dotnet-security-owasp

name	dotnet-security-owasp
description	Hardens .NET apps per OWASP Top 10 -- injection, auth, XSS, deprecated security APIs.
license	MIT
targets	["*"]
tags	["security","dotnet","skill"]
version	0.0.1
author	dotnet-harness
invocable	true
claudecode	{"allowed-tools":["Read","Grep","Glob","Bash","Write","Edit"]}
codexcli	{"short-description":".NET skill guidance for security tasks"}
opencode	{"allowed-tools":["Read","Grep","Glob","Bash","Write","Edit"]}

dotnet-security-owasp

OWASP Top 10 (2021) security guidance for .NET applications. Each category includes the vulnerability description, .NET-specific risk, mitigation code examples, and common pitfalls. This skill is the canonical owner of deprecated security pattern warnings (CAS, APTCA, .NET Remoting, DCOM, BinaryFormatter).

Scope

• OWASP Top 10 (2021) vulnerability categories with .NET-specific mitigations
• Injection, broken access control, XSS, SSRF prevention patterns
• Deprecated security API warnings (CAS, APTCA, BinaryFormatter, .NET Remoting)
• Security header configuration and CORS hardening
• Rate limiting and anti-forgery middleware patterns
• NuGet package audit and dependency vulnerability scanning

Out of scope

• Authentication/authorization implementation -- see [skill:dotnet-api-security]
• Blazor auth UI -- see [skill:dotnet-blazor-auth]
• Cryptographic algorithm selection -- see [skill:dotnet-cryptography]
• Configuration binding and Options pattern -- see [skill:dotnet-csharp-configuration]
• Secrets storage and management -- see [skill:dotnet-secrets-management]

Cross-references: [skill:dotnet-secrets-management] for secrets handling, [skill:dotnet-cryptography] for cryptographic best practices, [skill:dotnet-csharp-coding-standards] for secure coding conventions.

---

A01: Broken Access Control

Vulnerability: Users act outside their intended permissions -- accessing other users' data, elevating privileges, or bypassing access checks.

Risk in .NET: Missing [Authorize] attributes on controllers/endpoints, insecure direct object references (IDOR) where user IDs are taken from route parameters without ownership validation, and CORS misconfiguration allowing unintended origins.

Mitigation

// 1. Apply authorization globally, then opt out explicitly
builder.Services.AddAuthorizationBuilder()
    .SetFallbackPolicy(new AuthorizationPolicyBuilder()
        .RequireAuthenticatedUser()
        .Build());

var app = builder.Build();
app.MapControllers(); // All endpoints require auth by default

// 2. Resource-based authorization to prevent IDOR
public sealed class DocumentAuthorizationHandler
    : AuthorizationHandler<, >
{
    
    {
         (resource.OwnerId == context.User.FindFirstValue(ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier))
        {
            context.Succeed(requirement);
        }
         Task.CompletedTask;
    }
}


app.MapPut(,  (
     id,
    DocumentDto dto,
    IAuthorizationService authService,
    ClaimsPrincipal user,
    AppDbContext db) =>
{
     document =  db.Documents.FindAsync(id);
     (document  )  Results.NotFound();

     authResult =  authService.AuthorizeAsync(user, document, );
     (!authResult.Succeeded)  Results.Forbid();

    document.Title = dto.Title;
     db.SaveChangesAsync();
     Results.NoContent();
});

```text

```csharp


builder.Services.AddCors(options =>
{
    options.AddPolicy(, policy =>
    {
        policy.WithOrigins()
              .WithMethods(, )
              .WithHeaders(, );
    });
});

```text

**Gotcha:** `AllowAnyOrigin()` combined  `AllowCredentials()`  rejected at runtime  ASP.NET Core, but `SetIsOriginAllowed(_ => )`  `AllowCredentials()` silently allows all origins -- never use  pattern.

---



**Vulnerability:** Sensitive data exposed due to weak  missing encryption -- plaintext storage, deprecated algorithms,  improper key management.

**Risk  .NET:** Using MD5/SHA1  hashing passwords, storing connection strings  plaintext passwords  `appsettings.json`, transmitting sensitive data over HTTP,   `DES`/`RC2`  encryption.



```csharp


builder.Services.AddHttpsRedirection(options =>
{
    options.HttpsPort = ;
});

 app = builder.Build();
app.UseHsts(); 
app.UseHttpsRedirection();




```json

```csharp



{
      IDataProtector _protector =
        provider.CreateProtector();

     => _protector.Protect(plaintext);

     => _protector.Unprotect(ciphertext);
}

```text

See [skill:dotnet-cryptography]  =  db.Orders
    .Where(o => o.CustomerId == customerId)
    .ToListAsync();


 results =  db.Orders
    .FromSqlInterpolated()
    .ToListAsync();




```text

```csharp




app.MapGet(, ( name) =>
    Results.Content(,
        ));



 =>
    toolName      ;

```bash

**Gotcha:** `FromSqlRaw`   concatenation bypasses parameterization. Always use `FromSqlInterpolated`  pass `SqlParameter` objects to `FromSqlRaw`.

---



**Vulnerability:** Flaws  design patterns that cannot be   implementation alone -- missing rate limiting, lack of defense  depth, unrestricted resource consumption.

**Risk  .NET:** APIs without rate limiting, unbounded  uploads, missing anti-forgery tokens  state-changing operations.



```csharp


builder.Services.AddRateLimiter(options =>
{
    options.AddFixedWindowLimiter(, limiterOptions =>
    {
        limiterOptions.PermitLimit = ;
        limiterOptions.Window = TimeSpan.FromMinutes();
        limiterOptions.QueueLimit = ;
    });
    options.RejectionStatusCode = StatusCodes.Status429TooManyRequests;
});

 app = builder.Build();
app.UseRateLimiter();

app.MapGet(, () => Results.Ok())
    .RequireRateLimiting();

```text

```csharp


builder.Services.AddAntiforgery();

 app = builder.Build();
app.UseAntiforgery();


app.MapPost(,  ([FromForm]  productId, AppDbContext db) =>
{
     order =  Order { ProductId = productId };
    db.Orders.Add(order);
     db.SaveChangesAsync();
     Results.Created(, order);
});


app.MapPost(,  (CreateOrderDto dto, AppDbContext db) =>
{
     order =  Order { ProductId = dto.ProductId };
    db.Orders.Add(order);
     db.SaveChangesAsync();
     Results.Created(, order);
}).RequireAntiforgery();

```text

**Gotcha:** `UseRateLimiter()` must be called after `UseRouting()`  before `MapControllers()`/`MapGet()` to apply correctly.

---



**Vulnerability:** Insecure  configurations, incomplete configurations, open cloud storage, unnecessary features enabled, verbose error messages.

**Risk  .NET:** ;

 app = builder.Build();

 (app.Environment.IsDevelopment())
{
    app.UseDeveloperExceptionPage();
}

{
    
    app.UseExceptionHandler();
    app.UseHsts();
}


app.Use( (context, next) =>
{
    context.Response.Headers.Append(, );
    context.Response.Headers.Append(, );
    context.Response.Headers.Append(, );
    context.Response.Headers.Append(
        ,
        );
     next();
});

```text

```csharp


builder.WebHost.ConfigureKestrel(options =>
{
    options.Limits.MaxRequestBodySize =  *  * ; 
    options.Limits.MaxRequestHeadersTotalSize =  * ; 
    options.Limits.RequestHeadersTimeout = TimeSpan.FromSeconds();
});



```text

**Gotcha:** `UseDeveloperExceptionPage()` leaks source code paths  stack traces. Ensure it  gated behind `IsDevelopment()`  never enabled  production  staging.

---



**Vulnerability:** Using components  known vulnerabilities, unsupported frameworks,  unpatched dependencies.

**Risk  .NET:** Running  -of-support .NET versions, NuGet packages  known CVEs, transitive dependency vulnerabilities  audited.



```xml

<!-- Enable NuGet audit  Directory.Build.props  csproj -->
<PropertyGroup>
  <NuGetAudit></NuGetAudit>
  <NuGetAuditLevel>low</NuGetAuditLevel>
  <NuGetAuditMode>all</NuGetAuditMode> <!-- Audit direct + transitive -->
</PropertyGroup>

```text

```bash


dotnet list package --vulnerable --include-transitive


dotnet outdated  


dotnet --info

```text

**Gotcha:** `NuGetAuditMode` defaults to `direct` -- transitive vulnerabilities are hidden unless you  `all`. Always use `all`  CI to  deep dependency issues.

---



**Vulnerability:** Weak authentication mechanisms, credential stuffing, session fixation, missing multi-factor authentication.

**Risk  .NET:** Default Identity password policies that are too weak, session cookies without `Secure`/`SameSite` attributes, missing account lockout configuration.



```csharp


builder.Services.AddIdentity<ApplicationUser, IdentityRole>(options =>
{
    
    options.Password.RequireDigit = ;
    options.Password.RequiredLength = ;
    options.Password.RequireNonAlphanumeric = ;
    options.Password.RequireUppercase = ;
    options.Password.RequireLowercase = ;

    
    options.Lockout.DefaultLockoutTimeSpan = TimeSpan.FromMinutes();
    options.Lockout.MaxFailedAccessAttempts = ;
    options.Lockout.AllowedForNewUsers = ;

    
    options.User.RequireUniqueEmail = ;
})
.AddEntityFrameworkStores<AppDbContext>()
.AddDefaultTokenProviders();

```text

```csharp


builder.Services.ConfigureApplicationCookie(options =>
{
    options.Cookie.HttpOnly = ;
    options.Cookie.SecurePolicy = CookieSecurePolicy.Always;
    options.Cookie.SameSite = SameSiteMode.Strict;
    options.ExpireTimeSpan = TimeSpan.FromHours();
    options.SlidingExpiration = ;
});

```text

**Gotcha:** `CookieSecurePolicy.SameAsRequest` allows cookies over HTTP  development, which  fine. But  production behind a reverse proxy terminating TLS, the app sees HTTP -- so cookies are sent insecurely. Always use `CookieSecurePolicy.Always`  production  configure forwarded headers.

---



**Vulnerability:** Code  infrastructure that does  protect against integrity violations -- unsigned packages, insecure CI/CD pipelines, deserialization of untrusted data.

**Risk  .NET:** Using `BinaryFormatter` = = />
    < key= = />
  </packageSources>
  <packageSourceMapping>
    <packageSource key=>
      <package pattern= />
    </packageSource>
    <packageSource key=>
      <package pattern= />
    </packageSource>
  </packageSourceMapping>
</configuration>

```text

```csharp




 data = JsonSerializer.Deserialize<OrderDto>(jsonString);



 bytes = MessagePackSerializer.Serialize(order);
 restored = MessagePackSerializer.Deserialize<Order>(bytes);

```text

**Gotcha:** Package source mapping uses most-specific-pattern-wins: `MyCompany.*` beats the `*` wildcard. Always define specific patterns   packages to prevent dependency confusion attacks.

---



**Vulnerability:** Insufficient logging of security-relevant events, lack of monitoring  breaches, inability to detect  respond to active attacks.

**Risk  .NET:** Not logging authentication failures, missing audit trails  sensitive operations, 
{
    
    {
         userId = context.User.FindFirstValue(ClaimTypes.NameIdentifier) ?? ;
         path = context.Request.Path.Value;

         (logger.BeginScope( Dictionary<, ?>
        {
            [] = userId,
            [] = path,
            [] = context.Connection.RemoteIpAddress?.ToString()
        }))
        {
             next(context);

            
             (context.Response.StatusCode == StatusCodes.Status401Unauthorized)
            {
                logger.LogWarning(, path);
            }

            
             (context.Response.StatusCode == StatusCodes.Status403Forbidden)
            {
                logger.LogWarning(, path);
            }
        }
    }
}

```text

```csharp



builder.Logging.AddFilter(, LogLevel.Warning);


builder.Services.AddHttpLogging(options =>
{
    options.LoggingFields = HttpLoggingFields.RequestPath
        | HttpLoggingFields.RequestMethod
        | HttpLoggingFields.ResponseStatusCode
        | HttpLoggingFields.Duration;
    
});

```text

**Gotcha:** Structured logging  `{Placeholder}` syntax  safe, 
{
       HashSet<> AllowedHosts = (StringComparer.OrdinalIgnoreCase)
    {
        ,
        
    };

    
    {
         (!Uri.TryCreate(url, UriKind.Absolute,   uri))
             ;

        
         (uri.Scheme != Uri.UriSchemeHttps)
             ;

        
         (IPAddress.TryParse(uri.Host,   ip))
        {
             (IsPrivateOrReserved(ip))
                 ;
        }

        
         AllowedHosts.Contains(uri.Host);
    }

    
    {
        [] bytes = ip.GetAddressBytes();
         bytes[] 
        {
             => ,                                         
             => ,                                        
              bytes[] ==  => ,                   
              bytes[] >=  && bytes[] <=  => ,  
              bytes[] ==  => ,                   
            _ => 
        };
    }
}


app.MapPost(,  (FetchRequest request, IHttpClientFactory factory) =>
{
     (!UrlValidator.IsAllowed(request.Url))
         Results.BadRequest();

     client = factory.CreateClient();
     response =  client.GetStringAsync(request.Url);
     Results.Ok(response);
});

```text

```csharp


builder.Services.AddHttpClient(, client =>
{
    client.BaseAddress =  Uri();
})
.ConfigurePrimaryHttpMessageHandler(() =>  SocketsHttpHandler
{
    AllowAutoRedirect =  
});

```text

**Gotcha:** DNS rebinding can bypass IP allowlists -- an attacker