state-sync-analysis

name	state-sync-analysis
description	Auto-loaded by reentrancy-auditor agent during Phase 2 for state sync analysis. Framework: "When can state become inconsistent? How can that gap be exploited?" Identifies state inconsistency windows during external calls, CEI violations, read-only reentrancy, cross-contract state manipulation.
user-invocable	false

State Sync Analysis Framework

Purpose

"When can state become inconsistent? How can that gap be exploited?"

Identify state inconsistency windows that occur during external calls and analyze attack vectors.

---

1. State Synchronization Dependencies

1.1 Same-Contract Dependencies

// Dependencies between variables
uint256 totalSupply;       // A
uint256 totalAssets;       // B
// Invariant: B >= A * minRatio

// Risk: Inconsistency if A, B update order differs

1.2 Cross-Contract Dependencies

// Contract A depends on Contract B state
function getCollateralValue() external view returns (uint256) {
    return token.balanceOf(address(this)) * oracle.getPrice();
    //     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
    //     Contract A state                   Contract B state
}

1.3 View Function Dependencies

// External protocol depends on our view function
function totalAssets() public view returns (uint256) {
    return s_depositedAssets + s_assetsInAMM;
}
// Other protocol: ourVault.totalAssets() to calculate collateral value

---

2. State Inconsistency Windows

2.1 State Timeline During External Call

Time T0: Initial state
├── s_depositedAssets = 1000
├── s_assetsInAMM = 500
└── totalAssets() = 1500

Time T1: withdraw() called → state updated
├── s_depositedAssets -= 100  ← Updated
└── s_assetsInAMM = 500

Time T2: External call (token.safeTransfer)
└── ⚠️ Callback possible!

Time T2.5: During callback (INCONSISTENCY WINDOW)
├── s_depositedAssets = 900 (updated)
├── Actual tokens: Not yet transferred (1000)
└── totalAssets() = 900 + 500 = 1400 ← WRONG!
    (Actual: 1000 + 500 = 1500)

Time T3: Transfer complete
└── State consistency restored

2.2 Inconsistency Window Types

Type	Description	Risk Level
Pre-Update	External call before state update	Critical
Partial Update	External call after partial state update	High
Post-Update	External call after all state updates	Low

2.3 CEI Pattern and Inconsistency

// SAFE: Checks → Effects → Interactions
function withdraw(uint256 amount) external {
    // Checks
    require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);

    // Effects (state updates first)
    balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
    totalAssets -= amount;

    // Interactions (external calls last)
    token.safeTransfer(msg.sender, amount);
}

// DANGER: Checks → Interactions → Effects
function withdraw(uint256 amount) external {
    require(balances[msg.sender] >= amount);
    token.safeTransfer(msg.sender, amount);  // @audit State inconsistent!
    balances[msg.sender] -= amount;          // Too late!
}

---

3. Timing Attack Patterns

3.1 Read-Only Reentrancy

// Contract A (victim)
function totalAssets() public view returns (uint256) {
    return s_depositedAssets + s_assetsInAMM;
}

function withdraw(uint256 assets) external {
    s_depositedAssets -= assets;  // State updated

    // External call - callback occurs
    token.safeTransfer(msg.sender, assets);

    // During callback: totalAssets() returns stale value!
}

// Contract B (exploited by attacker)
function liquidate(address user) external {
    uint256 collateral = vaultA.totalAssets();  // @audit Manipulated!
    // If called during callback, gets lower collateral than actual
}

3.2 Cross-Contract State Race

// When two contracts depend on same state
// Contract A: uses oracle.getPrice()
// Contract B: uses oracle.getPrice()

// Attack:
// 1. Call A.function() → reads oracle → external call
// 2. In callback, manipulate oracle
// 3. Call B.function() → reads manipulated oracle
// 4. A.function() returns → already corrupted

3.3 Flash Loan Timing

// State manipulation within single transaction
flashLoanProvider.flashLoan(amount)
    → onFlashLoan() callback
        → manipulate pool reserves
        → call vulnerable function (sees manipulated state)
        → restore reserves
    → repay flash loan

---

4. State Dependency Graph Template

┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│              State Dependency Graph              │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                  │
│  ┌─────────┐      reads       ┌─────────────┐   │
│  │ Vault   │ ───────────────► │ Price Oracle │   │
│  │ .sol    │                  └─────────────┘   │
│  └────┬────┘                         ▲          │
│       │                              │ manipulate│
│       │ callback                     │          │
│       ▼                        ┌─────┴─────┐    │
│  ┌─────────┐      reads       │ Attacker  │    │
│  │ Token   │ ◄──────────────  │ Contract  │    │
│  │ .sol    │                  └───────────┘    │
│  └─────────┘                                    │
│                                                  │
│  Risk Path: Vault → callback → Attacker → Oracle│
│            → Vault reads manipulated Oracle     │
│                                                  │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

---

5. Output Format

## State Sync Analysis Results

### State Dependencies

| Contract | Function | Dependent State | External Source |
|----------|----------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Vault | getCollateralValue | totalAssets | Oracle.getPrice |
| Pool | swap | reserves | Token.balanceOf |

### Inconsistency Windows

| Location | Function | External Call | Inconsistent Variable | CEI Compliant |
|----------|----------|---------------|----------------------|---------------|
| Vault.sol:142 | withdraw | safeTransfer | s_deposited | ❌ |
| Pool.sol:89 | deposit | transferFrom | userShares | ⚠️ |

### Timing Attack Scenarios

#### Read-Only Reentrancy via totalAssets()

T0: Vault.withdraw(100) called T1: s_depositedAssets = 1000 → 900 T2: token.safeTransfer() → callback T3: [CALLBACK] ExternalProtocol.liquidate() called → Vault.totalAssets() = 900 + 500 = 1400 (actual: 1500) → Liquidation with incorrect collateral valuation T4: Transfer complete

- **Impact**: Incorrect collateral valuation in external protocol
- **Risk Level**: High

---

6. Search Queries

# Find external calls
Grep("\\.call\\{|\\.transfer\\(|safeTransfer", glob="**/*.sol")

# Find state updates after external calls (DANGER)
Grep("transfer.*\\n.*-=|safeTransfer.*\\n.*-=", glob="**/*.sol")

# Find view functions (read-only reentrancy risk)
Grep("view.*returns.*totalAssets|view.*returns.*totalSupply", glob="**/*.sol")

# Find token callbacks
Grep("tokensReceived|onERC721Received|onERC1155Received", glob="**/*.sol")

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7. Attacker Mindset

• "What state can be read during callbacks?"
• "If read state differs from actual, what can I gain?"
• "Does an external protocol trust our view functions?"
• "Can I sandwich the state inconsistency window?"