| name | hunt-deserialization |
| description | Investigate authorized unsafe deserialization and serialized-data trust boundaries. Use when typed discovery identifies encoded object cookies or tokens, pickle or object streams, YAML type tags, serialized uploads or imports, type-confusion errors, or suspected server-side object reconstruction. |
Hunt Deserialization Boundaries
Treat this card as advisory prioritization. Encodings, format fingerprints, and parser errors do not
prove unsafe object construction.
Workflow
- Identify the format, carrier, integrity protection, identity, and target-observed replay.
- Pair an unchanged baseline with a same-shape inert structural control; change one property.
- Use
cookie_deserialization for cookies or tokens and file_fetch_parser only for typed imports
or uploads. Their fixed command and file-read candidates must all be authorized.
- Preserve redacted inputs, format decisions, controls, deltas, and evidence references. Report a
validated vulnerability independently of any challenge objective.
Evidence Gate
Confirm only a replayable unsafe type, object-handling, or execution effect absent from the paired
control. Decoder errors, library names, gadget strings, and status changes remain observations.
Keep any contract_missing result suspected rather than promoting it.
Stop Conditions
Stop when format, integrity, identity, replay, or controls are unavailable, or policy limits fire.
Do not add destructive gadgets, persistence, or outbound effects; redact returned secrets.
