swift-auth-security-audit-suite

name	swift-auth-security-audit-suite
description	>- Use when this capability is needed.

Auth security audit suite (iOS, Swift Testing)

A functional auth flow can still leak secrets, enumerate users, or race itself into a corrupt token state. This skill builds a security-audit test suite that exercises the auth subsystem the way an attacker would: it scans for stored-secret leaks, validates App Transport Security, throws hostile inputs at validators, proves the error mapper can't be used for user enumeration, and asserts the concurrency and install-hygiene invariants. It is provider-agnostic — the anti-enumeration rule holds for Cognito, Firebase, Auth0, Okta, or any OAuth/OIDC backend.

When to invoke

• You have an auth subsystem (token store, OAuth flow, error mapper) and want a repeatable security gate in CI rather than a one-time manual review.
• A review flagged a possible secret leak (a token in a log line, a UserDefaults key, a pasteboard copy) and you want a regression-locking test.
• You're wiring federated/OAuth sign-in and need to prove state is single-use and compared in constant time, and that the provider's error codes never reach the UI.

Announce on invoke: "Using swift-auth-security-audit-suite to add attacker-perspective auth tests (leakage, ATS, anti-enumeration, OAuth state) per OWASP MASVS-AUTH + RFC 9700."

Do not treat this suite as a substitute for server-side controls. Client tests are defense-in-depth; the provider must also be configured to suppress user-existence errors (e.g. Cognito PreventUserExistenceErrors=ENABLED). Both layers are required.

What the suite must cover (verified rationale)

Audit area	Assertion	Source
Token leakage — storage	No UserDefaults key whose name/value looks token-like; tokens live only in Keychain	OWASP MASVS-STORAGE
Token leakage — pasteboard	UIPasteboard.general.string doesn't echo a secret after a copy event	MASVS-STORAGE
Token leakage — logs	No os_log call interpolates a token as %{public}@; default %@ is .private	OSLogPrivacy
ATS	NSAllowsArbitraryLoads / …InWebContent not true; no TLS-min below TLSv1.2 without a justified NSExceptionDomains entry	MASTG-KNOW-0071
Injection / boundary	Username/redirect validators reject javascript: schemes, NUL bytes, U+202E RTL override, over-length input	MASVS-CODE
Anti-enumeration	The error mapper never surfaces USER_NOT_FOUND / auth/user-not-found / "does not exist"; collapses to one generic credential error	provider docs (generalized)
OAuth state CSRF	Two parallel flows produce different state; a tampered state on callback is rejected; comparison is constant-time	RFC 9700 / RFC 6749 §10.12
Concurrent refresh	N parallel accessToken() calls → exactly one network refresh, all callers get the same token	MASVS-AUTH
First-launch hygiene	Fresh install (missing UserDefaults sentinel) purges stale Keychain items; idempotent across launches	Apple Keychain (survives uninstall)

The rules

1. Anti-enumeration is provider-agnostic — assert the mapped output, not the raw code

Every provider has a distinguishing "no such user" signal: Cognito UserNotFoundException, Firebase auth/user-not-found, Auth0 invalid_grant with a user-not-found description. The UI must receive one generic case ("Incorrect username or password"). The test iterates the data-layer error enum and asserts no case's user-facing message contains "not found", "does not exist", "unknown user", or a raw provider code. (The server must also suppress these — e.g. Cognito PreventUserExistenceErrors=ENABLED.)

2. state is required even with PKCE — and compared in constant time

RFC 9700 lets PKCE provide CSRF protection only when the authorization server supports it; otherwise state is required. Best practice: always send both. The audit asserts (a) state differs across parallel flows, (b) a tampered callback state is rejected, (c) comparison uses HMAC.isValidAuthenticationCode or XOR-accumulate — never == on the raw value.

3. Issue.record for sweep findings; #expect for hard invariants

For "scan everything and report all leaks" passes (UserDefaults dump, log grep), use Issue.record(...) so one offending key doesn't abort the sweep. For binary invariants (ATS has no arbitrary loads; refresh is single-flight) use #expect.

4. Keychain survives uninstall — the first-launch purge is mandatory and must be idempotent

iOS keeps Keychain items across app uninstall by design. Test that a missing first-launch sentinel triggers a purge, and that running the hook twice leaves the same state (no crash, no double-delete error).

Canonical example

import Testing
import Foundation
@testable import MyApp   // @testable import last

@Suite("Auth security audit")
struct AuthSecurityAuditTests {

    @Test func noTokenLikeKeysInUserDefaults() {
        for (key, value) in UserDefaults.standard.dictionaryRepresentation()
        where key.lowercased().contains("token") || key.lowercased().contains("secret") {
            Issue.record("Secret-like UserDefaults key leaked: \(key) = \(value)")  // soft: report all
        }
    }

    @Test func atsHasNoArbitraryLoads() {
        let ats = Bundle.main.object(forInfoDictionaryKey: "NSAppTransportSecurity") as? [String: Any] ?? [:]
        #expect(ats["NSAllowsArbitraryLoads"] as? Bool != true)
        #expect(ats["NSAllowsArbitraryLoadsInWebContent"] as? Bool != true)
    }

    @Test(arguments: ["javascript:alert(1)", "user\u{0000}name", , (repeating: , count: )])
     ( : ) {
        #expect(.isValid(input)  )
    }

    
      () {
         mapped  .allCasesForTesting.map(.message(for:)) {
             m  mapped.lowercased()
            #expect(m.contains())
            #expect(m.contains())
            #expect(m.contains())
        }
    }

      () {
         a  .generate(), b  .generate()
        #expect(a.value  b.value)                                  
        #expect(a.matches(a.value))                                  
        #expect(a.matches(b.value))                                 
    }

      ()  {
         session  ()
         withTaskGroup(of: ?.) { group 
                { group.addTask {   session.accessToken() } }
             tokens: []  []
              t  group {   t { tokens.append(t) } }
            #expect((tokens).count  )            
            #expect(session.refreshCallCount  )     
        }
    }

      () {
        .reset()                      
        .purgeStaleKeychainIfNeeded() 
        .purgeStaleKeychainIfNeeded() 
        #expect(.didComplete)
    }
}

Decision aid: CI gate vs runtime check

• CI gate (default): run the whole suite on every PR. ATS, anti-enumeration, and leakage scans belong here — they're cheap and deterministic.
• DEBUG runtime assertion: the UserDefaults/pasteboard scan can also fire on launch in DEBUG to catch leaks introduced between test runs; never ship it in RELEASE.
• UI-driven pasteboard test: the in-process UIPasteboard check is enough for logic; only escalate to an XCUIApplication keyboard-driven test if a real copy button is the surface under audit.

Related skills

• global-skills/apple-auth/swift-auth-security-checklist/SKILL.md — the defense-in-depth checklist these tests verify.
• global-skills/apple-auth/swift-post-quantum-security-ios26/SKILL.md — the constant-time comparison the state tests rely on (HMAC.isValidAuthenticationCode).
• global-skills/apple-auth/swift-testing-framework-conventions-mvvm/SKILL.md — Swift Testing conventions (@Suite, import order, Issue.record vs #expect).

Sources

• OWASP MASVS-AUTH · MASTG-KNOW-0071 ATS · OWASP Authentication Cheat Sheet
• OSLogPrivacy · UIPasteboard · Swift Testing @Suite
• AWS Cognito — Managing user existence error responses (one provider example of the generic rule)
• RFC 9700 OAuth 2.0 Security BCP · RFC 7636 PKCE

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Last verified: 2026-06-03 against OWASP MASVS-AUTH / MASTG, OSLogPrivacy, Cognito PreventUserExistenceErrors (exact name + ENABLED/LEGACY behavior confirmed), and RFC 9700. The anti-enumeration rule was verified to generalize across Cognito/Firebase/Auth0. Re-check after: WWDC26 + any CryptoKit/Security release, or by 2026-12-01. Decay risk: low (RFC/OWASP-grounded; the testing API surface is stable). Found a drift? Run /skill-pattern-freshness-audit apple-auth.

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Source: esaldgut/ai-native-engineering-workspace — distributed by TomeVault.