disabled and revoked keys, disabled users, unknown realms, MFA-enrolled accounts, and access-only login in refresh-enabled realms. Admin and profile APIs stay disabled; assert that authentication requests only the login endpoint. After saving and reopening credentials under an application-selected path, use a separate client without login cookies to call `/whoami`. Check identity, roles, and remaining lifetime, plus rejection of missing tokens and tampered signatures. Preserve this real portal test boundary when changing the public client contract; scripted HTTP response tests alone do not establish portal compatibility. `transport_e2e_test.go` exercises the public parser and serialization before real TLS password/TOTP/combined-MFA logins in body mode, repeated authentication, custom names, supplied browser jars, unavailable transport, and the intentional default-mode error in a refresh realm. Reopen each credential file and authorize through a separate client. API key fixtures check refresh-enabled realms without minting refresh tokens. These tests establish initial native login, not renewal. `pkg/authn/handle_json_api_key_login_test.go` checks the server's mixed-credential and refresh-transport rejection, cookie-free response, and no-store policy. `pkg/identity/database_test.go` covers expired/disabled key and owner state through the real verifier. The CLI's API key connect test verifies YAML loading and credential persistence without a username or terminal input. Browser OAuth/SAML, hardware WebAuthn assertions, SSH/GPG login, and refresh renewal are not supported client flows; do not describe unit mocks as E2E coverage for those methods. `io_test.go` covers failed response reads, request construction, and credential header rejection. Token-file failure tests inject a private factory on each `FileTokenStore` and wrap real temporary files to exercise creation, partial write, sync, and close failures. Verify preservation of the existing file, temporary-file cleanup, descriptor closure, and recovery after a failed save. Keep fault injection per instance so tests can run concurrently. The package has a focused 100% statement-coverage gate. Keep the threshold scoped to this package; it is not the repository-wide coverage threshold. Scalar-only JSON marshaling and the standard cookie-jar constructor have documented infallibility assumptions in code; revisit those assumptions if their types or dependencies change instead of adding synthetic failures for impossible states. ```sh go test -race ./pkg/authclient ./cmd/authdbctl make test TEST_DIR='./pkg/authclient' TEST='^TestE2E' COVERAGE_DIR='.coverage/authclient-e2e' make test TEST_DIR='./pkg/authclient' COVERAGE_DIR='.coverage/authclient' MINIMUM_COVERAGE=100 make test TEST_DIR='./pkg/authclient/... ./cmd/authdbctl' make ci-check ``` The E2E-only run uses the repository's default coverage threshold; the 100% gate requires the entire package suite. The complete gate is appropriate for changes spanning both packages. New tests use temporary directories and local HTTP servers; never use real credentials or a live portal. Check changed skill frontmatter with the default skill-creator validator and inspect integration links and concrete exported names.