Comprehensive iOS app security audit with static analysis, dynamic instrumentation, source-to-sink tracing, IPC/component abuse analysis, and CVSS 4.0 reporting. Covers decompilation, Info.plist analysis, URL schemes and universal links, secrets detection, crypto analysis, Frida/Objection integration, and IPA modification. Use when user says "audit IPA", "analyze iOS app", "iOS pentest", "app security", "decompile IPA", "iOS vulnerability assessment", "reverse engineer iOS", "modify IPA", "URL scheme abuse", "bypass SSL pinning", "bypass jailbreak detection", "download IPA from App Store", or provides an IPA for security review, decompiled iOS sources, or decoded resources. Do NOT use for Android apps (use Android-specific skill), web application testing, or general programming help.
license
Apache-2.0
compatibility
macOS 11+ with Apple Silicon recommended (full functionality). Linux has ~90% compatibility with tool alternatives (see tool-installation-ios.md). Some features require jailbroken iOS device. Requires Frida, Objection, dsdump, and standard macOS toolchain (plutil, otool, codesign, security, lipo).
Language Rule (CRITICAL): Match the user's language in your responses.
If user speaks Spanish → reply in Spanish
If user speaks English → reply in English
If user speaks another language → reply in that language
Default to English only when the user's language is unclear
This rule applies to ALL interactions: questions, explanations, findings, everything.
Deterministic 6-phase static analysis + optional dynamic confirmation workflow. Remove noise early, keep the bundle scope tight. Only report vulnerabilities where source, propagation, and sink are understood or clearly marked as needing dynamic confirmation.
When to Use
User provides an IPA file for security review
User asks to analyze decompiled iOS source code
User needs to modify or repackage an IPA for testing
User wants iOS mobile security testing or vulnerability assessment
User needs help testing URL schemes, universal links, or IPC mechanisms
User mentions iOS reverse engineering or app analysis
NEVER report bare grep hits without traced context
ALWAYS constrain searches to the app namespace (avoid framework noise)
STOP and report immediately if decoding fails
ALWAYS use imperative language in findings
NEVER skip validation — if unsure, mark as "Needs Dynamic Confirmation"
ALWAYS provide concrete PoC (frida script, objection command, or URL scheme payload)
NEVER duplicate findings for the same root cause
이 SKILL.md는 매우 커서 SkillsMP가 여기에는 첫 섹션만 미리 보여줍니다.GitHub에서 보기
Quality Note: Take your time to analyze thoroughly. Quality is more important than speed. Do not skip validation steps — a false positive is worse than a missed finding.
Reference: Before diving into specific analysis phases, consult references/ for detailed methodology on Mach-O analysis, crypto patterns, IPC abuse, and troubleshooting.
Interactive Decision Points
ALWAYS ask these questions BEFORE proceeding with the corresponding action.
Session Context (Remember for Entire Session)
The FIRST question establishes session context — remember the answer and reuse it.
When the user first provides an IPA or requests any action, establish:
Target Environment — iOS Simulator OR Physical Device
If Physical: Jailbreak status (jailbroken / non-jailbroken)
If Simulator: iOS version/runtime
Store this context and reuse it for ALL subsequent actions in the session.
Rule: Only ask "Simulator or Physical Device?" ONCE per session. After the first answer, use that context for all install/hook/modify decisions without re-asking.
SimForge Requirement (Apple Silicon only): When Simulator is chosen, ALWAYS use SimForge to patch arm64 binaries for simulator compatibility. See references/simforge-ios-testing.md.
Example Flow:
User: "Install this IPA"
Agent: "Simulator or physical device?"
User: "Simulator"
Agent: [Uses SimForge to patch, then installs to simulator]
... later ...
User: "Bypass SSL pinning"
Agent: [Uses simulator commands directly, NO re-ask]
When Installing an IPA
User request: "Install this IPA", "Install the app", "Deploy the IPA"
Required questions:
Target environment? — iOS Simulator OR Physical Device (jailbroken/non-jailbroken)
If Physical Device: Is it jailbroken? (determines if Frida server is available)
If Simulator: Which iOS version/runtime? (xcrun simctl list)
Commands based on answer:
Simulator: Use SimForge to patch arm64 binary → xcrun simctl install <UDID> <app-path>
See references/simforge-ios-testing.md for complete SimForge workflow
Physical (non-jailbroken): Needs re-signing with provisioning profile first
When Dynamic Analysis is Requested
User request: "Hook this app", "Bypass SSL pinning", "Intercept traffic", "Runtime analysis"
Required questions:
Target environment? — Use session context (established above)
Is Frida server running? — Verify with frida-ps -U (device) or frida-ps -D (simulator)
App bundle ID or process name? — Need exact identifier for attachment
When Modifying/Repackaging an IPA
User request: "Modify this IPA", "Patch the app", "Re-sign", "Repackage"
Required questions:
What modification? — Bypass protection, patch code, change resources, etc.
Target device type? — Use session context (jailbroken vs stock)
Provisioning profile available? — Required if stock device
When URL Scheme Testing
User request: "Test URL schemes", "Test deep links", "IPC testing"
Required questions:
Test target? — Static analysis (plist grep) OR Runtime (use session context)
Specific schemes to test? — Or test all found in Info.plist
Payload injection needed? — Yes for XSS/parameter testing, No for enumeration only
When Crypto/Keychain Testing
User request: "Test encryption", "Keychain analysis", "Crypto review"
Required questions:
Analysis type? — Static (code patterns) OR Runtime (Frida hooks)
Target algorithms? — CommonCrypto, CryptoKit, third-party, or all
Key extraction needed? — Yes (requires Frida) or No (pattern analysis only)
Rule: NEVER assume the target environment. ALWAYS ask before executing install/hook/modify commands.
Execution Model
Tools to use: bash, write, edit, read, glob, grep for core workflow.
Toolchain Requirements
Before starting, verify these tools are installed:
Frida (frida --version) — pinned version in references/tool-versions.md; ⚠️ frida-server on device must match the host frida core version (frida --version) exactly
Objection 1.12.4 (objection --version) — Note: Objection is in maintenance mode
dsdump dsdump_b2 (project archived Dec 2025) — Swift class dump for modern iOS binaries
class-dump (optional) — Objective-C class dump for legacy apps
plutil (system) — plist manipulation (preinstalled on macOS)
codesign (system) — code signing (preinstalled on macOS)
security (system) — keychain access (preinstalled on macOS)
lipo (system) — fat binary manipulation (preinstalled on macOS)
nm (system) — symbol extraction (preinstalled on macOS)
strings (system) — string extraction (preinstalled on macOS)
otool (system) — Mach-O analysis (preinstalled on macOS)
jtool2 (optional) — Advanced Mach-O analysis
SimForge (REQUIRED for arm64 apps on Simulator, Apple Silicon only) — simforge — Patches Mach-O LC_BUILD_VERSION to run arm64 iOS apps in the simulator with dylib injection (no jailbroken device required). See references/simforge-ios-testing.md.
ipatool (optional) — ipatool --version — Download IPAs from the App Store. Output is FairPlay-encrypted. See references/ipa-extraction-guide.md §5.
Python 3.10+ (python3 --version)
Run scripts/preflight-check.sh (bash), scripts/preflight_check.py (universal, JSON output), or scripts/preflight-check.ps1 (PowerShell) to verify all tools. See references/environment-setup-ios.md for installation instructions. See references/tool-versions.md for version requirements.
Phase 0 — Extract and Detect Framework
Extract IPA
# Extract IPA (IPA is a zip file)
unzip app.ipa -d extracted/
cd extracted/Payload/YourApp.app/
Reference: references/macho-binary-analysis.md for the complete Mach-O analysis methodology (LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO, LC_CODE_SIGNATURE, segment layout, symbol tables, strip/binary thinning).
Reference: references/advanced-tools-ios.md for the deep-dive tool set (Corellium, Hopper, Ghidra, frida-trace, lldb).
Reference: references/bitcode-analysis.md when the binary is bitcode-enabled (older App Store builds).
Reference: references/tool-installation-ios.md for tool install and troubleshooting.
Reference: references/libimobiledevice-guide.md for device pairing, syslog, backup, and filesystem access via the libimobiledevice toolchain.
Encrypted binary recovery: if cryptid == 1 after otool -l, use the bundled assets/frida-scripts/dump-ios.js to dump the decrypted binary from memory.
Framework Detection
Identify the app's architecture early to tailor analysis.
Framework
Detection Method
Key Artifacts
React Native
rg "RCTBridgeModule" · Check for libReactNative.a
index.ios.bundle, libReactNative.a
Flutter
Check Frameworks/ for Flutter.framework and App.framework · Check for FLT* keys in Info.plist (FLTEnableImpeller, FLTEnableSurfaceControl)
App.framework, Flutter.framework, flutter_assets/
Cordova/Ionic
rg "cordova" in Info.plist · Check www/ directory
cordova.js, config.xml
Xamarin
rg "xamarin" · Check for Mono runtime
libmonosgen-2.0.dylib
Unity
rg "UnityEngine" · Check for UnityFramework.framework
Data/Managed/, UnityFramework.framework
Swift Native
Check for Swift symbols · dsdump output shows Swift classes
Swift-only codebase
Objective-C
Check for ObjC runtime · class-dump shows ObjC classes
ObjC-only codebase
Reference: references/framework-detection-ios.md for complete detection scripts, Frida detection hooks, and framework-specific security considerations.
Framework-specific deep dives (load the relevant one when you detect the framework):
references/react-native-ios-security.md
references/flutter-ios-security.md
references/cordova-ios-security.md
references/xamarin-ios-security.md
references/unity-ios-security.md (also covers running Unity IL2CPP games in the simulator — Metal heap fix — and IL2CPP reverse engineering with Il2CppDumper on macOS)
references/swiftui-security-deep-dive.md (even for native SwiftUI apps)
references/core-ml-security.md and references/core-ml-security-expanded.md (apps with on-device ML)
Obfuscation Detection
Swift Obfuscation: Generic class names (a.b.c, x_1, internal_), mangled symbols
✅ CORRELATION: Findings merged with manual analysis
Interactive Setup (automatically prompts):
# Run MobSF detection and setup
python3 scripts/setup_mobsf.py
This script will:
Check if MobSF is already installed
Offer installation options if not found
Configure API access
Test connectivity
Save configuration for future sessions
Quick Start (Docker):
# Install MobSF via Docker
./scripts/install-mobsf-docker.sh
# Configure API
python3 scripts/mobsf_config.py set-url http://127.0.0.1:8000
python3 scripts/mobsf_config.py set-key generate
# Verify configuration
python3 scripts/mobsf_config.py status
Using MobSF in Analysis:
# Upload IPA to MobSF
python3 scripts/mobsf_upload.py --ipa app.ipa
# Get scan results
python3 scripts/mobsf_export.py --scan-id <SCAN_ID>
# Export findings for correlation
python3 scripts/mobsf_export.py --scan-id <SCAN_ID> --format json
Alternative: Local Install (no Docker):
# Detect an existing MobSF install or a running server
python3 scripts/mobsf_detect.py
# Install MobSF locally (clones repo + sets up a virtualenv)
./scripts/install-mobsf-local.sh
# Start the local MobSF server
./scripts/run-mobsf-local.sh
Correlation: merge MobSF's automated detections with your manual source-to-sink findings to deduplicate and enrich evidence using scripts/mobsf_findings_correlator.py.
NOTE: MobSF integration is OPTIONAL. The skill works perfectly without it.
Phase 1 — Attack Surface Mapping
Analyze Info.plist
plutil -p Info.plist # Pretty print plist
# Extract specific keys (only works on top-level keys)
plutil -extract CFBundleURLTypes xml1 -o - Info.plist # CFBundleURLSchemes is nested inside this array
plutil -extract NSAppTransportSecurity xml1 -o - Info.plist
# For nested keys, use PlistBuddy:
/usr/libexec/PlistBuddy -c "Print :CFBundleURLTypes:0:CFBundleURLSchemes" Info.plist
URL Schemes (Deep Links)
Extract and document all custom URL schemes:
Key
What It Controls
Security Impact
CFBundleURLSchemes
Custom schemes (e.g., myapp://)
URL scheme injection via malicious URLs
CFBundleURLTypes
Scheme declarations
Attack surface enumeration
NSAppTransportSecurity
TLS/ATS settings
Cleartext traffic, insecure connections
Info.plist Security Keys
Key
What It Controls
Security Checks
UIBackgroundModes
Background capabilities
Unintended background data collection
NSPhotoLibraryUsageDescription
Photo access
Permission request clarity, photo library scope
NSCameraUsageDescription
Camera access
Permission request clarity
NSMicrophoneUsageDescription
Microphone access
Permission request clarity
NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription
Location access
Permission request clarity
NSLocationAlwaysAndWhenInUseUsageDescription
Background location
Justification for always-on tracking
NSFaceIDUsageDescription
Face ID biometric
Required since iOS 11; fallback policy
NSContactsUsageDescription
Contacts access
PII extraction scope
NSHealthShareUsageDescription
HealthKit read
PII / health data scope
NSHealthUpdateUsageDescription
HealthKit write
Health data write justification
NSRemindersUsageDescription
Reminders access
PII scope
NSBluetoothPeripheralUsageDescription
Bluetooth (legacy)
Legacy key, replaced in iOS 13
NSBluetoothAlwaysUsageDescription
Bluetooth (modern)
iOS 13+ required for always-on BLE
NSSpeechRecognitionUsageDescription
Speech recognition
Audio data exfiltration scope
NSUserTrackingUsageDescription
App Tracking Transparency
Required for IDFA access since iOS 14.5
NSAppTransportSecurity
ATS exceptions
See references/ats-configuration-guide.md
LSApplicationQueriesSchemes
canOpenURL whitelist
Enumerates installed apps; surface for fingerprinting
In-house / VPP / DEP apps and MDM-managed devices expand the attack surface via configuration profiles, managed app config, and enterprise distribution certificates.
Configuration profiles (.mobileconfig): inspect for over-broad payloads, injected trusted CAs, and VPN/proxy settings.
Managed app config: read the NSUserDefaults key com.apple.configuration.managed.
Enterprise certs: validate the signing identity and provisioning scope (codesign -dvv).
Reference: references/enterprise-app-testing.md, references/mdm-security-testing.md, and references/configuration-profile-abuse.md.
Dynamic (Phase 4): assets/frida-scripts/mdm-bypass.js (MDM restriction bypass) and assets/frida-scripts/enterprise-cert-bypass.js (enterprise cert trust bypass).
Automation: references/automation-scripts-ios.md and scripts/auto-audit-static-ios.sh (one-shot static analysis driver for Phases 0–3).
Data Storage Locations (Quick Reference)
When analyzing data storage, check these locations for sensitive data exposure:
Location
Path Pattern
What to Check
Tool
NSUserDefaults
Library/Preferences/*.plist
Tokens, user data, feature flags, config
plutil -p
Core Data
Library/Application Support/*.sqlite
Cached API responses, user records, local DB
sqlite3
Keychain
System keychain database
Credentials, encryption keys, certificates
keychain-dumper, Frida
Cookies
Library/Cookies/*.binarycookies
Session cookies, authentication tokens
Binary parsing
Cache
Library/Caches/
Cached API responses, images with PII
find, strings
Snapshots
Library/SplashBoard/Snapshots/
App state screenshots (may contain PII)
Image review
Keyboard
Library/Keyboard/
Autocomplete entries with sensitive input
strings
Pasteboard
System pasteboard
Copied passwords, tokens, sensitive data
Frida hook
WebView Storage
Library/WebKit/WebsiteData/
LocalStorage, IndexedDB, cookies
sqlite3
Tmp
tmp/
Temporary files, may contain sensitive data
find, strings
Full reference: references/data-protection-api-guide.mdTesting: Use assets/frida-scripts/pasteboard-monitor.js, assets/frida-scripts/keylogger-basic.js
Phase 2 — Targeted Triage
Scoped Grep Patterns
ALWAYS grep within the app namespace only. Use patterns from references/static-analysis-patterns-ios.md:
Swift Concurrency → swift-concurrency-monitor-ios.js
SBOM & Supply Chain (OWASP M2)
Enumerate embedded frameworks, third-party SDKs, and their known CVEs:
# Generate a Software Bill of Materials from the IPA (CycloneDX / SPDX / JSON)
python3 scripts/sbom_generator.py --input app.ipa --format all --output sbom/
# Scan the SBOM for vulnerable or risky dependencies
python3 scripts/dependency_scanner.py --sbom sbom/sbom.json --check-cves --check-licenses --output dep-scan.json
Reference: references/sbom-supply-chain-guide.md for SBOM formats (CycloneDX/SPDX) and supply-chain risk methodology; references/third-party-sdk-analysis.md for per-SDK review (trackers, network behavior, ATS exemptions).
Runtime SDK behavior: assets/frida-scripts/sdk-tracer.js enumerates loaded third-party SDKs and hooks their methods for actual network/credential behavior (often more accurate than the static SDK inventory).
MobSF correlation (optional): scripts/mobsf_findings_correlator.py merges your manual findings with MobSF's automated ones, deduplicating overlapping detections.
Phase 3 — Data Flow Tracing
Source-to-Sink Methodology
Map data flow from untrusted sources to dangerous sinks:
Common Sources (iOS)
Source
Method
Example
URL Schemes
application(_:open:)
Malicious scheme URLs
Universal Links
application(_:continueUserActivity:)
Universal link abuse
Pasteboard
UIPasteboard.general.string
Data from clipboard
App Groups
Shared container NSFileManager
Inter-app data
XPC
NSXPCConnection
Inter-process communication
Keychain
SecItemCopyMatching
Stored credentials
Notifications
UNUserNotificationCenter
Notification payloads
WebView JS Bridge
WKScriptMessageHandler
Untrusted JS calls
Common Sinks (iOS)
iOS scope: iOS apps run in a sandbox and cannot spawn child processes (no NSTask, no Process, no popen). Realistic "execution" paths on iOS go through WebView JS bridges, XPC, URL schemes, or app group data exfiltration — not OS command execution.
Reference: references/deep-link-exploitation-ios.md for modern attack vectors: URL scheme injection, universal link abuse, WebView XSS, pasteboard attacks, XPC injection, app group data leakage, notification abuse.
Reference: references/url-scheme-security-guide.md for a complete scheme-by-scheme audit checklist (registration, parsing, validation, origin checks).
Reference: references/ipc-xpc-guide.md and references/xpc-services-security.md for the XPC connection lifecycle and audit patterns.
Reference: references/webview-security-ios.md for WKWebView and UIWebView attack surface (uiwebview-interceptor.js runtime hook).
Reference: references/notification-security.md for APNS token handling and notification payload abuse.
Reference: references/app-groups-security.md for shared container attack surface and app-groups-inspector.js runtime hook.
Clipboard as exfiltration channel → keylogger-basic.js (only when relevant)
Phase 4 — Dynamic Analysis (Optional)
Use when static analysis hits a wall: obfuscation, reflection, native code, runtime protections.
Simulator-Based Testing (Apple Silicon, no jailbreak required)
When no jailbroken device is available, SimForge lets you run a decrypted arm64 iOS app in the iOS simulator and inject dylibs (e.g., Frida Gadget) without frida-server. Use it as a fast first iteration before escalating to a physical device.
Prerequisite for HTTP(S) interception in the simulator: install your proxy's CA cert into the simulator's trust store before launching the app. On the simulator this is a single command (no Settings UI, no trust toggle), and the proxy host is 127.0.0.1 — the simulator shares the host's loopback. See references/simulator-mitm-setup.md for the full flow (works for Burp Suite, Charles, mitmproxy, Proxyman, OWASP ZAP).
Frida on iOS Simulator (Frida 17+): Use the .implementation hook pattern and attach by PID. All simulator-specific gotchas, CLI syntax changes, and verified recipes are in references/frida-ios-simulator-workflow.md.
Simulator visibility: By default, the simulator launches in visible mode. Only use headless mode when explicitly requested by the user.
Reference: references/simforge-ios-testing.md for the complete workflow, internal architecture (LC_BUILD_VERSION patching, SIMCTL_CHILD_DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES injection, tmpfs overlays), use cases (Frida Gadget, Theos tweaks, URL scheme testing, SpringBoard patching), limitations, and troubleshooting. For deep dives, see references/simforge-emulation-flow.md (the canonical 10-step procedure with pre-flight checks), references/simforge-crash-triage.md (diagnostic methodology with decision tree by termination.namespace+indicator), and references/simforge-compatibility.md (FairPlay / Swift ABI / hardware capability matrix).
Unity games in the simulator (Metal heap crash): if a converted Unity (IL2CPP) game aborts at graphics init with MTLStorageModePrivate is required for heaps, inject the interposer dylib assets/dylibs/metalheapfix.m (one-command driver: scripts/unity_sim_metalfix.sh <UDID> <bundle-id>). Full methodology + IL2CPP reversing (Il2CppDumper on macOS) in references/unity-ios-security.md; triage entry in references/simforge-crash-triage.md.
Troubleshooting: Mixed Load Commands
If the app crashes immediately after simforge convert with dyld assertion or SIGSEGV:
# Detect the problem: frameworks with BOTH load commands
otool -l Payload/YourApp.app/Frameworks/Suspect.framework/Suspect | grep -A3 "LC_VERSION_MIN\|LC_BUILD"
# Bad output shows BOTH:
# cmd LC_VERSION_MIN_IPHONEOS
# version 10.0
# cmd LC_BUILD_VERSION
# platform 7
# Clean up using the provided script
python3 scripts/simforge_cleanup.py Payload/YourApp.app
# Re-sign
codesign -f -s - --all-architectures Payload/YourApp.app
# Relaunch
xcrun simctl launch booted com.example.app
Why this happens: SimForge adds LC_BUILD_VERSION for simulator but doesn't remove the legacy LC_VERSION_MIN_IPHONEOS. Modern dyld rejects binaries with mixed version commands. See references/simforge-legacy-loadcmd-cleanup.md for detailed methodology.
Unity IL2CPP Simulator Fix (metalheapfix)
Critical: Unity 2021.x IL2CPP apps crash on the iOS Simulator due to MTLHeap using MTLStorageModeShared (valid on device, rejected by simulator's MTLSimDriver). This is NOT a code signing or packaging issue — it's a Metal driver incompatibility.
Fix: A dylib that intercepts MTLCreateSystemDefaultDevice() via DYLD_INTERPOSE and swizzles -[MTLSimDevice newHeapWithDescriptor:] to return nil. This forces Unity to fall back to direct buffer allocation (device.newBufferWithLength:options:) which the simulator supports.
⚠️ WRONG APPROACH (don't repeat): Forcing descriptor.storageMode = MTLStorageModePrivate passes the heap assertion but crashes at buffer creation (MTLSimHeap newBufferWithLength: → XPC error) because Unity's scratch buffers need CPU write access and Private heaps are GPU-only. The correct fix is returning nil, not forcing Private.
⚠️ Runtime version matters: Test on the SAME iOS runtime that was verified. iOS 18.6 works. iOS 17.5 may NOT work — the MTLSimDriver behavior differs between runtimes and the swizzle may not prevent heap creation on older runtimes. ALWAYS check xcrun simctl list devices and match the runtime explicitly.
Combine with Frida: You can inject multiple dylibs by colon-separating: SIMCTL_CHILD_DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES="/path/to/metalheapfix.dylib:/path/to/frida-gadget.dylib"
Making it Permanent: Embedding the Dylib in the Bundle
The SIMCTL_CHILD_DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES approach only works per-launch via command line. To make the fix permanent (app launches by tapping the icon), embed the dylib inside the bundle:
Concept: Add an LC_LOAD_DYLIB load command to the Mach-O binary so dyld loads the dylib automatically at startup. This is the same technique used for Frida Gadget injection, bypass tweaks, and any permanent code modification.
# 1. Copy dylib into Frameworks/
cp metalheapfix.dylib App.app/Frameworks/
# 2. Set the install name (dylib's internal identity)
install_name_tool -id "@executable_path/Frameworks/metalheapfix.dylib" \
App.app/Frameworks/metalheapfix.dylib
# 3. Add LC_LOAD_DYLIB to the main binary
# install_name_tool CANNOT add new load commands — use one of these:
# Option A: LIEF (Python, most reliable, cross-platform)
pip install lief
python3 -c "
import lief
binary = lief.MachO.parse('App.app/YourBinary')
for b in binary.builders:
b.add(lief.MachO.DylibCommand.from_path('@executable_path/Frameworks/metalheapfix.dylib'))
b.write('App.app/YourBinary')
break
"
# Option B: insert_dylib (third-party)
insert_dylib --strip-codesig --all-yes \
@executable_path/Frameworks/metalheapfix.dylib App.app/YourBinary
# Option C: optool
optool install -c load -p @executable_path/Frameworks/metalheapfix.dylib \
-t App.app/YourBinary
# 4. Re-sign everything (order matters — dylib first, bundle last)
codesign -f -s - App.app/Frameworks/metalheapfix.dylib
codesign -f -s - App.app/Frameworks/*
codesign -f -s - App.app
codesign -v --strict App.app
# 5. Install and launch — NO DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES needed
xcrun simctl install $UDID App.app
xcrun simctl launch $UDID com.example.app # just works!
Unity note: The main binary is a thin stub (~85KB). Adding LC_LOAD_DYLIB to the stub is sufficient — dyld processes DYLD_INTERPOSE globally regardless of which binary triggered the load. If it doesn't work, also add the load command to UnityFramework.framework/UnityFramework.
This technique applies to ANY dylib injection: Frida Gadget, SSL pinning bypass, jailbreak detection bypass, custom tweaks — the process is identical.
Frida iOS Integration
Frida Installation on macOS (Python 3.14+): macOS with Homebrew Python 3.14+ has PEP 668 enabled, which blocks global pip installs. See references/tool-installation-ios.md for complete troubleshooting.
# Recommended: Use pipx (isolated installation)
brew install pipx
pipx install frida-tools
export PATH="$HOME/.local/bin:$PATH"
# Alternative 1: --break-system-packages (dev/testing)
python3 -m pip install --break-system-packages frida frida-tools
# Alternative 2: User directory
python3 -m pip install --user frida frida-tools
export PATH="$HOME/Library/Python/3.14/bin:$PATH"
# Verify installation
frida --version # Should show 17.x
Simulator Workflow (Frida 17+)
# Step-by-step for iOS Simulator:
# 1. Get simulator UDID
UDID=$(xcrun simctl list devices booted | grep -oE "[A-F0-9]{8}-[A-F0-9]{4}-[A-F0-9]{4}-[A-F0-9]{4}-[A-F0-9]{12}")
# 2. Launch app
xcrun simctl launch booted com.example.app
sleep 2
# 3. Get PID (alternative method if simctl spawn fails)
PID=$(xcrun simctl spawn booted launchctl list 2>/dev/null | rg "com.example.app" | awk '{print $1}' || ps aux | rg "com.example.app" | awk '{print $2}')
# 4. Attach Frida (CRITICAL: Use -D for simulator, not -U)
frida -D $UDID -p $PID -l script.js
Syscall Hook Limitations: On simulator, C-level syscall hooks (stat(), fopen(), fork(), posix_spawn()) may fail. Use ObjC method hooks via .implementation pattern instead. See references/frida-ios-simulator-workflow.md for complete patterns and limitations.
Device Workflow (Jailbroken)
-U = USB device (jailbroken physical device with frida-server running). For simulator, use -D <SIMULATOR_UDID> instead — see Simulator Workflow below.
Gotcha: frida-ps -U works without jailbreak (uses lockdownd API), but frida -U -p / frida -U -f require jailbreak or Frida Gadget. If attach fails with "need Gadget to attach on jailed iOS", the device is not jailbroken — see references/troubleshooting-ios.md for solutions (SimForge, Gadget injection).
# Spawn app with hook
frida -U -f com.example.app -l script.js
# Attach to running process
frida -U com.example.app -l script.js
Frida for iOS
// Check if Frida can attach
if (ObjC.available) {
console.log("Objective-C runtime available");
// List all loaded classes
console.log(ObjC.classes);
} else {
console.log("Objective-C runtime not available");
}
Reference: bundled Frida scripts in assets/frida-scripts/. See references/frida-scripts-index.md for the canonical catalog.
Focused runtime triage: use pasteboard-monitor.js for clipboard visibility, xpc-tracer.js for XPC/native boundary discovery, and url-scheme-monitor.js for URL scheme logging.
SSL Pinning bypass: references/ssl-pinning-bypass-ios.md + assets/frida-scripts/ssl-pinning-bypass-ios.jsAnti-tamper bypass: references/runtime-integrity-bypass.md + assets/frida-scripts/jailbreak-detection-bypass.js (comprehensive: ObjC file/URL/write-test checks + stat/fopen/fork/posix_spawn/dlopen syscalls + direct isJailbroken/jailbreakTest method discovery) for anti-debug, anti-frida, and jailbreak detection bypass. For a quick, low-noise pass on apps that only call isJailbroken-style methods (or when the C-level hooks destabilize the target), use the lightweight assets/frida-scripts/jailbreak-bypass-ios.js instead. For simulator work, prefer jailbreak-bypass-ios.js — it uses the .implementation pattern required by Frida 17+ on the simulator (see references/frida-ios-simulator-workflow.md).
RASP bypass:
Comprehensive guide: references/rasp-guide-ios.md + assets/frida-scripts/rasp-bypass-ios.js — 15 RASP solutions (FreeRASP, IOSSecuritySuite, JailMonkey, plus 12 commercial: Arxan/Digital.ai, Guardsquare, Promon SHIELD, Appdome, Irdeto, WhiteCryption, Verimatrix, Zimperium, IBM Trusteer, Pradeo, V-Key, Build38). Includes detection methods, weaknesses, and bypass techniques for each.
Reusable patterns: references/rasp-patterns-ios.md — Generic RASP bypass patterns (dylib injection, SimForge complete conversion, framework stub creation, Frida 17+ simulator patterns, white screen diagnosis). Applicable to any iOS app.
Framework stub guide: references/rasp-framework-stub-guide.md — How to create Objective-C framework stubs for simulator compatibility (NuDetectSDK, IOSSecuritySuite, FreeRASP templates included)
Debugger detection: references/debugger-detection-bypass.md for sysctl P_TRACED, ptrace PT_DENY_ATTACH, getppid() checks and Frida Interceptor bypasses.
Secure Enclave probing: references/secure-enclave-testing.md + assets/frida-scripts/secure-enclave-probe.js.
iCloud Private Relay testing: references/icloud-private-relay-testing.md for relay-aware network captures.
Enterprise / MDM bypass: assets/frida-scripts/mdm-bypass.js and assets/frida-scripts/enterprise-cert-bypass.js for managed-device restrictions and enterprise certificate trust.
Jailbreak setup: references/jailbreak-setup-guide.md for the supported iOS versions and current checkra1n / palera1n / Dopamine coverage.
Frida server installation: references/frida-server-ios-install.md for step-by-step Frida server setup on jailbroken devices.
Frida on iOS (full guide): references/frida-ios-guide.md for installation, gadget mode, spawn vs attach.
Objection (full guide): references/objection-ios-guide.md for non-Frida interactive exploration.
Reference: references/libimobiledevice-guide.md for device pairing, syslog, backup, screenshot, and IPA installation commands.
Phase 5 — Classification and Reporting
Confidence Levels
Level
Definition
Example Evidence
Confirmed
Full source-to-sink trace validated
Direct call chain from URL scheme source to WKWebView.evaluateJavaScript() with no sanitization
Likely
Strong evidence, minor gaps
Static trace clear but reflection obscures final sink
Needs Dynamic Confirmation
Static analysis inconclusive
Obfuscated code or native boundary requiring runtime verification
Severity
Use CVSS 4.0. See references/cvss-scoring-ios.md for complete methodology, iOS-specific examples, and severity mapping. See references/cvss-examples-ios.md for 10 worked examples (ATS bypass, keychain exposure, URL scheme hijack, jailbreak bypass, biometric bypass, etc.).
Finding Template
## [ID] - [Title]
**Confidence**: [Confirmed/Likely/Needs Dynamic Confirmation]
**Severity**: [Critical/High/Medium/Low] (CVSS: [X.X])
**CWE**: [CWE-ID]
**OWASP**: [OWASP Category]
### Description
[1-2 sentences explaining what the vulnerability is]
### Affected Components
- **File**: `path/to/file.m` or `path/to/ViewController.swift`
- **Method**: `methodName` or `@objc func methodName()`
- **Component**: `[ViewController/Service/Extension]` (if applicable)
### Attack Scenario
1. Attacker [action, e.g., crafts malicious URL scheme with payload]
2. App [processing step, e.g., extracts parameter without validation]
3. Data propagates through [call chain]
4. Reaches sink [dangerous operation]
5. Results in [impact, e.g., arbitrary JavaScript execution in WebView context, data exfiltration, or credential theft]
### Proof of Concept
```bash
# Example: URL scheme path traversal
xcrun simctl openurl booted "myapp://deeplink?path=../../../../etc/passwd"
```
Or provide Frida hook script for dynamic verification:
```javascript
// Hook vulnerable method
const targetClass = ObjC.classes.MyViewController;
if (targetClass) {
const method = targetClass['- processURL:'];
if (method) {
Interceptor.attach(method.implementation, {
onEnter: function(args) {
console.log("URL processed: " + ObjC.Object(args[2]));
}
});
}
}
```
### Impact
- **Confidentiality**: [High/Medium/Low/None] — [explanation]
- **Integrity**: [High/Medium/Low/None] — [explanation]
- **Availability**: [High/Medium/Low/None] — [explanation]
### Remediation
```swift
// Provide secure code example
func application(_ app: UIApplication, open url: URL, options: [UIApplication.OpenURLOptionsKey: Any] = [:]) -> Bool {
// Parse URL query parameters safely using URLComponents
guard let components = URLComponents(url: url, resolvingAgainstBaseURL: false),
let queryItems = components.queryItems,
let input = queryItems.first(where: { $0.name == "path" })?.value,
isValidPath(input) else {
os_log("Invalid path detected")
return false
}
loadContent(at: input)
return true
}
private func isValidPath(_ path: String) -> Bool {
// Prevent path traversal and validate format
return !path.contains("..") && path.range(of: "^/safe/[a-zA-Z0-9_]+\\.html$", options: .regularExpression) != nil
}
```
Or Objective-C:
```objc
- (BOOL)application:(UIApplication *)app openURL:(NSURL *)url options:(NSDictionary *)options {
// NSURL has no -queryParameterValue: method. Use NSURLComponents + NSURLQueryItem.
NSURLComponents *components = [NSURLComponents componentsWithURL:url resolvingAgainstBaseURL:NO];
if (!components) return NO; // Invalid URL
NSArray<NSURLQueryItem *> *queryItems = components.queryItems;
NSString *input = nil;
for (NSURLQueryItem *item in queryItems) {
if ([item.name isEqualToString:@"path"]) {
input = item.value;
break;
}
}
if ([self isValidPath:input]) {
[self loadContentAtPath:input];
} else {
NSLog(@"Invalid path detected");
return NO;
}
return YES;
}
```
### CVSS 4.0 Calculation
[Show vector string and score breakdown]
Coverage Statement
End your report with:
Coverage Analysis:
- Static Analysis: Complete (all decompiled sources analyzed)
- Dynamic Analysis: [Complete/Partial/Not Performed] (reason if partial)
- Scope: [com.example.app.* bundle only]
- Framework: [React Native/Flutter/Native/Standard]
- Obfuscation: [Swift Obfuscator/Custom/None]
Limitations:
- [List any limitations, e.g., "Native code analysis requires additional tools"]
- [Any components that could not be analyzed]
- [Any findings requiring additional verification]
Total Findings: X (Critical: Y, High: Z, Medium: A, Low: B)
Reference: references/reporting-templates-ios.md for executive summary format, remediation priority matrix, and presentation templates.
Automated Report Generation
Use the generate-report.py script to generate professional HTML or Markdown reports from findings JSON:
The script supports both JSON array format and JSONL (one finding per line) and automatically:
Sorts findings by severity (Critical first)
Calculates CVSS 4.0 severity scores
Generates executive summary with risk rating
Maps OWASP MASTG categories
Provides formatted proof of concept and remediation sections
See scripts/test-findings.json for the expected JSON structure.
Reference: references/reporting-templates-ios.md for the full executive-summary format, remediation priority matrix, and presentation slide templates.
Reference: references/owasp-mastg-ios-checklist.md for the full MASTG test catalog (use it to make sure every applicable test has been run before signing off the report).
Reference: references/ios-privacy-testing.md for the privacy/ATT/Privacy Manifest section of the report.
IPA Modification Workflow
0. Optional: Convert for simulator testing (Apple Silicon)
Before any modification, if you intend to test the app in the iOS simulator instead of a physical device, run simforge convert to patch the Mach-O LC_BUILD_VERSION to PLATFORM_IOSSIMULATOR. This breaks the original code signature, so re-sign (step 3) becomes mandatory.
simforge convert /path/to/Payload/YourApp.app
# Re-signing in step 3 below will also cover this case
Reference: references/simforge-ios-testing.md for the full simulator-based modification + dylib injection flow.
1. Extract
unzip app.ipa -d app-extracted/
cd app-extracted/Payload/YourApp.app/
2. Modify
Binary Patching
Use tools like otool, jtool2, or hex editor to patch binary:
# Example: NOP out jailbreak detection
jtool2 -d YourApp > disassembly.txt
# Or specify architecture: ARCH=arm64 jtool2 -d YourApp > disassembly.txt
# Edit binary with hex editor or jtool2
# Remove existing signature
codesign --remove-signature YourApp.app
# Embed the provisioning profile INSIDE the .app bundle (codesign has no --provisioning-profile flag;
# the standard workflow is to place the .mobileprovision as embedded.mobileprovision inside the bundle)
cp YourProfile.mobileprovision YourApp.app/embedded.mobileprovision
# Sign with new identity and embedded entitlements
codesign -f -s "iPhone Distribution: Your Team" \
--entitlements entitlements.plist \
YourApp.app
# Verify signature
codesign -dvv YourApp.app
4. Re-package
# Repackage IPA
cd ../../
zip -r app-modified.ipa Payload/
5. Install and Verify
# Install on device
ideviceinstaller install app-modified.ipa
# Install on simulator (from app-extracted directory before cd ../../)
cd app-extracted/Payload && xcrun simctl install booted YourApp.app
# OR use absolute path:
# xcrun simctl install booted /full/path/to/app-extracted/Payload/YourApp.app
Reference: references/dynamic-analysis-setup-ios.md for advanced repackaging, code signing, and installation. See references/repackaging-ios-guide.md for binary patching edge cases and troubleshooting.
Troubleshooting
Encrypted Binary
# Check encryption status (covers both 32-bit and 64-bit load commands)
otool -l YourApp | rg -A 10 "LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO(_64)?"
# If encrypted (cryptid 1), decrypt with:
# - Clutch (for jailbroken device)
# - frida-ios-dump (dump decrypted binary)
# - decryption tool via Frida
Get PID: PID=$(xcrun simctl spawn booted launchctl list | rg "com.example.app" | awk '{print $1}')
Attach with bypass: frida -D $UDID -p $PID -l jailbreak-bypass-ios.js
Result: App runs in simulator without jailbreak restrictions
Real-World Vulnerability Patterns
Patterns discovered from disclosed vulnerability reports (HackerOne) that are NOT covered by standard testing methodologies. These represent gaps where mobile apps deviate from web security assumptions.
Pattern 1: Rate Limiting Bypass on Mobile Endpoints
Vulnerability: Authentication endpoints on mobile often lack rate limiting, even when web equivalents enforce lockouts.
Real Case: H1-160109 (Instacart iOS) - Web locked after 15 attempts, mobile allowed 50+ password guesses without restrictions. H1-2245437 (Files iOS) - PIN code with unlimited attempts.
Detection with this skill:
# 1. Identify auth endpoints
rg "oauth|login|token|pin" -g "*.m" -g "*.swift"
# 2. Monitor with rate limit detector
frida -U -f com.example.app -l assets/frida-scripts/mobile-rate-limit-detector-ios.js
# 3. Simulate brute force (Burp Intruder or Frida loop)
# Send 20+ login attempts with different passwords
Expected Finding:
[VULN] 50 attempts to /oauth/token
NO rate limiting detected after 50 requests
Reference: H1-160109 (Instacart iOS), H1-2245437 (Files iOS)
Impact: Brute force possible, account takeover risk HIGH
PoC:
// In Frida, simulate brute force:
for (let i = 0; i < 50; i++) {
// Send POST /oauth/token with password + i
}
// If all return 401 except one, no rate limiting
Related Script: assets/frida-scripts/mobile-rate-limit-detector-ios.js
Pattern 2: WebView XSS via Unsanitized HTML
Vulnerability: WebViews loading HTML content without sanitization, especially when HTML contains user input or template literals.
Real Cases: H1-575562 (Nextcloud iOS) - Blind XSS via unsanitized file content; H1-991713, 993670, 1436558, 1438028 (Brave iOS) - Multiple XSS vectors through WebView HTML injection.
Detection with this skill:
# 1. Monitor WebView HTML loading
frida -U -f com.example.app -l assets/frida-scripts/webview-xss-scanner-ios.js
# 2. Trigger HTML loading with user input
# Enter XSS payloads in user-controllable fields
Expected Finding:
[VULN] Unsanitized HTML loading detected in WebView
Pattern: {{username}}
Type: template
Impact: XSS possible if attacker controls HTML source
Reference: H1-575562 (Nextcloud WebView XSS)
PoC:
// Test payloads:
// Template injection: {{7*7}} → 49
// XSS: <script>alert(document.domain)</script>
// If executed, XSS confirmed
Remediation:
// Sanitize HTML before loading in WebView
func loadSafeHTML(_ html: String, baseURL: URL) {
let sanitized = html
.replacingOccurrences(of: "<script", with: "<script")
.replacingOccurrences(of: "{{", with: "")
.replacingOccurrences(of: "${", with: "")
webView.loadHTMLString(sanitized, baseURL: baseURL)
}
Related Script: assets/frida-scripts/webview-xss-scanner-ios.js
Pattern 3: Deep Link CSRF (Missing Token Validation)
Vulnerability: State-changing deep links lack CSRF tokens, allowing attackers to trigger actions on behalf of users.
Real Case: H1-805073 (Periscope iOS) - pscp://user/<id>/follow could be triggered from any context without CSRF token, allowing forced follows and account takeover.
Detection with this skill:
# 1. Monitor deep link processing
frida -U -f com.example.app -l assets/frida-scripts/deeplink-csrf-validator-ios.js
# 2. Trigger deep link with sensitive action
xcrun simctl openurl booted "myapp://follow?user=victim"
Expected Finding:
[VULN] Sensitive action via deep link WITHOUT CSRF token
URL: myapp://follow?user=victim
Action: follow
Impact: CSRF possible - forced action without user consent
Reference: H1-805073 (Periscope deep link CSRF)
PoC:
<!-- Attacker's website -->
<a href="myapp://follow?user=attacker">Click for prize!</a>
<!-- If victim clicks and gets forced to follow attacker, CSRF confirmed -->
Remediation:
// Validate CSRF token before processing deep link actions
func processDeepLink(_ url: URL) {
guard let token = url.queryParameters?["token"],
validateCSRFToken(token) else {
// Reject deep link without valid token
return
}
// Process action
}
Related Script: assets/frida-scripts/deeplink-csrf-validator-ios.js
Pattern 4: Missing SSL Certificate Validation
Vulnerability: Apps that don't validate SSL/TLS certificates are vulnerable to MITM attacks without any bypass needed.
Real Case: H1-168538 (Twitter iOS 6.62-6.62.1) - Did not validate SSL certificates. A transparent proxy was sufficient to intercept traffic and extract OAuth tokens without installing a trusted CA certificate.
Detection with this skill:
# 1. Run SSL validation checker
frida -U -f com.example.app -l assets/frida-scripts/ssl-validation-checker-ios.js
# 2. Wait 5 seconds for analysis verdict
Expected Finding:
[!] CRITICAL VULNERABILITY
[!] App does NOT validate SSL certificates!
[!] MITM attacks possible WITHOUT any bypass needed
[!] Reference: H1-168538 (Twitter iOS cert validation bypass)
PoC:
# Set up proxy WITHOUT installing CA certificate
# If app traffic visible, validation is missing
mitmproxy --listen-port 8080
# Configure device proxy, open app - if traffic visible → VULNERABLE
Related Script: assets/frida-scripts/ssl-validation-checker-ios.js
Pattern 5: Biometric Deeplink Bypass
Vulnerability: Deep links navigate to protected features without requiring biometric re-authentication when app is already unlocked.
Real Case: H1-637194 (Shopify Mobile) - When app was open, deep links could bypass fingerprint authentication and directly access protected features like settings/payment.
Detection with this skill:
# 1. Monitor biometric and navigation events
frida -U -f com.example.app -l assets/frida-scripts/biometric-deeplink-bypass-ios.js
# 2. Authenticate with biometric
# 3. Wait 10+ seconds (past re-auth timeout)
# 4. Trigger deep link to protected feature
xcrun simctl openurl booted "myapp://settings"
Expected Finding:
[VULN] Protected view accessed WITHOUT recent biometric
View: SettingsViewController
Biometric was 15000ms ago
Deep link was 2000ms ago
Reference: H1-637194 (Shopify deeplink bypass)
PoC:
# 1. Authenticate with fingerprint
# 2. Wait >5 seconds
# 3. Trigger: myapp://payment
# 4. If payment screen opens WITHOUT fingerprint → VULNERABLE
Remediation:
// Require biometric re-auth for protected features
var lastBiometricAuth: Date?
func navigateToProtectedFeature() {
let timeout: TimeInterval = 5.0
if let lastAuth = lastBiometricAuth,
Date().timeIntervalSince(lastAuth) < timeout {
// Recent auth, allow
showProtectedFeature()
} else {
// Require re-auth
requestBiometric { success in
if success { showProtectedFeature() }
}
}
}
Related Script: assets/frida-scripts/biometric-deeplink-bypass-ios.js
Troubleshooting
Encrypted Binary (FairPlay)
Error: LC_ENCRYPTION_INFO cryptid 1 - binary cannot be analyzed
Cause: App Store FairPlay encryption
Solution: Decrypt with frida-ios-dump, Clutch, or bagbak on a jailbroken device. See references/macho-binary-analysis.md §Encryption.
Frida Cannot Attach
Error: "Failed to attach", "Process not found", or immediate disconnect
Cause: Ptrace protection, anti-debug, or app crashed
Solution:
Error: dsdump shows unreadable or mangled symbols
Cause: Swift obfuscation
Solution:
# Use swift-demangle
swift-demangle <mangled_symbol>
# See references/static-analysis-patterns-ios.md → "Obfuscation Patterns"
# Switch to Phase 4 (dynamic analysis) for runtime behavior
Info.plist Cannot Parse
Error: "Cannot parse plist" or plutil fails
Cause: Corrupted or binary plist format
Solution:
# Convert to XML for inspection
plutil -convert xml1 Info.plist -o -
# Re-encode if needed
plutil -convert binary1 Info.plist -o
Class Dump Fails
Error: dsdump or class-dump produces no output
Cause: Binary stripped, protected, or not Mach-O
Solution:
# Verify architecture
lipo -info YourApp
# For Swift-only apps, use dsdump
# For ObjC, use class-dump
# Check for hardening: otool -l YourApp | rg -A 5 LC_CODE_SIGNATURE
Quick Device Verification Checklist
# 1. Check if device is connected via USB
idevice_id -l
# 2. Get device identity (model, iOS version, arch)
ideviceinfo | grep -E "^(DeviceName|ProductVersion|ProductType|ModelNumber|CPUArchitecture|SerialNumber)"
# 3. Check pairing status
idevicepair validate
# 4. List installed apps
ideviceinstaller list # user apps
ideviceinstaller list --all # all apps (system + user)
# 5. Verify Frida + jailbreak (physical device only)
# frida-ps -U listing processes = jailbreak detected + frida-server running
frida-ps -U | head -5 # any output confirms Frida is ready
frida-ps -Uai | head -15 # installed + running apps with bundle IDs
# For simulator, use: frida-ps -D <SIMULATOR_UDID>
# NOTE: frida-ps works via lockdownd (no jailbreak). If frida-ps -U works
# but frida -U -p fails, the device is NOT jailbroken — see troubleshooting-ios.md.
Device Not Found
Error: "No device found" or idevice commands fail
Cause: Device not connected, usbmuxd not running, or driver issue
Solution:
Error: App launches but crashes before main()
Cause: FairPlay encrypted, code signature invalid, or incompatible platform
Solution: See simforge-crash-triage.md for decision tree. Verify:
Error: App still detects jailbreak after bypass attempts
Cause: Multiple detection points, custom checks, or server-side validation
Solution: Use comprehensive bypass in assets/frida-scripts/jailbreak-detection-bypass.js. See references/jailbreak-detection-bypass-ios.md for full methodology.
For comprehensive troubleshooting, see references/troubleshooting-ios.md for detailed diagnosis of toolchain issues, environment problems, and common failure patterns.
CI/CD and DevSecOps Integration
When integrating iOS security testing into CI/CD pipelines or automating security checks in development workflows, consider these tools and practices:
CI/CD Platform Security
GitHub Actions: See references/github-actions-ios-security.md for secure workflow patterns, secrets management, and artifact handling in iOS projects.
Fastlane: See references/fastlane-security.md for secure automation, lane hardening, and credential protection in iOS build/deploy pipelines.
General CI/CD: See references/ci-cd-integration-ios.md for integrating automated security testing into any CI/CD platform (Jenkins, GitLab CI, CircleCI, etc.).
Automation Scripts
The scripts/ directory includes automation-friendly tools:
scripts/auto-audit-static-ios.sh — One-shot static analysis driver for Phases 0–3
scripts/sbom_generator.py — Generate SBOMs for supply chain security
scripts/dependency_scanner.py — Scan dependencies for CVEs and license compliance
scripts/generate-report.py — Generate reports from findings JSON
See references/automation-scripts-ios.md for complete automation workflow integration.
