security-threat-modeler

Analyze codebase architecture to generate a STRIDE-based threat model with data flow diagrams, trust boundaries, prioritized threats, and mitigations. Compatible with Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool concepts. Use when asked to "threat model", "security analysis", "STRIDE analysis", "identify security threats", "data flow security", "generate a threat model", or "security architecture review".

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type	skill
lifecycle	stable
inheritance	inheritable
name	security-threat-modeler
description	Analyze codebase architecture to generate a STRIDE-based threat model with data flow diagrams, trust boundaries, prioritized threats, and mitigations. Compatible with Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool concepts. Use when asked to "threat model", "security analysis", "STRIDE analysis", "identify security threats", "data flow security", "generate a threat model", or "security architecture review".
applyTo	*/threat,/security,/stride*
tier	standard
currency	2026-04-22T00:00:00.000Z

Security Threat Modeler

Produce a structured threat model using the STRIDE methodology, compatible with Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool concepts.

When to Use

Before deploying a new service or feature to production
During security design reviews or SDL milestones
When adding authentication, authorization, data storage, or external integrations

STRIDE Reference

Category	Threat	Property Violated
Spoofing	Impersonating another identity	Authentication
Tampering	Unauthorized modification of data	Integrity
Repudiation	Denying actions with no proof	Non-repudiation
Information Disclosure	Exposing data to unauthorized parties	Confidentiality
Denial of Service	Making a resource unavailable	Availability
Elevation of Privilege	Gaining unauthorized privileged access	Authorization

DFD Elements

Element	Description
Process	Code that transforms data (services, APIs, workers)
External Interactor	Entities outside your control (users, third-party APIs)
Data Store	Persistent storage (databases, files, caches, queues)
Data Flow	Data movement between elements (label with protocol)
Trust Boundary	Separation between zones of different trust

Process

Step 1: Scope

Identify: the system under analysis, the deployment model (cloud/on-prem/hybrid), stakeholders, and security requirements (compliance, data classification).

Step 2: Discover Architecture from Code

Scan the codebase to identify all DFD elements:

What to Find

Field	Content
ID	T-001, T-002, etc.
Element	Which DFD element/interaction
STRIDE	S, T, R, I, D, or E
Description	What could go wrong
Severity	Critical (RCE, auth bypass, full breach) / High (privilege escalation, significant exposure) / Medium (limited exposure, DoS) / Low (info leakage, minor impact)
Existing Controls	What the code already does (reference files)
Mitigation	What to add or change

Scope: AuthService — OAuth2 + JWT, Azure App Service, PII (email, name)

DFD: Browser →HTTPS→ API Gateway →HTTP→ AuthController →TLS→ SQL Database
     [Trust Boundary]     ├→HTTPS→ Azure AD | └→TLS→ Redis

Threats (3 of 8):
  T-001 | Gateway→AuthController | Spoofing | Medium
    Plain HTTP internal traffic. → Enable mTLS or private VNet.
  T-002 | AuthController→SQL | Info Disclosure | High
    Connection string in appsettings.json. → Migrate to Key Vault.
  T-003 | Browser→Gateway | Tampering | Medium
    JWT in localStorage (XSS risk). → Use HttpOnly secure cookies.

Verdict: CONDITIONAL — 2 High threats need remediation before production.

## Data Flow Diagram
  Browser →HTTPS→ [Auth Middleware] →HTTP→ OrderController →TLS→ PostgreSQL
                                     ├→HTTPS→ Stripe API
                                     └→TCP→ Redis

## Threats (4 of 9):
| ID    | Element                    | STRIDE | Severity | Mitigation                        |
|-------|----------------------------|--------|----------|-----------------------------------|
| T-001 | Browser→AuthMiddleware     | S      | High     | Add rate limiting + account lockout |
| T-002 | OrderController→PostgreSQL | I      | Critical | Parameterize all queries; audit ORM usage |
| T-003 | OrderController→Stripe     | T      | High     | Verify Stripe webhook signatures  |
| T-004 | AuthMiddleware→Redis       | I      | Medium   | Enable TLS for Redis connection   |

## Verdict
CONDITIONAL — 1 Critical + 2 High threats require remediation before production.
Top actions: (1) Parameterize DB queries, (2) Verify webhook signatures, (3) Add rate limiting.

What to Find