lisa-setup-remote-aws

name	lisa-setup-remote-aws
description	Install and validate Lisa's…
allowed-tools	["Bash","Read","Write","Glob","Grep"]

Set up remote-agent AWS access: $ARGUMENTS

Install the vendor-neutral AWS bootstrap into the current repository.

Arguments

• --platform=all|claude|codex|cursor|copilot|agy|opencode (default all)
• --project=<path> (default current working directory)
• --secret-name=<name> (default remote-agent-credentials)

Procedure

1. Resolve the plugin root from PLUGIN_ROOT, CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT, CURSOR_PLUGIN_ROOT, or the installed @codyswann/lisa/plugins/lisa package.

2. Run:

   node "$PLUGIN_ROOT/scripts/install-remote-agent-aws.mjs" $ARGUMENTS
   

3. Inspect every path returned by the installer. It must install scripts/remote-agent-aws-setup.sh; for Cursor it merges .cursor/environment.json; for Copilot it creates or merges .github/workflows/copilot-setup-steps.yml; and it always writes docs/remote-agent-aws.md.

4. Run bash -n scripts/remote-agent-aws-setup.sh.

5. Never write or request the actual bootstrap bundle in repository files. Tell the operator where to obtain it and where to put it — see Where the bundle lives below. Pass --secret-name when the source names it something other than remote-agent-credentials, so the generated runbook contains the exact retrieval command.

6. Report the external step that remains: configure that one secret in the remote environment and launch a smoke session.

Where the bundle lives

LISA_AWS_BOOTSTRAP_JSON is just another secret, and it belongs wherever the project keeps its secrets — resolved through lisa-secrets-access like everything else. It is not tied to any one store.

Whoever provisions the IAM user emits the bundle somewhere. cdkstarter writes it to AWS Secrets Manager as remote-agent-credentials, but that is where it is emitted, not where it must live. Copy it once into the project's configured provider and read it from there.

Do not maintain two stores by hand. A bundle sitting in Secrets Manager and in the platform's secret store is two live copies of one credential: rotate the IAM key and whichever copy you forget becomes stale, with nothing to say which is current. Treat the infrastructure secret as a short-lived deployment emission and the configured provider as the consumer-facing source of truth.

Publish the emission as part of the same rotation automation. The publisher reads the candidate on stdin, acquires a provider-backed lock for the exact bundle record, re-reads the current value after winning, proves every role before writing, reads the provider value back exactly, proves every stored role again, and restores the previous provider value if a post-write check fails. The lock remains held through rollback and its deletion is verified before the command reports success:

aws secretsmanager get-secret-value \
  --secret-id <selected-secret-name> \
  --query SecretString \
  --output text \
  | node .claude/skills/lisa-secrets-access/scripts/publish-aws-bootstrap.mjs publish

Use the same secret name passed to --secret-name; the default is remote-agent-credentials. Add --profile <source-profile> only when the operator's ambient AWS identity cannot read the emission and the project names a source profile. A named shared profile is not otherwise required.

Resolve the script from the installed runtime or node_modules when the .claude/skills copy is not present. Never print or place the candidate in an argument or temporary file. A CDK deployment followed later by a human copy is not a completed rotation.

The current publisher supports Bitwarden writes. It creates a temporary, non-secret contender in the bundle's Bitwarden project, elects the oldest active contender using provider-issued creation metadata, and removes the contender when the transaction finishes. A contender expires after 30 minutes so a killed publisher cannot block future rotations forever. The service account therefore needs create and delete access as well as read and edit access; preflight proves that complete lifecycle without changing the bundle.

Normal remote-session setup is read-only. It refreshes the already-published bundle but does not enter the publisher election or mutate Bitwarden, so two containers starting together cannot cause this publication race.

One provider cannot serve this particular secret. If secrets.provider is aws, reading the bundle requires AWS credentials — and the bundle is the AWS credential. Anything else works: Bitwarden, 1Password, Doppler, Vault, or a platform secret store. Pick the one that is not the thing being bootstrapped. Automated publication additionally requires a provider with an implemented write and coordination path; that is currently Bitwarden.

On a surface that materializes (see lisa-secrets-access), the bundle arrives in secrets.env with everything else, so the project hook can run this setup script after materialization with no extra plumbing. On a surface that reads through live, resolve it at the point of use.

Contract

A future coding agent is supported without an AWS change when its remote environment provides a Linux shell, a setup/start hook, one opaque secret, a writable home directory, and HTTPS access to AWS STS plus the allowed service endpoints. Set LISA_REMOTE_AGENT to a stable lowercase platform label; it is used only as role_session_name.

Do not create per-repository or per-agent IAM users. Do not expose the bootstrap key through standard AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID variables. Do not add production repair permissions; production repair is a human-driven local-workstation workflow.