Trigger Pattern ORACLE flag (required) - Inject Into Breadth agents, depth-external, depth-edge-case
ORACLE_ANALYSIS Skill
Trigger Pattern: ORACLE flag (required)
Inject Into: Breadth agents, depth-external, depth-edge-case
Purpose: Analyze all oracle integrations in Aptos Move protocols for staleness, decimal errors, zero/negative prices, confidence intervals, multi-oracle aggregation, and failure modes
For every oracle the protocol consumes:
STEP PRIORITY: Steps 6 (Failure Modes) and 5c (Deviation Reference) are where HIGH/CRITICAL severity findings most commonly hide. Do NOT rush these steps. If constrained, skip conditional sections (4a-4d, 5a) before skipping 5c or 6.
1. Oracle Inventory
Enumerate ALL oracle data sources the protocol reads:
For each oracle: What decision does the protocol make based on this data? (pricing, liquidation threshold, reward rate, rebase trigger, collateral valuation, etc.)
Hardcoded stablecoin pricing: Does the protocol skip oracle lookup for any asset and hardcode its price (e.g., USDC = 1e8)? All assets require dynamic oracle pricing — stablecoins depeg.
2. Staleness Analysis
For each oracle identified in Step 1:
2a. Staleness Checks Present?
Oracle
Timestamp Checked?
Max Staleness Enforced?
Staleness Threshold
Appropriate?
{name}
YES/NO
YES/NO
{seconds or NONE}
{analysis}
Pyth-specific: Is price.publish_time compared against timestamp::now_seconds()? What max age is enforced?
Switchboard-specific: Is the aggregator's latest_confirmed_round.round_open_timestamp validated?
Chained feed deviation: If derived prices require multiple feeds (e.g., token_A/USD via token_A/APT + APT/USD), sum individual deviation thresholds to compute total worst-case deviation. If total exceeds LTV buffer → FINDING.
If NO staleness check: What happens when the oracle returns stale data?
Protocol uses stale price for liquidations -- unfair liquidations
Protocol uses stale price for minting -- mispriced assets
Protocol uses stale price for swaps -- arbitrage opportunity
Protocol uses stale rate for rewards -- incorrect distribution
2b. Stale Data Impact Trace
For each consumer function, trace the impact of receiving data that is {freshness_guarantee x 2} old:
Pyth decimal handling: Pyth uses expo field (typically negative, e.g., expo = -8 means 8 decimal places). The actual price = price.price * 10^expo. Common errors:
Treating expo as positive when it is negative
Not converting I64 exponent to unsigned for power calculation
Mixing Pyth's expo-based decimals with token decimals (Aptos Coin typically uses 8 decimals, but FungibleAsset varies)
Switchboard decimal handling: Uses mantissa and scale (or decimals). Actual value = mantissa * 10^(-scale).
MANDATORY GREP: Search all oracle consumer files for hardcoded decimal constants: 100000000, 1e8, 10_000_000, DECIMAL, PRECISION. For each hit: (1) Is this a decimal normalization constant? (2) Does it match the ACTUAL oracle's decimal format? (3) If the oracle feed changes or is swapped, does this constant break?
Decimal chain trace: For each arithmetic operation using oracle data, trace the full decimal chain: oracle_output_decimals -> normalization_step -> consumer_expected_decimals. If any step uses a hardcoded constant rather than reading decimals dynamically -> FINDING.
Cross-multiplication without normalization: price * amount where price and amount have different decimal bases
3d. Decimal Grep Sweep (MECHANICAL -- MANDATORY)
Grep ALL oracle consumer files for 10_u128|pow\(10|DECIMALS|PRECISION|100000000|normalize. For each match, fill:
File:Line
Pattern
Hardcoded Value
Oracle's Actual Decimals
Match?
If ANY row shows Match=NO or oracle decimals UNKNOWN with hardcoded constant -> FINDING (R16).
Skipping this step is a Step Execution violation (x3d).
4. TWAP-Specific Analysis
If protocol uses any TWAP oracle (DEX-derived, custom accumulator, etc.):
4a. TWAP Window Analysis
TWAP Oracle
Window Length
Pool Liquidity
Manipulation Cost (est.)
Sufficient?
{oracle}
{seconds}
{USD value}
{estimated}
YES/NO
Rule of thumb: TWAP window < 30 min AND pool TVL < $10M -> potentially manipulable.
4b. TWAP Arithmetic
Check
Status
Impact if Wrong
Overflow protection on cumulative price difference?
YES/NO
{impact}
Geometric vs arithmetic mean -- correct for use case?
{which used}
{impact if wrong}
Time-weighted vs block-weighted -- which is used?
{which}
{manipulation vector}
Empty observation slots handled?
YES/NO
{impact}
Aptos epoch boundaries handled? (epoch changes can affect timestamps)
YES/NO
{impact}
4c. TWAP Lagging Behavior
During rapid price movements, TWAP lags spot price. Trace:
What happens when TWAP price is significantly lower than spot? (discounted minting/borrowing)
What happens when TWAP price is significantly higher than spot? (premium liquidations)
Is this lag exploitable by attackers who can predict the direction?
4d. TWAP Cold-Start Analysis
Check oracle behavior when history is insufficient: (1) zero snapshots, (2) single snapshot, (3) window period not yet elapsed.
Cold-Start State
Oracle Return Value
Protocol Behavior
Exploitable?
For each exploitable state: can attacker act during cold-start window at manipulated price? Tag: [BOUNDARY:snapshots=0], [BOUNDARY:snapshots=1].
If TWAP returns 0 or aborts during cold-start with no fallback -> FINDING (R16, minimum Medium).
5. Oracle Weight / Threshold Boundaries
For multi-oracle systems or oracle-based thresholds:
5a. Multi-Oracle Systems
Oracle System
Aggregation Method
Oracle Count
Agreement Required
What if Disagreement?
{system}
Median / Mean / Weighted / First-valid
{N}
{M of N}
{fallback behavior}
Check: What happens at exact threshold boundaries?
If median of [100, 100, 101]: result = 100. Is that correct?
If weighted average with equal weights rounds down: impact?
If one oracle call aborts: does fallback handle it gracefully?
5b. Oracle-Based Thresholds
Threshold
Oracle Data Used
Threshold Value
At Exact Boundary
Off-by-One?
{name}
{oracle field}
{value}
{behavior at exact value}
YES/NO
Check > vs >=: At the exact threshold value, does the protocol behave as intended?
5c. Deviation Reference Point Audit
For each deviation check in the protocol (maxDeviation, priceDeviation, deviationThreshold, etc.):
Parameter
Measured Against
Reference Source
Reference Manipulable?
Reference Staleable?
Checks:
What is the deviation MEASURED AGAINST? (previous on-chain price, TWAP, external oracle, hardcoded value)
Is the reference point itself manipulable? (e.g., if deviation checks current vs last-recorded, and last-recorded is admin-settable -> admin can set a stale reference that makes all future prices "within deviation")
Can the reference become stale? (e.g., if reference is updated only on specific actions, and those actions stop occurring)
Is the first recorded price special? (no prior reference -> deviation check may be bypassed on first update)
Tag: [TRACE:deviation check: current vs {reference} -> reference source: {X} -> manipulable: {Y/N}]
6. Oracle Failure Modes
For each oracle, model failure scenarios:
Failure Mode
Oracle Behavior
Protocol Response
Impact
Mitigation Present?
Zero return
Returns price = 0
{what happens}
{impact}
YES/NO
Abort
Call aborts (Move has no try/catch)
{what happens}
{impact}
YES/NO -- can_* check first?
Stale (freshness exceeded)
Returns old data
{what happens}
{impact}
YES/NO -- staleness check?
Extreme value
Returns outlier
{what happens}
{impact}
YES/NO -- bounds check?
Negative price (Pyth I64)
Returns < 0
{what happens}
{impact}
YES/NO -- sign check?
Feed not initialized
Resource does not exist
{what happens}
{impact}
YES/NO -- exists check?
Aptos-specific failure note: Move does not have try/catch. Oracle call failures result in transaction abort. This means:
External oracle call that aborts -> entire transaction reverts
No graceful fallback unless protocol pre-checks oracle state with exists<> or similar
Oracle DoS (feed stops updating) -> all dependent functions become uncallable
For each unmitigated failure mode: What is the worst-case impact? Can it lead to fund loss?
Circuit breaker check: Does the protocol have a mechanism to pause oracle-dependent operations if the oracle enters a failure state?
Instantiation Parameters
{CONTRACTS} -- Move modules to analyze
{ORACLE_MODULES} -- Oracle module paths (pyth::price_feed, switchboard::aggregator, custom)
{CONSUMER_FUNCTIONS} -- Functions that read oracle data
{PRICE_FEED_IDS} -- Pyth price feed identifiers or Switchboard aggregator addresses
{TOKEN_DECIMALS} -- Decimal configuration of tokens in scope
Finding Template
**ID**: [OR-N]
**Severity**: [based on fund impact and likelihood of oracle failure/manipulation]
**Step Execution**: checkmark1,2,3,4,5,6 | x(reasons) | ?(uncertain)
**Rules Applied**: [R1:Y, R4:Y, R10:Y, R16:Y]
**Location**: module::function:LineN
**Title**: Oracle [issue type] in [function] enables [attack/failure]
**Description**: [Specific oracle issue with data flow trace]
**Impact**: [Quantified impact under worst-case oracle scenario]