isolated-setup-doctor

<!-- Placeholder convention (see AGENTS.md#placeholder-convention-used-in-skill-files): <project-config> → adopting project's `.apache-magpie/` directory --> # setup-isolated-setup-doctor ## Runtime routing (run before the Claude-specific probes) Use the operator's explicitly requested runtime when supplied; otherwise use the active session's runtime. An installed executable or configuration directory alone does not select a runtime. For the routing below, treat that selection as the active harness. When the active harness is Codex, first require the static verification in [docs/adapters/codex.md](../../../../docs/adapters/codex.md#verify), then run the shared live environment probes inside the active Codex sandbox. Attribute failures separately to native sandbox/network denial, approval policy, or the POSIX agent-iso layer. Do not prescribe a `.claude` settings change for a Codex failure. Then stop before the Claude-specific branch below. When the selected runtime is Gemini CLI, follow [docs/adapters/gemini.md](../../../../docs/adapters/gemini.md#doctor): verify the profile first, then diagnose the actual tool result in the active Gemini session. Distinguish policy refusal, sandbox expansion, hook or trust failures, and wrapper or authentication problems. Do not require Claude configuration or prescribe Claude settings changes; then stop before the Claude-specific probes below. When the selected runtime is Copilot CLI, follow [docs/adapters/copilot.md](../../../../docs/adapters/copilot.md#doctor): verify the hook first, then diagnose the actual tool result in the live session. When the harness is Claude Code, continue below. If the harness cannot be determined, ask once. This is the diagnostic layer over the secure agent setup. [`verify`](../isolated-setup-verify/SKILL.md) checks statically that the setup is *installed* right, catching drift and missing pieces. This skill checks whether common workflows are *functionally blocked* by the sandbox as configured, catching over-restrictive allowlists. ([`install`](../isolated-setup-install/SKILL.md) puts the setup in place; [`update`](../isolated-setup-update/SKILL.md) reports framework drift.) Run `verify` first when the install itself is in doubt: fresh machine, recent upgrade, sandbox-state surprise. Run `doctor` when the install is known good and a workflow fails in a sandbox-shaped way: agent unreachable, socket error, port permission error. Every probe maps to a numbered entry in [`docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md`](../../../../docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md). The doctor identifies *which* entry applies now; it does not re-explain the remediation. If a fail shows a failure mode not catalogued there, propose appending a new entry per the catalog's *Adding a new entry* section. ## Golden rules - **Read-only.** Each probe is a small, deterministic, side-effect-free check. The skill **never** edits a settings file, **never** runs a command with `dangerouslyDisableSandbox`, and **never** installs anything. If a check fails, surface it and point at the catalog entry; do not auto-fix. - **Run every probe, even on early failure.** Do not stop at the first ✗. A user may have one of eight independent restrictions or all eight, and finding them one re-run at a time is annoying. - **Distinguish ✗ (failing) from ⊘ (not applicable).** ✗ means the probe ran and the sandbox blocked it. ⊘ means the probe was skipped because a prerequisite is absent (e.g. no `docker` / `podman` on `PATH` → docker probe ⊘, not ✗). - **Surface evidence.** Each report line names the probe command, the exit code, and the relevant stderr snippet. "Looks blocked" is not useful; "ssh-add -l → rc=2 → `Could not open a connection to your authentication agent`" is. - **Map each ✗ to a catalog entry.** The fail report links directly to the matching section of [`docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md`](../../../../docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md). Do not paraphrase the remediation; the catalog is the single source of truth. ## The 8 probes The probes cover the catalog's failure modes that a sandboxed command can detect on its own; the signing entries that need a live touch or a terminal are verified by `setup-isolated-setup-verify` check 10 instead. New probes are added when new entries land in the catalog, so the two stay in lock-step. ### Probe 1 — SSH agent / Yubikey reachable Tests whether `ssh-agent` is reachable from inside the sandbox. Two failure modes: `SSH_AUTH_SOCK` passes through `claude-iso`'s env whitelist but the socket file is not in `sandbox.filesystem.allowRead`, so the agent's `ssh` / `git push` subprocesses cannot even `stat(2)` it; or, on macOS, the file is readable but its path is missing from `sandbox.network.allowUnixSockets`, so `connect(2)` is denied and the agent looks unreachable while the socket is plainly there. A signed commit hits the second as `No private key found for public key`. **Command:** ```bash bash <skill-dir>/scripts/probe-1-ssh-agent.sh ``` **Interpretation:** | Result | Status | Meaning | |---|---|---| | `✓ N identities listed` | Pass | `ssh-add -l` returned the key list. | | `✓ agent reachable, no identities` | Pass | `ssh-add -l` returned rc=1 (the documented "no keys" exit). | | `✗ socket not stat-able` | Fail | Sandbox blocks `stat(2)` on the socket file. | | `✗ agent unreachable` | Fail | Sandbox blocks `connect(2)` to the socket. | | `⊘ SSH_AUTH_SOCK not set` | Skip | Either the user does not run `ssh-agent`, or `claude-iso`'s env whitelist dropped it (separate bug — verify). | **On ✗ → remediation:** [`docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md` — SSH agent / Yubikey appears unreachable from inside the sandbox](../../../../docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md#ssh-agent--yubikey-appears-unreachable-from-inside-the-sandbox). ### Probe 2 — Localhost port bind Tests whether a process inside the sandbox can bind to a loopback port AND then talk to itself over loopback. The catalog documents the second half failing (egress proxy blocks `127.0.0.1`). **Command:** ```bash bash <skill-dir>/scripts/probe-2-localhost-bind.sh ``` **Interpretation:** | Result | Status | Meaning | |---|---|---| | `✓ bound + loopback GET → HTTP 200` | Pass | Both bind and loopback HTTP work. | | `✗ bind: [Errno 1] Operation not permitted` | Fail | The sandbox refuses listening sockets outright; `sandbox.network.allowLocalBinding` is unset. Fails before any egress rule is consulted, so `allowedDomains` changes do not help. | | `✗ bind: ...` (other errno) | Fail | The sandbox blocks `bind(2)` on `127.0.0.1` for another reason. Rare; report the literal error. | | `✗ bind ok, loopback GET: ...` | Fail | Bind works but the sandbox egress proxy refuses `127.0.0.1` as a destination. Common shape. | **On ✗ → remediation:** [`docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md` — Test cannot bind to a localhost port](../../../../docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md#test-cannot-bind-to-a-localhost-port). ### Probe 3 — Podman / Docker through the container gateway Tests whether the runtime CLI can talk to the [container gateway](../../../../tools/container-gateway/README.md), not the real daemon socket; the sandbox never gets a route to the daemon itself. Run it for each of `podman` / `docker` on `PATH`; ⊘ each one not installed (an absent prerequisite, not a sandbox failure). The remaining checks narrow down which of the three wiring pieces (env var, running gateway, allowed socket) is missing, in the order a fresh install would hit them. **Command:** ```bash bash <skill-dir>/scripts/probe-3-container-gateway.sh ``` `status_json` comes from the gateway's own read-only `status` subcommand. The doctor may call it from inside the sandbox, since it neither binds a socket nor touches the daemon. `gw_src` picks the adopter's pinned snapshot (`.apache-magpie/tools/container-gateway/src`) when present, else the framework repo's own tree (`tools/container-gateway/src`), so the same probe runs in an adopter checkout and in this framework's own worktree. The `gw_state` check runs **before** the raw socket-file test. A backend that `status` does not list under `serving` never gets a socket file, so testing `-S "$sock"` first would misreport "gateway not running" for the "running, but this backend's machine/daemon is down" case. The `-S` test is a defensive fallback for an already-serving backend whose socket vanished mid-probe, not the primary check. **Interpretation:** | Result | Status | Meaning | |---|---|---| | `✓ <rt> reaches the container gateway at <sock>` | Pass | CLI → gateway → daemon all answer. | | `✗ … unset — gateway not wired into settings` | Fail | The reference `env` block is missing from project settings. | | `✗ gateway socket missing` | Fail | The `SessionStart` hook did not start the gateway, or it exited; check `container-gateway.log` in the gateway's run directory — `<project>/.apache-magpie-local/run/` when adopted, else `<git-common-dir>/apache-magpie/run/<worktree-id>/`. | | `✗ gateway running without a <rt> backend` | Fail | `status` reports the gateway up but `serving` does not list this CLI's backend — the Podman machine or Docker daemon behind it is not running. Start it from outside the sandbox, then restart the gateway. | | `✗ connect … denied` | Fail | The gateway socket is not in `sandbox.network.allowUnixSockets`. | | `✗ gateway up, backend down` | Fail | Podman machine / Docker not running on the host; start it from your own terminal. | | `✗ no response in 15s — <rt> info hung` | Fail | `_probe_timeout` killed a stalled `<rt> info` call; the backend daemon behind the gateway is likely wedged — restart it from outside the sandbox. | | `⊘ <rt> not on PATH` | Skip | Runtime not installed; not a sandbox restriction. | An empty `podman machine list` from inside the sandbox is a read denial on the machine's directory, not proof that no machine exists. Decide the machine's real state from outside the sandbox, per the catalog entry below. **On ✗ → remediation:** [`docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md` — Docker / Podman command fails with a socket error](../../../../docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md#docker--podman-command-fails-with-a-socket-error). ### Probe 4 — Per-project scratch directory (`TMPDIR`) Tests whether the session has a **writable** scratch directory. The sandbox mounts the host `/tmp` read-only and makes only specific subpaths writable, so a session whose `TMPDIR` falls back to `/tmp` has no scratch area at all. `TMPDIR` landing on the shared session root rather than a per-project directory is **not** a finding. Claude Code sets `TMPDIR` itself when it builds the sandbox, and that wins over `env.TMPDIR` from any settings file, so the shared root is expected and no configuration changes it. Each session still gets a per-project, per-session scratchpad beneath it. **Command:** ```bash bash <skill-dir>/scripts/probe-4-scratch-dir.sh ``` **Interpretation:** | Result | Status | Meaning | |---|---|---| | `✓ per-project + writable` | Pass | `TMPDIR` resolves under this project's path slug and accepts writes. | | `✓ writable; shared session root` | Pass | The expected value on current Claude Code. Every project on the machine shares this directory, so write through the per-session scratchpad beneath it, or use unique filenames — but there is nothing to fix. | | `✗ TMPDIR not set` | Fail | Tooling falls back to `/tmp`, which is read-only inside the sandbox. | | `✗ directory missing` | Fail | `TMPDIR` names a path nothing has created yet. | | `✗ not writable inside sandbox` | Fail | `TMPDIR` points outside `sandbox.filesystem.allowWrite`. | **On ✗ → remediation:** [`docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md` — Temp files fail with "Read-only file system" under `/tmp`](../../../../docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md#temp-files-fail-with-read-only-file-system-under-tmp). Do **not** propose `env.TMPDIR` in a settings file as the fix. Claude Code overrides it when it builds the sandbox, so the setting is accepted and silently has no effect. The giveaway is a directory that exists, is named exactly as configured, and stays empty. The catalog entry above covers what is actually actionable. ### Probe 5 — Signing key readable (`gpg.format=ssh`) Tests whether the public key git hands to `ssh-keygen -Y sign` can be opened from inside the sandbox. Failure mode: the framework denies `~/.ssh/` wholesale, so with `gpg.format=ssh` every signed commit fails before the hardware key asks for a touch. The touch overlay, which waits for `ssh-keygen` to block, never sees it block. **Command:** ```bash bash <skill-dir>/scripts/probe-5-signing-key.sh ``` **Interpretation:** | Result | Status | Meaning | |---|---|---| | `✓ readable inside sandbox` | Pass | `ssh-keygen` will be able to open the public key. | | `✓ literal key` | Pass | `user.signingkey` holds the key text itself; no file is involved. | | `✗ not readable inside sandbox` | Fail | The sandbox's `~/.ssh/` read deny covers the public key; add that one file to `allowRead`. | | `⊘ gpg.format is not ssh` | Skip | Signing goes through gpg (or is off); the agent-socket rules behind Probe 1 are what matter. | | `⊘ user.signingkey unset` | Skip | Misconfigured signing, not a sandbox problem — mention it, do not fail the probe. | | `signing-program → ✓` | Pass | git's signing program (the touch overlay's `gpg-touch-wrap-*` wrapper, or whatever `gpg.ssh.program` / `gpg.program` names) can be started from inside the sandbox. Nothing printed when neither key is set: git uses its default `ssh-keygen` / `gpg` from `PATH`. | | `signing-program → ✗` | Fail | The program git is configured to sign with is read-denied inside the sandbox — for the overlay wrapper, `~/.claude/scripts/` is. Every sandboxed signed commit fails at once with `cannot exec`; add the wrapper's two files to `allowRead`. | **On ✗ → remediation:** [`docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md` — Signed commit fails before any touch when git signs with ssh](../../../../docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md#signed-commit-fails-before-any-touch-when-git-signs-with-ssh) for the key, and [`docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md` — Signed commit fails with "cannot exec" of the touch-overlay wrapper](../../../../docs/setup/sandbox-troubleshooting.md#signed-commit-fails-with-cannot-exec-of-the-touch-overlay-wrapper) for the program. ### Probe 6 — `gh` runs outside the sandbox Tests whether `gh` can reach GitHub from a sandboxed Bash call, and if not, whether the `sandbox.excludedCommands: ["gh *"]` exclusion the framework reference relies on is in place. On macOS a sandboxed `gh` cannot verify TLS or read the keychain (`x509: OSStatus -26276` / `HTTP 401`), so only the exclusion makes it work. The exclusion applies only when every segment of a Bash invocation is `cd …` or `gh …`. The probe deliberately runs `gh` through `sh -c` so the exclusion cannot apply to it, showing what an *un-excluded* `gh` does on this machine. **Command:** ```bash bash <skill-dir>/scripts/probe-6-gh-outside-sandbox.sh ``` **Interpretation:** | Result | Status | Meaning | |---|---|---| | `✓ gh works inside the sandbox` | Pass | Platform lets `gh` verify TLS and read its token inside the sandbox (typical on Linux). | | `✓ … "gh *" is in excludedCommands` | Pass | The known macOS shape, and the framework's exclusion is present. Calls still fail if they are not `cd`/`gh`-only invocations — see the catalog entry. | | `✗ … NOT found in excludedCommands` | Fail | `gh` cannot work inside the sandbox on this machine and nothing runs it outside. | | `⚠ gh failed for another reason` | Warn | Not the catalogued shape (network down, not logged in, …); inspect the message. | | `⚠ catch-all "Bash(gh *)" in permissions.ask` | Warn | Ask beats allow regardless of specificity, so this rule prompts on every read-only `gh` call. Replace it with the explicit write-subcommand list from the reference `.claude/settings.json`. Extra line, printed after the main result. | | `⊘ gh not on PATH` | Skip | `gh` not installed; not a sandbox restriction. | `~/.claude/settings.json` is usually unreadable from inside the sandbox, so the exclusion check may see only the project-scope files. If the user keeps the exclusion at user scope, a ✗ here is a false alarm; say so when reporting.