web3-audit

> **⚠️ AUTHORIZED USE ONLY** > This skill is for educational purposes or authorized security assessments only. > You must have explicit, written permission from the system owner before using this tool. > Misuse of this tool is illegal and strictly prohibited. > **Mandatory confirmation gate** > Before running any command that probes, exploits, changes, persists on, extracts data from, or attempts credential access against a target: > 1. Ask the user to state the exact target URL, IP, account, or resource. > 2. Ask the user to confirm written authorization and the permitted scope. > 3. Show the exact command(s) and explain their expected effect. > 4. Wait for explicit confirmation in the current conversation. > > Without that confirmation, remain read-only and provide defensive guidance only. Prefer a sandbox, disposable VM, or controlled lab. # WEB3 SMART CONTRACT AUDIT 10 bug classes. Pre-dive kill signals. Foundry PoC template. Real paid examples. --- ## PRE-DIVE KILL SIGNALS (check BEFORE any code review) > ZKsync lesson: $322M TVL + OZ audit + 750K LOC + 5 sessions = 0 findings. Large well-audited bridges are extremely hard. 1. **TVL < $500K** → max payout capped too low for effort 2. **2+ top-tier audits** (Halborn, ToB, Cyfrin, OpenZeppelin) on simple protocol → bugs already found 3. **Protocol < 500 lines, single A→B→C flow** → minimal attack surface 4. **Formula**: `max_realistic_payout = min(10% × TVL, program_cap)` — if < $10K, skip **Soft kill:** OZ/ToB/Cyfrin audit on current version + codebase > 500K LOC → expect 40+ hours for maybe 1 finding. Only proceed if bounty floor > $50K AND you have protocol-specific expertise. **Target scoring (go if >= 6/10):** - TVL > $10M: +2 - Immunefi program with Critical >= $50K: +2 - No top-tier audit on current version: +2 - < 30 days since deploy: +1 - Protocol you've hunted before: +1 - Source code + natspec comments: +1 - Upgradeable proxies: +1 --- ## THE ONE RULE > "Read ALL sibling functions. If `vote()` has a modifier, check `poke()`, `reset()`, `harvest()`. The missing modifier on the sibling IS the bug." This single rule explains 19% of all Critical findings. --- ## 1. ACCOUNTING STATE DESYNCHRONIZATION > #1 Critical bug class — 28% of all Criticals on Immunefi. ### What It Is Two state variables supposed to stay in sync. One code path updates A but forgets B. Later code reads both and makes decisions based on stale B. ``` Real Value = A - B If A updated but B isn't → Real Value appears larger → phantom value ``` ### Root Cause Patterns **Variant 1: Phantom Yield** (Yeet protocol — 35 duplicate reports) ```solidity function startUnstake(uint256 amount) external { totalSupply -= amount; // decremented BEFORE transfer // aToken.balanceOf(this) still reflects old value // yieldAmount = aToken.balanceOf - totalSupply = phantom yield } ``` **Variant 2: Fast Path Skips State Update** (Alchemix V3) ```solidity function claimRedemption(uint256 tokenId) external { if (transmuter.balance >= amount) { transmuter.transfer(user, amount); _burn(tokenId); return; // EARLY RETURN — cumulativeEarmarked, _redemptionWeight, totalDebt never updated } // Slow path: updates all state vars correctly alchemist.redeem(...); } ``` **Variant 3: Update Happens in Wrong Order** (Alchemix) ```solidity function deposit(uint256 amount) external { _shares = (amount * totalShares) / totalAssets; // calculated BEFORE deposit totalAssets += amount; // assets added AFTER shares calculated → wrong rate } ``` ### Grep Patterns ```bash # Find all accounting variables grep -rn "totalSupply\|totalShares\|totalAssets\|totalDebt\|cumulativeReward\|rewardPerShare" contracts/ # Find all early returns in claim/redeem functions grep -rn "\breturn\b" contracts/ -B3 | grep -B3 "if\b" # For each early return: which state updates in normal path are skipped? ``` --- ## 2. ACCESS CONTROL > #2 Critical — 19% of Criticals. $953M lost in 2024 alone. ### Variant 1: Missing Modifier on Sibling Function ```solidity function vote(uint256 tokenId) external onlyNewEpoch(tokenId) { // guarded function reset(uint256 tokenId) external onlyNewEpoch(tokenId) { // guarded function poke(uint256 tokenId) external { // NO GUARD → infinite FLUX inflation } ``` ### Variant 2: Wrong Check (Existence vs Ownership) ```solidity function split(uint256 tokenId, uint256 amount) external { _requireOwned(tokenId); // checks if token EXISTS, not if caller OWNS it _burn(tokenId); _mint(msg.sender, amount); // attacker steals tokens they don't own } ``` ### Variant 3: Silent Modifier (if vs require) ```solidity // VULNERABLE — non-admin silently gets through: modifier onlyAdmin() { if (msg.sender == admin) { _; // body only executes for admin, but non-admin doesn't revert } } // CORRECT: require(msg.sender == admin, "Not admin"); _; ``` ### Variant 4: Uninitialized Proxy ```solidity function initialize(address _owner) public { // MISSING: initializer modifier owner = _owner; // anyone can call → become owner } // Fix: constructor() { _disableInitializers(); } ``` ### Grep Patterns ```bash # Find sibling function families — do ALL have the same modifier set? grep -rn "function vote\|function poke\|function reset\|function update\|function claim\|function harvest" contracts/ -A2 # Ownership check: existence vs ownership? grep -rn "_requireOwned\|ownerOf\|_isApprovedOrOwner\|_checkAuthorized" contracts/ -B5 # Silent modifiers grep -rn "modifier\b" contracts/ -A8 | grep -B3 "if (" | grep -v "require\|revert" # Uninitialized initializer grep -rn "function initialize\b" contracts/ -A3 grep -rn "_disableInitializers()" contracts/ ``` ### Real Paid Examples | Protocol | Payout | Bug | |---|---|---| | Wormhole | $10M | Uninitialized UUPS proxy → anyone calls initialize() | | ZeroLend | n/a | split() uses existence check, not ownership check | | Alchemix | n/a | poke() missing onlyNewEpoch → infinite FLUX inflation | | Parity | $150M frozen | No access control on initWallet() in library | --- ## 3. INCOMPLETE CODE PATH > #3 Critical — 17% of Criticals. ### The Function Family Comparison Test ``` 1. List all state changes in function A (deposit/place/create) 2. List all state changes in function B (withdraw/update/cancel) 3. For each state change in A: does B have the corresponding reverse? 4. For each token transfer in A: does B have the corresponding refund? If A does X but B doesn't do the reverse of X → BUG. ``` ### Variant 1: Update Function Missing Refund (ThunderNFT) ```solidity function place_order(OrderInput calldata order) external { token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), order.price); // takes tokens orders[orderId] = order; } function update_order(OrderInput calldata updatedOrder) external { // BUG: NO REFUND for sell orders when price decreases → tokens permanently stuck orders[orderId] = updatedOrder; } ``` ### Variant 2: Partial Fill Token Stuck (Plume) ```solidity function swapForETH(uint256 amountIn) external { token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amountIn); uint256 filled = dex.swap(amountIn); // partial fill possible _refundExcessEth(amountIn - filled); // BUG: refunds ETH only, not ERC20 } ``` ### Variant 3: mint() Bypasses Check That deposit() Has (MetaPool) ```solidity function deposit(uint256 assets, address receiver) public override { shares = _deposit(assets, receiver); // includes receipt validation } function mint(uint256 shares, address receiver) public override { assets = convertToAssets(shares); _mint(receiver, shares); // MISSING: _deposit() validation → mints without receiving assets } ``` ### Grep Patterns ```bash grep -rn "function place_\|function create_\|function add_\|function open_" contracts/ -A5 grep -rn "function update_\|function modify_\|function cancel_" contracts/ -A5 grep -rn "safeApprove\b" contracts/ # safeApprove without zero-reset before grep -rn "delete\b" contracts/ -B5 -A5 # delete before operation completes grep -rn "function deposit\|function mint\|function withdraw\|function redeem" contracts/ -A10 ``` --- ## 4. OFF-BY-ONE & BOUNDARY CONDITIONS > #4 High — 22% of Highs. Single character change. Massive impact. ### Root Cause ```solidity // VeChain Stargate — post-exit reward drain: function _claimableDelegationPeriods(address delegator) internal view returns (uint256) { if (endPeriod > nextClaimablePeriod) { // BUG: should be >= return 0; // exited users get nothing } return nextClaimablePeriod - lastClaimedPeriod; // rewards for period AFTER exit } ``` ### Mental Test for Every Comparison > For every `if (A > B)`: "What happens when A == B?" Is that correct? ### 6 Boundary Locations to Check 1. Period/Epoch boundaries: `>` vs `>=` at period end 2. Time-based locks: does `block.timestamp == deadline` lock or unlock? 3. Loop break conditions: `break` with `>` vs `>=` 4. Array index boundaries: `i <= array.length` (should be `i < array.length`) 5. Amount/balance boundaries: `>= amount` allows exact full withdrawal? 6. Rounding/precision: can any input produce 0 output that should be non-zero? ### Grep Patterns ```bash # Boundaries in comparisons grep -rn "Period\|Epoch\|Round\|Deadline\|period\|epoch\|deadline" contracts/ -A3 | grep "[<>][^=]" # Loop breaks grep -rn "\bbreak\b" contracts/ -B10 # Off-by-one in array access grep -rn "\.length\s*-\s*1\|i\s*<=\s*.*\.length\b" contracts/ ``` --- ## 5. ORACLE / PRICE MANIPULATION > 12% of all reports. Largest individual payouts. $117M Mango, $70M Curve. ### Bug A: Missing Staleness Check (most common) ```solidity // VULNERABLE: (, int256 price,,,) = priceFeed.latestRoundData(); return uint256(price); // If Chainlink node goes down, stale price returned indefinitely // CORRECT: (, int256 price,, uint256 updatedAt,) = priceFeed.latestRoundData(); require(block.timestamp - updatedAt <= MAX_PRICE_AGE, "Stale price"); require(price > 0, "Invalid price"); ``` ### Bug B: Missing Confidence Interval (Pyth) ```solidity // VULNERABLE: PythStructs.Price memory p = pyth.getPriceUnsafe(priceFeed); return p.price; // ignores p.conf (confidence interval) // CORRECT: require(p.conf * 10 <= uint64(p.price), "Price too uncertain"); // conf > 10% of price = untrustworthy ``` ### Bug C: TWAP Too Short (flash loan manipulatable) ```solidity // VULNERABLE: 60-second TWAP uint32[] memory secondsAgos = new uint32[] (2); secondsAgos[0] = 60; secondsAgos[1] = 0; // Flash loan can shift price for entire 60s window // CORRECT: 1800s minimum TWAP (30 min) ``` ### Bug D: Single-Source Oracle ```solidity // VULNERABLE: only Uniswap spot price uint price = getUniswapSpotPrice(token); // flash loan manipulatable // CORRECT: Chainlink primary, Uniswap TWAP as fallback, require close agreement ``` ### Grep Patterns ```bash # Missing staleness check grep -rn "latestRoundData" contracts/ -A5 | grep -v "updatedAt\|timestamp" # Pyth price usage — confidence interval checked? grep -rn "getPriceUnsafe\|getPrice\b" contracts/ -A8 | grep -v "conf\|confidence" # TWAP windows — short TWAP flag grep -rn "secondsAgo\|TWAP\|cardinality" contracts/ -A5 ``` --- ## 6. ERC4626 VAULT ATTACKS ### Exchange Rate Manipulation (near-empty vault) ```solidity // VULNERABLE — first depositor attack: // 1. Attacker deposits 1 wei → gets 1 share // 2. Attacker donates large amount directly (transfer, not deposit) // 3. Exchange rate: 1 share = (1 + donation) assets // 4. Victim deposits → rounds down to 0 shares → free donation to attacker // CORRECT: virtual shares (OpenZeppelin v4.9+) function _decimalsOffset() internal view virtual override returns (uint8) { return 9; // add 1e9 virtual shares + assets to prevent manipulation } ``` ### ERC4626 Transfer (moves shares but not stake/lock records) ```solidity // VULNERABLE: shares transferred, but lock records stay with original owner // → shares stuck, can't redeem → permanent freeze (Belong pattern) function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) external override { _transfer(msg.sender, to, amount); // moves shares // MISSING: transfer lock record from msg.sender to `to` } ``` ### Grep Patterns ```bash grep -rn "function transfer\|function transferFrom" contracts/ -A15 grep -rn "function deposit\|function mint\|function withdraw\|function redeem" contracts/ -A10 ``` --- ## 7. REENTRANCY > 2016–present. CEI pattern prevents it. Still found in DeFi. ### Variants - **Single-function**: attacker re-enters same function before state updated - **Cross-function**: re-enters a sibling function with stale state - **Cross-contract**: re-enters via a callback to another protocol - **Read-only**: re-enters a view function that returns stale data used by attacker ### Root Cause Pattern ```solidity // VULNERABLE (effects after interaction): function withdraw(uint256 amount) external { require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount); (bool success,) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}(""); // INTERACTION first require(success); balances[msg.sender] -= amount; // EFFECT after → reentrancy window } // CORRECT (CEI — Checks, Effects, Interactions): function withdraw(uint256 amount) external { require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount); // CHECK balances[msg.sender] -= amount; // EFFECT (bool success,) = msg.sender.call{value: amount}(""); // INTERACTION last require(success); }