| name | observability-triage |
| description | Triage OpenSEO production errors in Cloudflare Workers Observability — verified query recipes, counting gotchas, and a known-noise filter list applied automatically. Use when asked to review Cloudflare logs/observability, count OOMs or worker errors, compare error rates between periods, or investigate a prod error spike. |
| metadata | {"internal":true} |
Observability triage
Query Cloudflare Workers Observability for prod errors, count them correctly, and skip the noise that has already been investigated to a dead end. Apply the known-noise list below without re-investigating those entries.
Access
- Resolve the account at runtime — never hardcode it: the
cloudflare-api MCP server pre-binds accountId in mcp__cloudflare-api__execute, and npx wrangler whoami prints it. The workers to triage are the ones this repo deploys (see alchemy.run.ts): the main app worker plus the aux workers (audit engine, landing, self-host).
- Query via the
cloudflare-api MCP server (mcp__cloudflare-api__execute). If its tools are absent, run its authenticate flow and give the user the URL — wrangler's OAuth token gets a 403 on the observability API (missing scope), so don't burn time on curl-with-wrangler-token.
- PostHog is the second error source but cannot see
exceededMemory / canceled / responseStreamDisconnected outcomes — worker-outcome questions are answerable only here.
Query recipes (verified shapes)
POST /accounts/{account_id}/workers/observability/telemetry/query. All of these are load-bearing; the API's 400s are opaque:
-
queryId: "adhoc" is required. Timeframe is epoch milliseconds: timeframe: { from, to }.
-
Count invocations by outcome:
{
"queryId": "adhoc",
"timeframe": { "from": 0, "to": 0 },
"parameters": {
"datasets": ["cloudflare-workers"],
"filters": [
{ "key": "$metadata.type", "operation": "eq", "value": "cf-worker-event", "type": "string" }
],
"calculations": [{ "operator"
Counting gotchas
- Grouped results are unsorted and effectively capped (~10 rows returned regardless of
limit). A missing group ≠ zero. To see error outcomes, add $workers.outcome neq ok instead of hoping the error rows make the cut; sort client-side.
- One isolate death fans out. An OOM kills every request pinned to the isolate at the same instant — cluster raw OOM events by timestamp before reading the count as user impact.
- Message prefixes fragment groups. Logs with leading timestamps (better-auth's format) split one error into N single-count groups; grouped-by-message counts badly understate them. Sample events and merge client-side.
- Prod deploys are manual — main being fixed doesn't mean prod runs the fix. Check
$workers.scriptVersion and the scripts' modified_on before concluding a fix didn't work.
Known noise — filter these out, do not re-investigate
Entries land here only after an investigation proved there is no first-party emit site to fix or demote. Each keeps the one condition that would make it real signal again.
1. SAM chat Durable Object lifecycle (close code 1006)
- Messages (one phenomenon, counted three ways):
Connection closed: this Durable Object instance is no longer active. Reconnect or retry the request. (hibernation/eviction), Durable Object reset because its code was updated. (deploy), plus the paired invocation summary whose $metadata.error is close.
- Identify by:
eventType: "hibernatableWebSocket", entrypoint SamChatAgent/OnboardingChatAgent, webSocketType: "close", code: 1006, wasClean: false, outcome: "exception", single-digit wallTimeMs, cpuTimeMs: 0, no stack. Fingerprints 3aa4cac26653d09a0a41100a33d413ae (exception), 0ae15457af49b4d9a117eeecf66b040a (summary).
- Why unfixable: the DO is destroyed under the JS — its IoContext is already aborted when workerd delivers
webSocketClose, so the first await never settles. partyserver already try/catches the whole close path; an onClose override would catch nothing.
- Nothing breaks: transcripts persist per message in DO SQLite, PartySocket reconnects unconditionally, and credit metering (
onChatResponse) never fires on an aborted turn.
- Real signal: a sustained rise that does not correlate with a deploy (would mean mid-conversation evictions beyond hibernation).
2. Network connection lost.
- Identify by: fingerprint
be89d4ff7a64cb4d4dceae0f51cfe708, or the message verbatim. Runtime-generated shape: source.level absent, source.exception present, $metadata.origin: "fetch" — the opposite of every app log (source.level present, no exception).
- Why unfixable: workerd's own record of a client disconnecting mid-stream; the exception never enters app code — the sibling request event for the same
requestId has outcome: "ok". No emit site exists; wrangler.jsonc observability config has no per-message filter. Do not add try/catch around the stream handlers (dead ceremony).
- Real signal: if the
/mcp share of this group grows, treat it as a tool-call-latency symptom (clients timing out and cancelling) and route it to the /mcp performance track — not to this log group.
Runtime-vs-app litmus test
Before investigating any unfamiliar error event: source.level absent + source.exception present ⇒ the Workers runtime wrote it, not the app. There is no call site to grep for; judge it by the sibling request's outcome.
Adding an entry
Add to this list only after establishing there is no first-party emit site (grep the message; check the runtime-vs-app litmus above) and nothing is left in a wrong state. Every entry must include identify-by markers (fingerprint if stable) and its real-signal condition.