posture

name	posture
description	Assess a repository's security posture and its readiness to receive a vulnerability report. Checks for a security policy, private vulnerability reporting, security.txt, prior advisories, scanning workflows, and other hygiene signals, then rates the project ready / partial / unprepared. Use before disclosure to decide how much hand-holding the maintainer will need, or as a standalone health check.
license	MIT
compatibility	Needs network access to api.github.com and api.securityscorecards.dev. Works best on GitHub-hosted repositories; degrades to file-only checks elsewhere.
metadata	{"scrutineer.version":1,"scrutineer.output_file":"report.json","scrutineer.output_kind":"posture"}

posture

You are scoring how prepared a project is to receive and act on a security report. This is not a code audit. You are looking at policy files, repository settings, and process signals, then producing a checklist and a one-word tier.

Workspace

• ./src — the cloned repository
• ./context.json — has repository.url and repository.full_name (e.g. owner/repo). Derive the host from repository.url; the GitHub-only checks below run when that host is github.com. Use full_name as {owner}/{repo} in API URLs.
• ./report.json — write the result here
• ./schema.json — shape of report.json

Checks

Run every check below. For each one, record present (true/false/unknown), a one-line evidence string saying what you found, and a url pointing at the file or API result when there is one. Do not skip checks; an explicit false is more useful downstream than a missing key.

Disclosure intake

security_policy — Look for SECURITY.md, .github/SECURITY.md, docs/SECURITY.md, SECURITY.rst, or a ## Security section in README.md. If found, read it and fill the security_policy_detail object: does it name a contact (email, form, or "use GitHub advisories"), list supported_versions, and give a response_sla? A file that just says "open an issue" counts as present but with empty detail.

private_vulnerability_reporting — Only when the host is github.com. Fetch https://api.github.com/repos/{owner}/{repo}/private-vulnerability-reporting (no auth needed for public repos). It returns {"enabled": true|false}. On 404 or a non-GitHub host, record unknown.

security_txt — Look for .well-known/security.txt or security.txt in ./src. Some projects vendor it for the website they ship.

manifest_security_contact — Read the top-level package manifest if one exists (package.json bugs/security, pyproject.toml [project.urls] Security, *.gemspec metadata["security_uri"], Cargo.toml [package.metadata.security], etc). Present if any names a security URL or email.

bounty_or_lifter — Grep README* and SECURITY* for Tidelift, HackerOne, Bugcrowd, Open Collective security, or an explicit bounty programme. Record which one in evidence.

prior_advisories — Fetch https://api.github.com/repos/{owner}/{repo}/security-advisories?state=published. Present if the array is non-empty; put the count in evidence. A project that has published before knows the drill.

Hygiene

scorecard — Fetch https://api.securityscorecards.dev/projects/github.com/{owner}/{repo}. If it returns a result, put the overall score in evidence and present: true. 404 means not scanned; record unknown.

dependency_updates — Look for .github/dependabot.yml, .github/dependabot.yaml, renovate.json, .renovaterc*, or .github/renovate.json.

code_scanning — Look in .github/workflows/*.y*ml for github/codeql-action, securego/gosec, aquasecurity/trivy-action, snyk/actions, or similar. Present if any scanning workflow exists.

signed_releases — Look in .github/workflows/ for sigstore/cosign, slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator, goreleaser with signs:, or GPG signing steps. Also check git tag -l | head in ./src and git tag -v one recent tag. Treat gpg: Can't check signature: No public key as present: true with that message in evidence; the signature exists even if you cannot verify it. Only no signature found is present: false.

codeowners — Look for CODEOWNERS, .github/CODEOWNERS, or docs/CODEOWNERS.

funding — Look for .github/FUNDING.yml. A funded project is more likely to have time to respond.

security_issue_template — Look in .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/ for a template that redirects security reports away from public issues (mentions SECURITY.md, "do not report vulnerabilities here", or similar). Also check .github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/config.yml for a contact_links entry pointing at a security channel.

archived — From the GitHub API repo response (GET https://api.github.com/repos/{owner}/{repo}, field archived). On a non-GitHub host or a non-200 response, record unknown. An archived repo is an automatic unprepared regardless of other checks.

Tier

Assign exactly one of:

• ready — has a security policy with a contact AND (PVR true, OR PVR unknown with a security email/form documented in the policy), and is not archived. You are checking that a contact is documented, not that it works.
• partial — has at least one intake signal (policy, PVR, security.txt, manifest contact) but no documented contact in the policy, and is not archived.
• unprepared — no intake signal at all, or the repository is archived.

Hygiene checks inform the summary prose but do not on their own move the tier; a project with CodeQL and Dependabot but no way to receive a report is still unprepared.

Output

Write ./report.json matching ./schema.json:

{
  "tier": "partial",
  "summary": "SECURITY.md names [e-mail] but PVR is off and no advisories have been published. Dependabot and CodeQL are configured.",
  "checks": [
    { "id": "security_policy", "present": true, "evidence": "SECURITY.md at repo root, names email contact", "url": "https://github.com/o/r/blob/main/SECURITY.md" },
    { "id": "private_vulnerability_reporting", "present": false, "evidence": "API returned enabled:false" }
  ],
  "security_policy_detail": {
    "contact": "[e-mail]",
     
     
  
   

Keep summary to one or two sentences a human can read in the repo list. Do not write to the scrutineer API; this skill is read-only and its output is the report file.