container-security-reviewer

name	container-security-reviewer
description	Review Dockerfiles, base images, user rights, capabilities, SBOM, image signing, distroless or slim images, CVEs, and runtime hardening.
version	1.0.0
since	2026-08-27
last_modified	2026-08-27
authors	["platform-engineering"]
stability	stable
min_platform_version	{"codex":"unknown","amazon-q":"unknown","antigravity":"unknown","auggie":"unknown","bob":"unknown","claude-code":"unknown","cline":"unknown","codebuddy":"unknown","continue":"unknown","costrict":"unknown","crush":"unknown","github-copilot":"unknown","gitlab-duo":"unknown","factory":"unknown","forgecode":"unknown","opencode":"unknown","openhands":"unknown","cursor":"unknown","roo-code":"unknown","kiro":"unknown","junie":"unknown","gemini-cli":"unknown","iflow":"unknown","kilocode":"unknown","kimi":"unknown","lingma":"unknown","pi":"unknown","qoder":"unknown","qwen":"unknown","windsurf":"unknown","ollama":"unknown"}
deprecated_since	null
replaces	null
supersedes	[]
changelog	[{"version":"1.0.0","date":"2026-08-27","change":"Initial generated production-ready SDLC / DevSecOps skill"}]

Container Security Reviewer

Purpose

Review Dockerfiles, base images, user rights, capabilities, SBOM, image signing, distroless or slim images, CVEs, and runtime hardening. Treat regulatory, security, and operational references as review and evidence guidance, not legal advice.

Goal and behavioral contract

The authoritative Goal and artifact references are defined in descriptor.yaml. Capability boundaries, identity and delegation requirements, tool permissions, data boundaries, invariants, approval requirements, output contract, and operational limits are defined in contract.yaml. MCP/A2A trust boundaries and the reviewed execution closure live in integrations/ and dependencies.yaml; ASPS and assurance requirements live in assurance.yaml.

Treat those declarations as mandatory execution constraints. skcr validates requirements but does not claim verification or enforce them at runtime.

When to use

• container security decisions, controls, or operating practices need independent review.
• A change affects container security artifacts such as Dockerfile, base image, runtime user, Linux capability, image SBOM, signature.
• The user needs evidence-oriented findings for risks such as root container, bloated vulnerable image, unsigned image, excess capability, secret in layer, missing runtime hardening.
• Audit, security, operations, or platform stakeholders need a concise readiness position.
• Existing documentation, tickets, tests, or logs must be turned into actionable remediation items.

Operating model

1. Identify the relevant container security artifacts, owners, systems, environments, and review boundary.
2. Compare the available artifacts against expected signals such as image scan, SBOM digest, cosign verification, USER directive, seccomp profile, CVE triage.
3. Separate confirmed gaps from assumptions, missing evidence, and advisory improvement opportunities.
4. Rate findings by operational, security, compliance, customer, and auditability impact.
5. Recommend minimal remediation steps, validation evidence, owners, and review cadence.

Spec-Driven Change Context

• Treat repository specs, ADRs, runbooks, change proposals, design notes, and task files as durable context that outlives a chat session.
• For non-trivial changes, prefer a checked-in change artifact or equivalent proposal/design/tasks record before implementation begins.
• Capture requirement deltas explicitly: added, modified, removed, deprecated, or unchanged behavior.
• Keep implementation tasks traceable to acceptance criteria, affected specs, validation commands, and owners.