detecting-pass-the-hash-attacks

name	detecting-pass-the-hash-attacks
description	Detect Pass-the-Hash attacks by analyzing NTLM authentication patterns, identifying Type 3 logons with NTLM where Kerberos is expected, and correlating with credential dumping.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	threat-hunting
tags	["threat-hunting","mitre-attack","pass-the-hash","credential-access","t1550","proactive-detection"]
version	1.0
author	mahipal
license	Apache-2.0
d3fend_techniques	["Token Binding","Execution Isolation","Restore Access","Application Protocol Command Analysis","Process Termination"]
nist_csf	["DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05"]

Detecting Pass The Hash Attacks

When to Use

• When proactively hunting for indicators of detecting pass the hash attacks in the environment
• After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques
• During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques
• When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators
• During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises

Detection Gaps & Validation

• NTLM logging is the blind spot: PtH surfaces as Security EID 4624 Type 3 with Authentication Package = NTLM and Logon Process = NtLmSsp on a host/account that normally uses Kerberos. If NTLM auditing (Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication) and DC EID 4776 are not enabled, the hash use is invisible — confirm both are on.
• Local-account hashes (RID 500) skip DC logs: lateral movement with a local admin hash only logs on the destination, not the DC. Hunt 4624 Type 3 where TargetUserName is a local account and LogonGuid is all-zero (no Kerberos TGT was ever requested).
• LogonGuid = {00000000-0000-...} reliably separates NTLM 4624s from Kerberos; attackers cannot fake a TGT they never obtained.
• Evasions: over-pass-the-hash converts the hash to a Kerberos ticket so activity shows as 4768/4769 and defeats NTLM-only rules; Impacket sets Logon Process = User32/seclogo only on legacy paths.
• Validate the rule fires: run Atomic Red Team T1550.002 (Mimikatz sekurlsa::pth or Impacket psexec.py -hashes) from a test host and confirm the 4624 Type 3 / 4776 events land in the SIEM within the search window.
• Tune FPs: scheduled tasks, vuln scanners (Nessus/Qualys), and clustered apps generate legitimate NTLM Type 3 logons — baseline service accounts and exclude known source IPs, not account names.

Prerequisites

• EDR platform with process and network telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)
• SIEM with relevant log data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)
• Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration
• Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled
• Threat intelligence feeds for IOC correlation

Workflow

1. Formulate Hypothesis: Define a testable hypothesis based on threat intelligence or ATT&CK gap analysis.