lisa-sentry-access

name	lisa-sentry-access
description	Vendor-neutral access layer for…
allowed-tools	["Bash","Read","Skill"]

Sentry Access: $ARGUMENTS

Single chokepoint for Sentry operations. Caller skills MUST NOT call mcp__sentry__*, sentry-cli, or https://sentry.io/api/ directly.

Invocation Contract

operation: list-issues org:<ORG> project:<PROJECT> query:<QUERY> [environment:<ENV>]
operation: get-issue issue_id:<ID>
operation: events org:<ORG> project:<PROJECT> query:<QUERY>
operation: releases org:<ORG> project:<PROJECT>

Return parsed JSON in a <result> block.

Substrate Selection

Probe in order:

1. Sentry MCP, if available and authenticated.
2. sentry-cli, if installed and authenticated to the requested org/project.
3. SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN bearer token against Sentry REST.

Sentry documents API auth tokens for REST API calls. The headless REST tier uses:

sentry_api() {
  local path="$1"
  [ -n "$SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN" ] || {
    echo "Error: SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN is not set." >&2
    return 1
  }
  curl -sS "https://sentry.io/api/0${path}" \
    -H "Authorization: Bearer $SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN"
}

If neither tier works, fail with:

Error: no Sentry access substrate available. Authenticate Sentry MCP/CLI or set SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN.

Invariants

• Fallback is gated on SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN.
• Org/project come from .sentryclirc, .lisa.config.json, or explicit operation args; never infer by searching all accessible orgs.
• Consumer skills do not embed Sentry REST paths.