Skip to main content 홈 크리에이터 impertio-studio tauri-2-claude-skill-package tauri-impl-security
tauri-impl-security Use when hardening Tauri 2 app security, configuring CSP, reviewing permissions, or implementing isolation patterns. Prevents overly permissive CSP, disabled prototype freeze, and unscoped file/shell/http permissions in production. Covers CSP configuration, Tauri protocols, freezePrototype, isolation pattern, scope-based access control, and dangerous permissions. Keywords: tauri security, CSP, Content Security Policy, freezePrototype, isolation pattern, scope, permissions audit, harden app, CSP policy, secure permissions, production security, lock down access..
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Zip 다운로드 다운로드 중... tauri-agents-project-scaffolder Use when scaffolding a new Tauri 2 project, setting up initial project structure, or generating boilerplate code. Prevents incomplete scaffolding with missing permission files, unregistered commands, or broken IPC bridges. Covers configured plugins, capability files, Rust commands with TypeScript invoke calls, build pipeline, and frontend integration. Keywords: tauri scaffolder, project generator, boilerplate, scaffold, new project, project structure, code generation, new desktop app, start Tauri project, generate boilerplate, getting started..
Use when reviewing Tauri 2 code, auditing permissions, or validating a Tauri project before deployment. Prevents shipping apps with missing permissions, unhandled IPC errors, insecure CSP, and unregistered commands. Covers command signature review, permission coverage, state management, error handling, security audit, and anti-pattern detection. Keywords: tauri code review, validation checklist, security audit, permissions audit, anti-pattern scan, deployment readiness, check my Tauri code, security review, permission audit, before release..
Use when creating new Tauri 2 apps, understanding project structure, or reasoning about the component model. Prevents mixing Tauri 1.x architecture assumptions with the v2 multi-webview and capability-based model. Covers Rust backend structure, webview layer, IPC bridge model, process model, project layout, and type hierarchy. Keywords: tauri architecture, project structure, IPC bridge, webview layer, process model, Rust backend, how Tauri works, project layout, frontend backend split, getting started, what is IPC..
name tauri-impl-security description Use when hardening Tauri 2 app security, configuring CSP, reviewing permissions, or implementing isolation patterns. Prevents overly permissive CSP, disabled prototype freeze, and unscoped file/shell/http permissions in production. Covers CSP configuration, Tauri protocols, freezePrototype, isolation pattern, scope-based access control, and dangerous permissions. Keywords: tauri security, CSP, Content Security Policy, freezePrototype, isolation pattern, scope, permissions audit, harden app, CSP policy, secure permissions, production security, lock down access..
license MIT compatibility Designed for Claude Code. Requires Tauri 2.x. metadata {"author":"OpenAEC-Foundation","version":"1.0"}
tauri-impl-security
Quick Reference
Security Architecture (Tauri 2)
Layer Mechanism Configuration Content Security Policy Restricts resource loading in webview app.security.csp in tauri.conf.jsonPermissions Define which IPC commands are allowed/denied
src-tauri/permissions/*.toml
Capabilities Bind permissions to specific windows src-tauri/capabilities/*.json
Scopes Restrict what data commands can access Within permission definitions
Isolation Pattern Separate IPC from frontend context app.security.pattern
Prototype Freeze Prevent prototype pollution app.security.freezePrototype
Tauri-Specific Protocols Protocol Purpose CSP Directive tauri:Internal protocol for serving frontend assets default-srcasset: / https://asset.localhostAccess bundled resources and filesystem assets img-src, media-srcipc: / http://ipc.localhostIPC communication between frontend and Rust connect-src
Critical Warnings NEVER set csp to null in production -- this disables all content security restrictions, exposing the app to XSS and injection attacks.
NEVER use "windows": ["*"] with broad permissions -- this grants all windows identical access. ALWAYS use specific window labels.
NEVER set dangerousDisableAssetCspModification: true unless you fully understand that it removes automatic CSP nonce injection for asset loading.
NEVER grant shell:default without scope restrictions -- this allows arbitrary command execution. ALWAYS define explicit command scopes.
ALWAYS enable freezePrototype: true in production -- it prevents JavaScript prototype pollution attacks.
ALWAYS add capabilities for every plugin you install -- plugins do NOT automatically receive permissions.
ALWAYS define deny rules for sensitive paths (e.g., $HOME/.ssh/*) when granting filesystem access.
Essential Patterns
Pattern 1: Content Security Policy Configuration {
"app" : {
"security" : {
"csp" : "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' asset: https://asset.localhost data:; font-src 'self' data:; connect-src ipc: http://ipc.localhost https://api.example.com; media-src 'self' asset: https://asset.localhost"
}
}
}
Common CSP directives for Tauri:
Directive Recommended Value Purpose default-src'self'Fallback for all resource types script-src'self'JavaScript sources style-src'self' 'unsafe-inline'Stylesheets (inline needed for most frameworks) img-src'self' asset: https://asset.localhost data:Image sources including asset protocol font-src'self' data:Font files connect-srcipc: http://ipc.localhostIPC + any external APIs media-src'self' asset: https://asset.localhostAudio/video sources
Pattern 2: Security Settings Block {
"app" : {
"security" : {
"csp" : "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'" ,
"freezePrototype" : true ,
"dangerousDisableAssetCspModification" : false ,
"assetProtocol" : {
"enable" : true ,
"scope" : [ "$APPDATA/**" , "$RESOURCE/**" ]
} ,
"pattern" : {
"use" : "brownfield"
}
}
}
}
Property Description freezePrototypeFreezes Object.prototype to prevent pollution attacks dangerousDisableAssetCspModificationDisables automatic CSP nonce injection for the asset protocol assetProtocol.enableEnable the asset: protocol for file access assetProtocol.scopeGlob patterns defining allowed asset paths pattern.use"brownfield" (default) or "isolation"
Pattern 3: Permissions System Permissions follow the naming convention:
<plugin>:default -- Default permission set<plugin>:allow-<command> -- Allow a specific command<plugin>:deny-<command> -- Deny a specific command Defining custom permissions (src-tauri/permissions/my-commands.toml):
[[permission]]
identifier = "allow-read-file"
description = "Enables the read_file command"
commands.allow = ["read_file" ]
[[permission]]
identifier = "deny-write-file"
description = "Blocks the write_file command"
commands.deny = ["write_file" ]
[[permission]]
identifier = "scope-home"
description = "Access to files in $HOME but not .ssh"
[[scope.allow]]
path = "$HOME/*"
[[scope.deny]]
path = "$HOME/.ssh/*"
Permission sets (bundle multiple):
[[set]]
identifier = "allow-home-read-extended"
description = "Read access + directory creation in $HOME"
permissions = [
"fs:read-files" ,
"fs:scope-home" ,
"fs:allow-mkdir"
]
Pattern 4: Capabilities System Capabilities tie permissions to specific windows. Files in src-tauri/capabilities/ are automatically enabled.
{
"$schema" : "../gen/schemas/desktop-schema.json" ,
"identifier" : "main-capability" ,
"description" : "Capability for the main window" ,
"windows" : [ "main" ] ,
"permissions" : [
"core:path:default" ,
"core:event:default" ,
"core:window:default" ,
"core:app:default" ,
"core:resources:default" ,
"core:menu:default" ,
"core:tray:default"
]
}
Platform-specific capabilities:
{
"$schema" : "../gen/schemas/desktop-schema.json" ,
"identifier" : "desktop-capability" ,
"windows" : [ "main" ] ,
"platforms" : [ "linux" , "macOS" , "windows" ] ,
"permissions" : [ "global-shortcut:allow-register" ]
}
{
"$schema" : "../gen/schemas/remote-schema.json" ,
"identifier" : "remote-capability" ,
"windows" : [ "main" ] ,
"remote" : {
"urls" : [ "https://*.tauri.app" ]
} ,
"permissions" : [ "nfc:allow-scan" ]
}
Pattern 5: Scope-Based Access Control {
"permissions" : [
{
"identifier" : "fs:allow-read-file" ,
"allow" : [ { "path" : "$APPDATA/**" } ] ,
"deny" : [ { "path" : "$APPDATA/secrets/**" } ]
}
]
}
{
"permissions" : [
{
"identifier" : "http:default" ,
"allow" : [ { "url" : "https://api.example.com/*" } ] ,
"deny" : [ { "url" : "https://api.example.com/admin/*" } ]
}
]
}
{
"permissions" : [
{
"identifier" : "shell:allow-execute" ,
"allow" : [ {
"name" : "exec-sh" ,
"cmd" : "sh" ,
"args" : [ "-c" , { "validator" : "\\S+" } ] ,
"sidecar" : false } ]
}
]
}
Pattern 6: Accessing Scopes in Rust Commands use tauri::ipc::{CommandScope, GlobalScope};
#[tauri::command]
async fn scoped_command <R: tauri::Runtime>(
command_scope: CommandScope<'_ , ScopeEntry>,
global_scope: GlobalScope<'_ , ScopeEntry>,
) -> Result <(), String > {
let allowed = command_scope.allows ();
let denied = command_scope.denies ();
Ok (())
}
Windows URL Scheme Change (v2) On Windows, production frontend files load from http://tauri.localhost instead of https://tauri.localhost. This resets IndexedDB, LocalStorage, and Cookies unless:
dangerousUseHttpScheme was enabled in v1app.windows[].useHttpsScheme is set to true in v2
Dangerous Permissions Audit Checklist Review these permissions carefully before granting:
Permission Risk Mitigation shell:allow-executeArbitrary command execution Define explicit command scopes with validators fs:allow-write-file with broad scopeData destruction/exfiltration Restrict to $APPDATA or specific directories http:default without URL scopeUnrestricted network access Define allowed URL patterns clipboard-manager:allow-read-textRead sensitive clipboard data Only grant when functionally required "windows": ["*"]All windows get same permissions Use specific window labels dangerousDisableAssetCspModificationRemoves CSP nonce protection Almost never needed
Isolation Pattern The isolation pattern creates a separate execution context for the IPC bridge, preventing the frontend from directly accessing Tauri internals:
{
"app" : {
"security" : {
"pattern" : {
"use" : "isolation" ,
"options" : {
"dir" : "../isolation-app"
}
}
}
}
}
Use "brownfield" (default) for standard apps. Use "isolation" for apps loading untrusted third-party content.
Core Permissions (Built-in) These require no plugin installation but still need explicit capability grants:
core:path:default
core:event:default
core:window:default
core:app:default
core:resources:default
core:menu:default
core:tray:default
core:window:allow-set-title
core:window:allow-close
core:window:allow-minimize
core:window:allow-maximize
Reference Links
Official Sources 