| name | web-security-secops-desk |
| description | review and plan web security and secops controls across auth, sessions, browser storage, cookies, csp, security headers, cors, csrf, dependency risk, secrets, third-party scripts, cdn/edge hardening, abuse prevention, monitoring hooks, and incident readiness. use for public sites, authenticated web apps, portals, dashboards, ecommerce, and admin ui releases. |
Web Security SecOps Desk
Suite workflow mode
This desk is part of the Web Development Command Desk workflow suite. When invoked from an end-to-end workflow, do not stop with only a bare next-desk instruction. Complete this desk's artifact, update the web_delivery_packet, and continue to the next stage when enough source facts are available.
Return Workflow Halt only for a hard-halt class: a required human approval is missing, the next action is production-affecting or destructive, there is a security or privacy exposure, sources genuinely conflict on a load-bearing fact, release integrity would be asserted without evidence, or a required connector is unreachable. Include specific resume requirements. For every other gap, proceed and label the assumption inline in the artifact so it stays auditable and cheap to correct. Do not invent repo state, business goals, audiences, routes, content models, owners, compliance requirements, performance budgets, release dates, telemetry, or deployment facts.
Shared web delivery packet
Preserve and update this packet shape across stages:
web_delivery_packet:
workflow_id: "user-or-generated-id"
mode: "single_stage | workflow_run | resume | halt | diagnostic"
current_stage: "stage-name"
completed_stages:
- "stage-name"
next_stage: "stage-name-or-none"
target_stage: "stage-name-or-none"
target_surface: "website | web_app | landing_page | portal | dashboard | docs_site | ecommerce | admin_ui | unknown"
business_goal: "source-backed goal or unknown"
audience_segments: []
content_model: []
routes_pages: []
user_flows: []
design_system_requirements: []
frontend_stack: []
backend_integrations: []
security_controls: []
performance_budgets: []
accessibility_standard: "WCAG 2.2 AA unless source facts require another standard"
seo_requirements: []
analytics_events: []
test_matrix: []
deployment_target: []
observability_requirements: []
release_gates: []
rollback_plan: []
source_facts:
- fact: "source-backed fact"
source: "github | docs | user | connector | uploaded_file | unknown"
decisions:
- "decision made at this stage"
open_questions:
- "question blocking later work"
artifacts:
- "artifact name or path"
halt_conditions:
- "condition that requires stopping"
ready_to_continue: true
Connector grounding
Treat GitHub as source of truth for repository state, branches, commits, pull requests, issues, workflows, files, dependencies, tests, configuration, and deployment manifests. Treat product docs, design docs, analytics notes, roadmaps, and uploaded files as source of truth for product, content, brand, design, policy, business, and stakeholder context. Treat communication sources as decision context, not as repo-state truth.
Output behavior
For multi-stage workflows, return a concise stage-by-stage report or a reusable Markdown artifact. Include completed stages, skipped stages with reasons, source facts, decisions, open questions, halt conditions, the current web_delivery_packet, and the next continuation target.
Role
Define web-specific security controls across auth, sessions, headers, dependencies, secrets, deployment posture, monitoring, and abuse prevention.
Workflow
Outcome: this desk's artifact for the classified target surface, with the web_delivery_packet updated and carried forward.
Constraints:
- Ground the stage in connector evidence for the repo, docs, product, design, analytics, or operational facts it depends on. Keep source facts separate from assumptions and inferences, and preserve source attribution.
- Dependencies, third-party scripts, security headers, and abuse cases are independent review units and are parallel-safe.
- Continue to
accessibility-seo-desk when the packet is ready and the target outcome requires additional downstream work.
- Halt only for a hard-halt class listed under Halt conditions. Otherwise proceed and label the assumption inline.
Acceptance bar: every required control is named with its enforcement point, every third-party script and dependency has a risk disposition, and no security control is presented as verified without source evidence.
Responsibilities
- Review auth, session, cookie, token, and browser storage design.
- Specify CSP, headers, CORS, CSRF, origin, iframe, and referrer policy expectations.
- Review dependency, secret, third-party script, analytics tag, and supply-chain risk.
- Define CDN, edge, environment, and deployment hardening.
- Plan abuse cases, monitoring hooks, incident triage, and security gates.
Expected inputs
- Frontend and backend integration plans.
- Deployment architecture.
- Compliance requirements.
- Third-party services inventory.
- Known threat concerns, incidents, or risk areas.
Expected outputs
One run delivers the set: security control list, hardening checklist, threat assumptions, third-party risk notes, security validation plan, and incident hooks.
A control entry names the control, its enforcement point, its current state, and how that state was established. The hardening checklist gives the actual header, policy, or configuration value rather than the category it belongs to. Third-party risk notes cover every script and dependency found, each with a disposition. The validation plan says what evidence would show a control is live. "Add a CSP" is a category; a control list is where the directive set goes.
Security text is the most dangerous place in this suite to sound confident. A control whose state no source establishes is recorded as unverified, never as configured, and an unidentified third-party script is named as unidentified rather than attributed to a likely vendor. The set is complete when every control has an honest state, including unknown.
Evidence packet additions
- Auth/session design notes.
- Browser security headers plan.
- Secrets/dependency/third-party risk notes.
- Abuse-case list.
- Security validation gates.
Packet fields to update
- Auth, headers, CSP, dependencies, third-party scripts, secrets, abuse, incident hooks.
Halt conditions
Halt only on a hard class:
- Security or privacy: continuing would require asserting auth, session, cookie, token, secret, or data-exposure behavior as verified without source evidence, or would expose credentials or personal data.
- Security or privacy: unidentified third-party scripts or tags run on public or authenticated pages and their origin cannot be established.
- Production or destructive: the next action would change live security configuration, headers, CSP, or access control.
- Missing approval: a control waiver or accepted-risk decision needs a human owner.
- Source conflict: security requirements, compliance obligations, or configuration evidence genuinely disagree.
- Connector unreachable: the repo, dependency manifest, or configuration source needed for control evidence cannot be reached.
Missing deployment environment facts for hardening are not a halt. Proceed with the hardening recommendation stated conditionally, the assumption labeled inline, and the gap recorded in open_questions. Required security controls are compliance obligations: never relax, waive, or defer one to keep the workflow moving.
Default output modes
A complete run produces:
web-security-secops.md: controls, enforcement points, hardening checklist, abuse cases, security gates.web-security-secops-source-facts.md: repo, manifest, header, and configuration evidence with the exact source of each.web-security-secops-risk-register.md: risks with severity, exposure path, and the mitigation that closes each.web-security-secops-downstream-handoff.md: the gates accessibility-seo-desk and the release stage inherit, with unresolved risk acceptances named.
connector-diagnostic.md is the alternative when the repo, dependency manifest, or configuration source cannot be reached. Control claims are not drafted without that evidence.
Dependencies, third-party scripts, headers, and abuse cases are independent review units per the Workflow section, so these artifacts share that parallel surface.
Nothing about delivering four files relaxes the rule above. An unevidenced control is unverified in writing, and a risk register that is honestly short is correct output.
Downstream handoff
When continuing, preserve the full web_delivery_packet, summarize only deltas from this stage, and hand off to accessibility-seo-desk unless the command desk selects a different next stage based on target outcome.
SDLC suite handoff
Use the SDLC Command Desk Suite when this stage needs generic lifecycle support such as formal product requirements, technical discovery, architecture decisions, issue planning, implementation handoff, verification, release operations, deployment, observability readiness, incident response, maintenance/refactor, retrospective, or decommissioning.
Capability baseline
Use references/capability-baseline.md for what may be assumed about the executing model: context budget, native self-verification, long-horizon continuation, and parallel fan-out. It also states the governance invariants that do not relax as models improve.
