security-bun

name

security-bun

description

Review Bun runtime security audit patterns. Use for auditing Bun-specific vulnerabilities including shell injection, SQL injection, server security, and process spawning. Use proactively when reviewing Bun apps (bun.lockb, bunfig.toml, or bun:* imports present). Examples: - user: "Review this Bun shell script" → audit `$` usage and argument injection - user: "Check my bun:sqlite queries" → verify `sql` tagged template usage - user: "Audit my Bun.serve() setup" → check path traversal and request limits - user: "Is my Bun.spawn() usage safe?" → audit command injection and input validation - user: "Review WebSocket security in Bun" → check authentication before upgrade

Security audit patterns for Bun runtime applications covering shell injection, SQL injection, server security, and Bun-specific vulnerabilities.

The #1 Bun Footgun: Shell Escaping vs Raw Shell

Bun's shell $ is a tagged template that escapes by default. If you bypass escaping (via raw mode), user input can become command injection.

import { $ } from "bun";

const userInput = "hello; rm -rf /";

// SAFE: Tagged template - automatically escapes
await $`echo ${userInput}`;
// Executes: echo 'hello; rm -rf /'

// CRITICAL: Spawning a new shell (bypasses Bun escaping) - MUST NOT do this
await $`bash -c "echo ${userInput}"`;
// The nested shell interprets user input as code

Argument Injection (Even with Escaping)

Even the safe tagged template is vulnerable to argument injection:

import { $ } from "bun";

// HIGH: Argument injection via -- prefix - MUST validate
const userRepo = "--upload-pack=id>/tmp/pwned";
await $`git ls-remote ${userRepo} main`;
// The -- prefix makes it a command-line argument, not a value

// MUST validate input format before use
const userRepo = getUserInput();
if (!userRepo.match(/^https?:\/\//)) {
  throw new Error("Invalid repository URL");
}
await $`git ls-remote ${userRepo} main`;

// MAY use -- to end argument parsing
await $`git ls-remote -- ${userRepo} main`;

bun:sqlite SQL Injection

sql is a tagged template that parameterizes values. If you build SQL strings manually, you can still be vulnerable.

import { sql } from "bun";

const userId = "1 OR 1=1";

// CRITICAL: Function call - SQL injection! - MUST NOT do this
await sql(`SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${userId}`);
// Executes: SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = 1 OR 1=1

// SAFE: Tagged template - parameterized query - MUST do this
await sql`SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ${userId}`;
// Executes: SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1 with params ['1 OR 1=1']

bun:sqlite Database Class

import { Database } from "bun:sqlite";

const db = new Database("mydb.sqlite");
const userInput = "'; DROP TABLE users; --";

// CRITICAL: String interpolation - MUST NOT do this
db.run(`INSERT INTO logs VALUES ('${userInput}')`);

// SAFE: Parameterized with .run() - MUST do this
db.run("INSERT INTO logs VALUES (?)", [userInput]);

// SAFE: Prepared statements
const stmt = db.prepare("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = ?");
stmt.get(userInput);

// SAFE: Query with parameters
db.query("SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ?").get(userInput);

Bun.serve() Security

Missing Request Validation

// No input validation - MUST NOT do this
Bun.serve({
  fetch(req) {
    const url = new URL(req.url);
    const file = url.searchParams.get("file");
    return new Response(Bun.file(`./uploads/${file}`)); // Path traversal!
  },
});

// MUST validate and sanitize
import { join, basename, resolve } from "path";

Bun.serve({
  fetch(req) {
    const url = new URL(req.url);
    const file = url.searchParams.get("file");
    
    // Sanitize filename
    const safeName = basename(file ?? "");
    const uploadsDir = resolve("./uploads");
    const filePath = resolve(join(uploadsDir, safeName));
    
    // MUST verify path is within uploads directory
    if (!filePath.startsWith(uploadsDir)) {
        (, { :  });
    }
    
      (.(filePath));
  },
});

Request Size Limits (DoS Protection)

// No body size limit (large uploads can exhaust memory) - SHOULD NOT do this
Bun.serve({
  fetch(req) {
    return new Response("ok");
  },
});

// SHOULD set a max request body size
Bun.serve({
  maxRequestBodySize: 1_000_000, // 1 MB
  fetch(req) {
    return new Response("ok");
  },
});

CORS Configuration

// Wide open CORS - MUST NOT do this
Bun.serve({
  fetch(req) {
    return new Response("data", {
      headers: {
        "Access-Control-Allow-Origin": "*",
        "Access-Control-Allow-Credentials": "true", // Dangerous combo!
      },
    });
  },
});

// MUST use explicit origin allowlist
const ALLOWED_ORIGINS = ["https://app.example.com"];

Bun.serve({
  fetch(req) {
    const origin = req.headers.get("Origin");
    const corsHeaders: Record<string, string> = {};
    
    if (origin && ALLOWED_ORIGINS.includes(origin)) {
      corsHeaders["Access-Control-Allow-Origin"] = origin;
      corsHeaders["Access-Control-Allow-Credentials"] = "true";
    }
    
    return new Response("data", { headers: corsHeaders });
  },
});

Host Binding

// Exposed to network (sometimes unintentional) - SHOULD verify intent
Bun.serve({
  hostname: "0.0.0.0", // Accessible from any network interface
  port: 3000,
  fetch(req) { /* ... */ },
});

// SHOULD use localhost only for development
Bun.serve({
  hostname: "127.0.0.1", // Only local access
  port: 3000,
  fetch(req) { /* ... */ },
});

Bun.spawn() Command Injection

// CRITICAL: User input in command array (can still be dangerous) - MUST validate
const filename = userInput; // Could be "--version" or other flags
Bun.spawn(["convert", filename, "output.png"]);

// CRITICAL: Shell execution with user input - MUST NOT do this
Bun.spawn(["sh", "-c", `convert ${userInput} output.png`]);

// MUST validate input first
const filename = userInput;
if (!filename.match(/^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+\.(jpg|png|gif)$/)) {
  throw new Error("Invalid filename");
}
Bun.spawn(["convert", filename, "output.png"]);

// SHOULD use -- to prevent flag injection
Bun.spawn(["convert", "--", filename, "output.png"]);

Bun.file() and Bun.write() Path Traversal

// HIGH: Path traversal - MUST NOT do this
const userFile = req.query.file; // "../../etc/passwd"
const content = await Bun.file(`./uploads/${userFile}`).text();

// HIGH: Writing to arbitrary paths - MUST NOT do this
await Bun.write(`./data/${userFile}`, content);

// MUST sanitize paths
import { join, basename, resolve } from "path";

const UPLOADS_DIR = resolve("./uploads");

function getSafePath(userInput: string): string {
  const safeName = basename(userInput);
  const fullPath = resolve(join(UPLOADS_DIR, safeName));
  
  if (!fullPath.startsWith(UPLOADS_DIR)) {
    throw new Error("Invalid path");
  }
  
  return fullPath;
}

const content = await Bun.file((userFile)).();

Bun.password (Secure, but check usage)

// Bun.password.hash is secure by default (uses argon2)
const hash = await Bun.password.hash(password);

// Verify passwords
const isValid = await Bun.password.verify(password, hash);

// MUST check: is it actually being used?
// Common vibecoding mistake: storing plaintext anyway

// MUST NOT store plaintext
db.run("INSERT INTO users (password) VALUES (?)", [password]);

// MUST store hash
const hash = await Bun.password.hash(password);
db.run("INSERT INTO users (password_hash) VALUES (?)", [hash]);

Environment Variables

// Bun.env is the same as process.env

// Secrets in client-facing code - MUST check what gets bundled
// If using Bun with a bundler, verify bundle contents

// SHOULD access server-only
const apiKey = Bun.env.API_KEY;
if (!apiKey) {
  throw new Error("API_KEY not configured");
}

// MUST check bunfig.toml for any exposed variables

bunfig.toml Security

# MUST check for suspicious configurations

[install]
# Disabling lockfile = supply chain risk - SHOULD NOT do this
save-lockfile = false

# Allowing arbitrary registries - MUST verify trusted
registry = "http://malicious-registry.com"

[run]
# Disabling sandbox (if applicable) - MUST verify intent

WebSocket Security

Bun.serve({
  fetch(req, server) {
    if (req.headers.get("upgrade") === "websocket") {
      // No auth check before upgrade - MUST NOT do this
      server.upgrade(req);
      return;
    }
  },
  websocket: {
    message(ws, message) {
      // Broadcasting without auth - MUST NOT do this
      ws.publish("chat", message);
    },
  },
});

// MUST authenticate before upgrade
Bun.serve({
  fetch(req, server) {
    if (req.headers.get("upgrade") === "websocket") {
      const token = req.headers.get("Authorization");
      const user = await verifyToken(token);
      
      if (!user) {
        return new Response("Unauthorized", { status: 401 });
      }
      
      server.upgrade(req, { data: { user } });
      return;
    }
  },
  websocket: {
    message(ws, message) {
      
       user = ws..;
      
    },
  },
});

<severity_table>

Common Vulnerabilities Summary

Issue	Pattern to Find	Severity
Shell injection (function call)	$(...) or $("...")	CRITICAL
SQL injection (function call)	sql(...)	CRITICAL
SQL string interpolation	`...${var}...` in SQL	CRITICAL
Argument injection	User input starting with -	HIGH
Path traversal	Bun.file(userInput)	HIGH
Command injection	Bun.spawn with user input	HIGH
Open CORS	Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *	MEDIUM
Network exposure	hostname: "0.0.0.0"	MEDIUM
Missing WebSocket auth	server.upgrade without auth check	HIGH

</severity_table>

Quick Audit Commands

# Find dangerous shell usage (function call instead of tagged template)
rg '\$\s*\(' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js"

# Find SQL function calls (should be tagged template)
rg 'sql\s*\(' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js"

# Find string interpolation in queries
rg '(query|run|exec)\s*\(\s*`' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js"

# Find Bun.spawn usage
rg 'Bun\.spawn' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js" -A 2

# Find Bun.file with variables (potential path traversal)
rg 'Bun\.file\s*\([^"'\''`]' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js"

# Find hostname binding
rg 'hostname.*0\.0\.0\.0' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js"

# Find CORS headers
rg 'Access-Control-Allow-Origin' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js"

# Find WebSocket upgrades
rg 'server\.upgrade' . -g "*.ts" -g "*.js" -B 5

Hardening Checklist

• All $ shell usage MUST be tagged template (no parentheses)
• All sql usage MUST be tagged template (no parentheses)
• All bun:sqlite queries MUST use parameterization
• User input MUST be validated before shell/spawn commands
• -- SHOULD be used to prevent argument injection where applicable
• File paths MUST be sanitized with basename() and path validation
• CORS MUST be restricted to specific origins
• hostname SHOULD be 127.0.0.1 for dev, explicit for prod
• WebSocket connections MUST be authenticated before upgrade
• Bun.password.hash MUST be used for passwords (not plaintext)
• bunfig.toml SHOULD be reviewed for suspicious settings