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Security scanning domain knowledge — OWASP Top 10, CWE mappings, IaC hardening, CI/CD pipeline security, supply chain controls, and SARIF output format
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SOC 職業分類に基づく
OWASP Agentic Security Top 10 vulnerability knowledge base for identifying, assessing, and remediating security risks in AI agent systems - Brought to you by microsoft/hve-core.
OWASP CI/CD Top 10 vulnerability knowledge base for identifying, assessing, and remediating security risks in continuous integration and continuous delivery environments - Brought to you by microsoft/hve-core.
OWASP Docker Top 6 vulnerability knowledge base for identifying, assessing, and remediating security risks in containerized Docker environments - Brought to you by microsoft/hve-core.
OWASP Infrastructure Top 10 vulnerability knowledge base for identifying, assessing, and remediating security risks in internal IT infrastructure environments - Brought to you by microsoft/hve-core.
OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025) vulnerability knowledge base for identifying, assessing, and remediating security risks in large language model systems - Brought to you by microsoft/hve-core.
OWASP MCP Top 10 vulnerability knowledge base for identifying, assessing, and remediating security risks in Model Context Protocol environments - Brought to you by microsoft/hve-core.
| name | security-scan |
| description | Security scanning domain knowledge — OWASP Top 10, CWE mappings, IaC hardening, CI/CD pipeline security, supply chain controls, and SARIF output format |
Domain knowledge for security scanning agents. Agents load this skill to understand vulnerability categories, severity classification, compliance mappings, and SARIF output requirements.
The following table maps OWASP Top 10 (2021) categories to their primary CWE identifiers for automated detection and SARIF enrichment.
| # | OWASP Category | Primary CWEs | Detection Approach |
|---|---|---|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | CWE-200, CWE-201, CWE-352, CWE-639, CWE-862, CWE-863 | SAST (authorization checks), code review (RBAC patterns) |
| A02 | Cryptographic Failures | CWE-259, CWE-261, CWE-327, CWE-328, CWE-330, CWE-522 | SAST (weak algorithms), secret scanning |
| A03 | Injection | CWE-20, CWE-77, CWE-78, CWE-79, CWE-89, CWE-94 | SAST (taint analysis), DAST (fuzzing) |
| A04 | Insecure Design | CWE-209, CWE-256, CWE-501, CWE-522 | Architecture review, threat modeling |
| A05 | Security Misconfiguration | CWE-2, CWE-11, CWE-16, CWE-611 | IaC scanning, configuration audit |
| A06 | Vulnerable and Outdated Components | CWE-1104 | SCA (Dependabot, Dependency Review), SBOM |
| A07 | Identification and Authentication Failures | CWE-255, CWE-287, CWE-384, CWE-613 | SAST (session management), DAST (auth flows) |
| A08 | Software and Data Integrity Failures | CWE-345, CWE-426, CWE-494, CWE-502, CWE-829 | CI/CD integrity checks, artifact attestations |
| A09 | Security Logging and Monitoring Failures | CWE-117, CWE-223, CWE-532, CWE-778 | Code review (logging patterns), monitoring audit |
| A10 | Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) | CWE-918 | SAST (URL construction), DAST (SSRF payloads) |
| # | Category | CWEs | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|
| LLM01 | Prompt Injection | CWE-77, CWE-94 | Agent configuration files, user input to LLM |
| LLM02 | Insecure Output Handling | CWE-79, CWE-94 | LLM-generated code execution |
| LLM03 | Training Data Poisoning | CWE-506 | Model supply chain |
| LLM04 | Model Denial of Service | CWE-400 | Resource exhaustion |
| LLM05 | Supply Chain Vulnerabilities | CWE-829, CWE-494 | Agent packages, prompt files |
| LLM06 | Sensitive Information Disclosure | CWE-200 | PII in training data or outputs |
| LLM07 | Insecure Plugin Design | CWE-862 | MCP tools, agent tool permissions |
| LLM08 | Excessive Agency | CWE-269 | Agent tool access scope |
| LLM09 | Overreliance | N/A | Trust calibration |
| LLM10 | Model Theft | CWE-200 | Model exfiltration |
| Pattern | Implementation | Risk if Missing |
|---|---|---|
| JWT validation | AddAuthentication().AddJwtBearer() with issuer/audience validation | A07 — Auth bypass |
| Role-based authorization | [Authorize(Roles = "Admin")] or policy-based [Authorize(Policy = "...")] | A01 — Broken access control |
| CORS configuration | AddCors() with explicit origins, never AllowAnyOrigin() with credentials | A01 — Cross-origin abuse |
| Anti-forgery tokens | [ValidateAntiForgeryToken] on state-changing actions | A01 — CSRF (CWE-352) |
| Rate limiting | AddRateLimiter() with fixed/sliding/token bucket policies | A04 — Abuse prevention |
| Pattern | Implementation | Risk if Missing |
|---|---|---|
| Model validation | Data annotations + [ApiController] automatic 400 responses | A03 — Injection |
| Parameterized queries | EF Core LINQ or Dapper with parameters, never string concatenation | A03 — SQL injection (CWE-89) |
| Output encoding | Razor auto-encodes by default; use HtmlEncoder for raw output | A03 — XSS (CWE-79) |
| File upload validation | Validate content type, size, and extension; store outside web root | A04 — Arbitrary file upload |
| Pattern | Implementation | Risk if Missing |
|---|---|---|
| User Secrets (dev) | dotnet user-secrets for local development | A02 — Secrets in source |
| Azure Key Vault (prod) | AddAzureKeyVault() configuration provider | A02 — Hardcoded secrets |
| Managed Identity | DefaultAzureCredential with no connection strings in config | A02 — Credential exposure |
| Header | Value | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
X-Content-Type-Options | nosniff | Prevent MIME sniffing |
X-Frame-Options | DENY or SAMEORIGIN | Prevent clickjacking |
Content-Security-Policy | Strict CSP with nonce/hash | Prevent XSS, injection |
Strict-Transport-Security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains | Force HTTPS |
Referrer-Policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin | Control referrer leakage |
| Check | Rule | CWE |
|---|---|---|
No hardcoded secrets in .tf files | Scan for password, secret, key in plain text | CWE-259 |
| Encryption at rest enabled | azurerm_storage_account.enable_https_traffic_only = true | CWE-311 |
| Network segmentation | No 0.0.0.0/0 in NSG rules or firewall exceptions | CWE-284 |
| Logging enabled | Diagnostic settings on all resources | CWE-778 |
| TLS 1.2+ enforced | min_tls_version = "TLS1_2" on all services | CWE-327 |
| Managed Identity over keys | Use identity {} block, avoid access_key references | CWE-522 |
| State file encryption | Remote backend with encryption, never local state in CI | CWE-312 |
| Check | Rule | CWE |
|---|---|---|
| Secure parameters | @secure() decorator on secrets, never @description with default values | CWE-259 |
| Resource locks | Microsoft.Authorization/locks on production resources | CWE-284 |
| Diagnostic settings | Deploy Microsoft.Insights/diagnosticSettings with all resources | CWE-778 |
| Private endpoints | Use Microsoft.Network/privateEndpoints for data services | CWE-284 |
| Key Vault references | reference(keyVaultId).getSecret('name') instead of inline secrets | CWE-522 |
| Check | Rule | CWE |
|---|---|---|
| No privileged containers | securityContext.privileged: false | CWE-250 |
| Read-only root filesystem | securityContext.readOnlyRootFilesystem: true | CWE-732 |
| Resource limits | CPU and memory limits set on all containers | CWE-400 |
| Network policies | Default-deny NetworkPolicy with explicit allow rules | CWE-284 |
| No latest tag | Pin image tags to specific digests or versions | CWE-829 |
| Secrets from external store | Use CSI Secret Store driver or sealed secrets, never kind: Secret | CWE-312 |
| Pod Security Standards | Enforce restricted profile via PodSecurity admission | CWE-250 |
| Domain | Check | Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| Secrets | No secrets in workflow files | Use ${{ secrets.NAME }}, never inline values |
| Secrets | Rotate secrets regularly | Automated rotation via Key Vault or GitHub secret scanning |
| Permissions | Least-privilege permissions | Set permissions: read-all at workflow level, escalate per job |
| Dependencies | Pin actions to SHA | uses: actions/checkout@abcdef1 not @v4 |
| Dependencies | Enable Dependabot for actions | dependabot.yml with package-ecosystem: github-actions |
| Isolation | Use ephemeral runners | GitHub-hosted or self-hosted with clean images per run |
| Artifacts | Sign and attest artifacts | actions/attest-build-provenance for SLSA provenance |
| Artifacts | Verify artifact integrity | Check SHA256 digests before deployment |
| Branch protection | Require status checks | Branch rules enforce CI pass before merge |
| Branch protection | Require code review | Minimum 1 approval, dismiss stale reviews |
| SARIF upload | Upload all scanner results | github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v4 per domain |
| Audit | Log all workflow runs | GitHub audit log + Defender for Cloud integration |
| Control | Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Secret scanning | GitHub Secret Protection + custom patterns | Prevent credential leaks in commits |
| Dependency scanning | Dependabot + Dependency Review | Detect vulnerable dependencies before merge |
| SBOM generation | Anchore Syft, Microsoft SBOM Tool | Inventory all components |
| Container scanning | Trivy, Grype, MSDO | Detect vulnerabilities in container images |
| Artifact attestation | actions/attest-build-provenance | SLSA Build Level 2+ provenance |
| Code signing | Sigstore / Cosign | Verify artifact authenticity |
| Agent config scanning | APM apm audit | Detect hidden Unicode in agent files |
| Lock files | package-lock.json, requirements.txt with hashes | Prevent dependency confusion |
Read the security-reviewer-formats skill for full format specifications before generating any report. Follow its normative reference links to load:
references/report-formats.md) — VULN_REPORT_V1 template (audit and diff modes), diff mode qualifiers, and PLAN_REPORT_V1 template (plan mode).references/finding-formats.md) — Verified Findings Collection Format describing the input structure.references/completion-formats.md) — Scan Completion Format used by the orchestrator after report delivery.