triage-image-cves

name

triage-image-cves

description

Scan an Activepieces Docker image with grype for OS/base-image (deb) and application (npm) CVEs of High/Critical severity. Lists the 3 most-recent published tags and lets the user pick which to scan, validates each finding is real and reachable, and proves candidate fixes in an isolated git worktree (rebuild image + re-scan + tests + container smoke-run + codebase diff) before proposing anything — fixes are NEVER auto-applied; the user decides per finding. Use when the user asks to grype-scan the image, triage container/image vulnerabilities, or check a shipped Docker image for CVEs.

Triage Image CVEs (grype container scan)

On-demand triage of vulnerabilities in a published Activepieces Docker image on Docker Hub (activepieces/activepieces) using grype. The skill lists the 3 most-recent tags and lets the user pick which to scan. Produces a review-ready report per affected package and proposes fixes that are proven non-breaking in an isolated worktree — image rebuilds, the target CVE clears with no new High/Critical introduced, tests pass, the container boots, and the codebase diff is scoped. Nothing is ever applied to the working tree or committed. The user decides per finding: approve / dismiss / escalate.

Scope (decided with the user; defaults below — re-confirm if they want different):

• Image source: Docker Hub activepieces/activepieces, one of the 3 most-recent tags, chosen by the user at the start of the run.
• Findings: both OS/base-image packages (deb, fix = Dockerfile base/apt change) and app npm deps (fix = lockfile bump).
• Severity: High + Critical only (above medium).
• Validation: full gate, always in a throwaway git worktree.

Artifacts go in the .security-triage/ workspace (gitignored).

Privacy note

Write all artifacts to .security-triage/ (gitignored — confirm with git status after a run that nothing new appears under tracked paths). Image CVEs are public, so fixes may use normal PRs (no private-fork flow) — but still never commit triage artifacts.

Prerequisites

• grype on PATH (grype version). If missing, install it yourself first — do not pipe a remote installer into a shell. Prefer a package manager (brew install grype) or download the pinned release binary from https://github.com/anchore/grype/releases and verify its published checksum before use. If grype is absent, this skill stops and asks you to install it rather than fetch-and-exec an installer in the security workspace.
• docker running.
• First scan downloads/updates the grype vuln DB (needs network). Force it once with grype db update if a run reports a stale DB.

Step 1 — Pick the tag, then scan (deterministic)

List the 3 most-recent tags from Docker Hub and let the user choose which to scan (use AskUserQuestion, one option per tag, newest first, showing the push date):

mkdir -p .security-triage
curl -s "https://hub.docker.com/v2/repositories/activepieces/activepieces/tags?page_size=50&ordering=last_updated" \
  | jq -r '[.results[] | select(.name|test("^[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+\\.[0-9]+$"))][0:3][]
           | "\(.name)\t\(.last_updated)"'

The select(... test ...) keeps only semver release tags and drops the floating latest pointer (it just aliases one of them). If the API call fails or returns nothing, fall back to docker search / ask the user for a tag explicitly. Set TAG to the user's choice, then scan:

docker pull activepieces/activepieces:$TAG
# scan EVERYTHING (do not pass --only-fixed here — we still want to surface no-fix CVEs for a
# risk writeup). Pin the platform so the result is reproducible.
grype activepieces/activepieces:$TAG --platform linux/amd64 -o json \
  > .security-triage/grype.json

Validate it is a real scan, not an error. A failed scan can still write a small JSON object; guard on the matches array explicitly:

jq -e '.matches | type=="array"' .security-triage/grype.json >/dev/null \
  || echo "No matches array — grype scan failed (pull/DB/network). Stopping."

Filter to High + Critical, dedupe to the real triage unit (CVE, package, version) — the same CVE recurs once per install location — and split OS vs app by artifact.type:

# the deduped High/Critical set, tagged class=os|app
jq -r '
  .matches[]
  | select(.vulnerability.severity=="High" or .vulnerability.severity=="Critical")
  | { id:.vulnerability.id, sev:.vulnerability.severity,
      pkg:.artifact.name, ver:.artifact.version, type:.artifact.type,
      fixState:.vulnerability.fix.state,
      fixedIn:((.vulnerability.fix.versions // []) | join(",")),
      class:(if (.artifact.type|test("^(deb|apk|rpm)$")) then "os" else "app" end) }
' .security-triage/grype.json \
  | jq -s 'unique_by(.id + "|" + .pkg + "|" + .ver)' \
  > .security-triage/grype-filtered.json

# headline table, OS first then app, critical first
jq -r 'sort_by(.class!="os", (.sev=="Critical"|not), .pkg)[]
  | "\(.class)\t\(.sev)\t\(.pkg) \(.ver)\t\(.id)\tfix=\(.fixState):\(.fixedIn)"' \
  .security-triage/grype-filtered.json

fixState is fixed / not-fixed / wont-fix / unknown. Only fixed findings have a fix to test; the rest go to the risk-writeup path (Step 4, NO_FIX_YET).

Reachability caveat for OS findings: the shipped image's run stage is FROM base, so the build toolchain in the Dockerfile (g++, build-essential, git, python3, poppler-utils, curl, …) is present in the final image, not stripped. "Present" therefore does not mean "reachable" — a CVE in g++ only matters if a runtime path invokes it. Decide reachability in Step 2, do not assume.

Step 2 — Validate each finding (one focused subagent per package)

Spawn one read-only subagent per package (not per match). Each returns a verdict backed by evidence. Keep subagents read-only; they write reports/image-<pkg>.md and return a compact verdict line.

For every finding, ground the version in the scan, not recall: the installed version is artifact.version from grype.json; compare it to the advisory's fixed version (vulnerability.fix.versions). Pull the advisory link from vulnerability.dataSource.

OS / base-image (deb) findings:

• Confirm the package is in the shipped image (it is, if grype found it on the scanned tag) and whether it sits on a runtime-reachable path or is a build-tool leftover. Map it to how AP uses it: git → git-sync; python3/poppler-utils → PDF/AI pieces; ca-certificates/curl → outbound HTTP; g++/build-essential/node-gyp → native-module rebuild at install (build- time, but the binary still ships). State which.
• Determine the fix path and its blast radius:
  • apt patch available in bullseye → apt-get install -y --only-upgrade <pkg> or pin the fixed version. Low risk.
  • fixed only in a newer base tag → bump FROM node:<x>-bullseye-slim to the latest patch digest. Medium risk (Node minor/patch).
  • fixed only in a newer Debian release → bullseye(11)→bookworm(12). High risk — glibc/openssl bumps can break native modules (isolated-vm, sandboxes). Must be proven by the full gate, never proposed on paper.
  • no fix → not-fixed/wont-fix → NO_FIX_YET.
• Self-hosting rule: any base/apt change must keep zero-setup self-hosting working — no new env var, no build-time dependency on a third-party CDN, no manual step. Flag violations.

App (npm) findings:

• Confirm the package is a real dependency and the vulnerable API is actually exercised (not transitive dead code). Read the installed version from bun.lock (this repo is bun), not from recall. For a package with multiple advisories, being ≥ one fix version does not mean safe.
• Confirm it on the built image, not just the lockfile. The shipped image runs a trimmed bun install --production over a regenerated lockfile (pieces are stripped in the build), so the set of installed npm packages in the image can differ from the dev bun.lock. The version grype reports is the one actually shipped — treat that as ground truth.

Emit one verdict per package:

Verdict	Meaning
FIXABLE	Reachable, a patched version exists, fix path is in-distro / minor bump.
FIX_VIA_BASE_BUMP	Only fixed by a base-image tag/release bump (higher risk; must pass full gate).
NOT_REACHABLE	Package present in image but the vulnerable component is not invoked by AP.
NO_FIX_YET	No upstream fix (not-fixed / wont-fix). Risk writeup, no build.

Step 3 — Report

Write .security-triage/reports/image-<pkg>.md per affected package: class (os/app), the CVEs + severities, installed version (from the scan), fixed version(s), fixState, reachability verdict with the runtime path, the proposed fix path + risk class, and any self-hosting concern.

Then the consolidated .security-triage/IMAGE-CVE-TRIAGE-SUMMARY.md (distinct filename so it never collides with other tools' artifacts in the shared gitignored .security-triage/ workspace):

• Image digest scanned + grype DB date (jq '.descriptor' grype.json), so the run is reproducible.
• Verdict tally and a table grouped by class then severity (pkg, severity, installed → fix, verdict, reachability, CVE count).
• Findings clearable by a single base-image bump grouped together (one Dockerfile change resolves many deb CVEs).

Present headline verdicts in chat, runtime-reachable first; surface NOT_REACHABLE / build-only separately so a scary-looking CVE in a build tool doesn't bury a reachable one. Then ask the user which findings to fix before doing anything.

Step 4 — Fix on approval (PROVEN in an isolated worktree, never applied)

Only after the user picks findings. All build/test/scan work happens in a throwaway git worktree so the working tree is never touched.

# <short> MUST be unique per run (e.g. $(date +%s)-$RANDOM) so paths never collide across runs;
# `git worktree add` also aborts if the path already exists, so a collision fails here.
git worktree add ../ap-cve-fix-<short> HEAD     # isolated copy; main tree stays clean

Group approved fixes sensibly: all approved OS findings → one Dockerfile change set; all approved npm bumps → one lockfile change set (the repo has a single shared bun.lock, so per- package branches would all conflict on it — bump all approved npm packages in one batch, never one worktree/PR per package). Then, inside the worktree:

1. Apply the candidate fix.
   • OS: edit Dockerfile (and Dockerfile.worker if affected) — pin the upgraded apt package, bump the FROM digest, or change the Debian release. Keep it minimal and self-hosting-safe.
   • npm: bump the pinned range(s) to the first version clearing all advisories + bun install; patch-bump any versioned internal package touched (packages/core/shared, packages/server/utils) per the repo rule (once per branch).
2. Rebuild the image from the worktree: docker build -t ap-cve-test:<short> . (plus -f Dockerfile.worker if it was changed). A failed build = fix rejected; report the build error.
3. Re-scan the rebuilt image and diff against baseline — the fix must clear the target CVE(s) and introduce no new High/Critical:

   grype ap-cve-test:<short> --platform linux/amd64 -o json > .security-triage/grype-after.json
   # target CVE(s) gone?
   jq -r '[.matches[].vulnerability.id] | unique' .security-triage/grype-after.json   # must NOT contain the target ids
   # no NEW high/critical vs baseline?
   comm -13 \
     <(jq -r '.matches[]|select(.vulnerability.severity|test("High|Critical"))|.vulnerability.id' .security-triage/grype.json | sort -u) \
     <(jq -r '.matches[]|select(.vulnerability.severity|test("High|Critical"))|.vulnerability.id' .security-triage/grype-after.json | sort -u)
   

   The comm output must be empty (no High/Critical present after that wasn't there before).
4. Run tests for code/dep changes: npx turbo run build lint test --filter=<pkg> … (one --filter per affected package). Triage failures against base — re-run a failing test on HEAD before blaming the fix; only green-on-base / red-after is yours. For a pure base-image bump with no code change, the build + smoke run below is the proof; still run a representative package's tests to catch a glibc/native-module regression.
5. Smoke-run the container — prove it actually boots (entrypoint, migrations):

   docker run --rm -d --name ap-cve-smoke -p 8080:80 ap-cve-test:<short>
   # poll the health/entrypoint for boot, then:
   docker logs ap-cve-smoke; docker rm -f ap-cve-smoke
   

   Container must come up clean (no crash loop, migrations run). Tear it down.
6. Scan the codebase diff — git -C ../ap-cve-fix-<short> status + git diff. Confirm the change is scoped to the intended files (Dockerfile / lockfile / the one adapted call site) with no stray churn or unrelated edits. Report the diff stat.

NO_FIX_YET findings get no build — produce a risk-acceptance writeup in the package report: where it's reachable in the image, any sandboxing that mitigates it, and the options (accept with justification, pin/patch locally, swap the component, or wait for upstream).

Output recap

Everything lands in .security-triage/ (gitignored): grype.json (baseline scan), grype-filtered.json (High/Critical deduped), grype-after.json (post-fix re-scan), IMAGE-CVE-TRIAGE-SUMMARY.md, and one report per affected package under reports/image-*.md. The working tree and git history are never modified; all fix validation happens in a discarded worktree.