audit-approval-bypass

name	audit-approval-bypass
description	Audit which subagents and skills bypass approval; flag any that touch untrusted input
when_to_use	["User asks to audit approval / bypass configuration","Scheduled monthly security check","Before granting a new subagent bypass"]
toolsets	["terminal","file"]

audit-approval-bypass — Verify Approval Posture

Approval bypass is how power users make trusted subagents run unattended. It's also how attackers escalate if misconfigured. This skill catches drift.

Procedure

1. Load ~/.hermes/config.yaml → security.approval block. Capture:

   • bypass_subagents[]
   • auto_approve_read
   • require_approval[] rules
   • denylist[]

2. For each subagent in bypass_subagents: a. Locate its skill file: ~/.hermes/skills/<name>/SKILL.md. b. Parse the frontmatter when_to_use: and toolsets:. c. Flag if the skill reads any of:

   • Telegram / Discord / Slack message body (anything with gateway: trigger pattern)
   • Email inbox or any SMTP/IMAP tool
   • Webhook body (generic or GitHub PR/issue body)
   • Scraped web content (tool names matching /scrape|fetch_url|crawl/)
   • Voice transcription output d. Flag if toolsets: includes terminal or bash AND the skill accepts any user-supplied argument.

3. Check the denylist:

   • Verify every entry is still syntactically valid regex.
   • Flag if rm -rf / or curl * | sh style patterns are missing.
   • Suggest additions based on 2026 attack patterns (e.g. cat ~/.ssh/, aws s3 sync, curl.*169.254.169.254).

4. Check require_approval layers:

   • Confirm every production tool class is covered:
     • github: [create_pr, merge_pr, delete_branch]
     • email: [send]
     • twilio: [send_sms]
     • terminal: pattern-based
     • any_mcp: sampling: true present

5. Render a report:

   ## Approval Bypass Audit — 2026-04-17
   
   ### Bypass subagents
   - ✅ nightly-backup — read-only, no untrusted input
   - ✅ build-and-test — CI-triggered, clean workspace
   - 🔴 telegram-triage — BYPASSED but reads Telegram messages (untrusted input)
   
   ### Denylist coverage
   - ✅ rm -rf patterns
   - ✅ curl | bash patterns
   - 🟡 Missing: AWS metadata IP exfil (169.254.169.254)
   - 🟡 Missing: SSH key reads (cat ~/.ssh/)
   
   ### Require-approval layers
   - ✅ github destructive actions
   - ✅ email send
   - 🔴 Missing: any_mcp with sampling:true
   
   ### Recommendations
   1. Remove telegram-triage from bypass_subagents (it reads untrusted input).
   2. Add denylist entries for 169.254 and ~/.ssh.
   3. Add require_approval for MCP sampling calls.
   

6. Offer to apply fixes. Never auto-apply.

Notes

• If security.approval is missing entirely, treat that as 🔴 HIGH across the board and suggest the full config from Part 19.
• Cross-check with the audit-mcp skill's output — an MCP flagged HIGH there often correlates with a bypass misconfig here.