attack-path-stitcher

# Attack Path Stitcher The Validation Run task (#3) produces confirmed findings *per asset*. Real attacker risk lives in **chains**: a finding on asset A leaks credentials that enable a finding on asset B that pivots into asset C. This skill builds that graph. Mounted onto cloud-agent task #6. ## Trigger Cron daily (default 03:00 UTC). May also re-run after a Validation Run task batch completes. ## Workflow 1. **Load inputs.** - `validated/*.json` — every confirmed finding across all engagements. - `artifacts/org-surface.json` — the org-wide surface graph (assets, services, network zones, trust relationships). - `findings/finding-NNN/evidence/raw-source.txt` — for credential / token extraction during stitching. 2. **Build asset nodes.** One node per asset in `org-surface.json`, attributed with: `tier`, `services`, `network_zone`, `trust_relationships`. 3. **Build edges** — one edge per detected pivot. See `reference/edge-detectors.md` for the seven detectors: - Credential reuse (creds leaked on A reused as auth on B) - Shared secret / API key (same secret appears in two assets' evidence) - Trust-zone transitive access (A in zone X has implicit reach to B in zone X) - AD path hops (kerberoast / DC sync / RBCD chains) - Cloud IAM role chains (assume-role from compromised asset) - SSRF → internal asset reach (A's SSRF reaches B's internal endpoint) - Supply-chain (A is a dependency of B per `source-code-scanning` SBOM) 4. **Compute reachability closure.** For each tier-`crown_jewel` node, BFS backwards through edges to find every external-facing node that can reach it. Mark these as "entry points". 5. **Write graph** to `artifacts/attack-paths.json` plus a human DOT file `artifacts/attack-paths.dot` (renderable with Graphviz). Implementation runs through `tools/chain-merger.py` which handles the graph construction. The skill provides the *rules* the tool consults; the tool does the iteration. ## Output ``` {OUTPUT_DIR}/ artifacts/ attack-paths.json # nodes, edges, entry_points, crown_jewel_paths attack-paths.dot # Graphviz source attack-paths.md # ranked list of distinct paths (human read) ``` `attack-paths.json` schema: ```json { "generated_at": "2026-05-13T03:00:00Z", "nodes": [ {"id": "asset42", "tier": "revenue", "services": ["http/443"], "zone": "dmz", "external": true, "findings": ["finding-012", "finding-018"], "max_cvss": 9.8} ], "edges": [ {"src": "asset42", "dst": "asset77", "detector": "credential-reuse", "via_findings": ["finding-012", "finding-019"], "evidence": "credential (userpass) present in evidence of asset42 and asset77", "feasibility": 1.0} ], "entry_points": ["asset42", "asset05"], "confirmed_paths": [ {"jewel": "asset99", "paths": [ {"hops": ["asset42", "asset77", "asset99"], "edges": [{"src":"asset42","dst":"asset77","detector":"credential-reuse","feasibility":1.0,"via_findings":["finding-012"]}, {"src":"asset77","dst":"asset99","detector":"ssrf-reach","feasibility":1.0,"via_findings":["finding-024"]}], "feasibility": 1.0, "max_cvss": 9.8, "path_class": "confirmed"} ]} ], "inferred_paths": [ {"jewel": "asset99", "paths": [ {"hops": ["asset05", "asset99"], "edges": [...], "feasibility": 0.5, "max_cvss": 7.5, "path_class": "inferred"} ]} ], "truncation": { "edge_cap_hit": false, "depth_truncated_count": 0, "topn_dropped_count": 0, "max_depth": 8, "edge_cap": 50000 } } ``` **Crucial for RFP §3.3 compliance**: `confirmed_paths` contains ONLY paths where every edge has feasibility 1.0 AND every edge cites at least one validated finding. These are the "confirmed attack paths" the RFP requires. `inferred_paths` carries topology / supply-chain hops with no PoC evidence — surfaced for analyst review but excluded from remediation SLA buckets by `risk-prioritiser`. ## Rules 1. **Edges require evidence.** An edge is only written if at least one finding's evidence corroborates the pivot. No speculative edges. 2. **Bi-directional ≠ assumed.** If A reaches B, do not infer B reaches A. Each direction needs its own evidence. 3. **Deduplicate by `(src, dst, detector)`.** Multiple findings that enable the same hop merge into one edge with `via_findings` listing all of them. 4. **Feasibility ∈ {1.0, 0.5, 0.25}.** Reliable PoC re-run = 1.0; conditional (race, timing, specific user) = 0.5; theoretical (logically follows but never demonstrated) = 0.25. 5. **Limit path enumeration.** For each crown-jewel, return top-10 paths per class (confirmed + inferred separately) sorted by `feasibility × max_cvss / hop_count`. Full graph is in `attack-paths.json` for downstream prioritisation. 6. **Read-only.** Stitcher never re-fires PoCs and never touches `findings/`. It only reads. 7. **Bound graph size.** Stop edge construction at 50,000 edges; cap path-search depth at `--max-depth` (default 8 hops). Emit `truncation.edge_cap_hit`, `truncation.depth_truncated_count`, and `truncation.topn_dropped_count` in the JSON so downstream consumers can detect silent path loss. 8. **Confirmed vs inferred is non-negotiable.** A path appears in `confirmed_paths` only if every edge has feasibility 1.0 AND every edge has a non-empty `via_findings`. Trust-zone-only, shared-secret-only, and supply-chain-only chains land in `inferred_paths`. This split is the contract that lets the RFP-§3.3 claim "confirmed attack paths" stand. 9. **Schema enforcement on input.** `tools/chain-merger.py` drops `validated/{id}.json` rows missing `finding_id` or `asset`, or whose `verdict != "VALID"`, with stderr WARNs. Upstream validator must comply with the schema in `projects/rfp-3.2/task-03-validation-run.md`. ## References - `reference/edge-detectors.md` — the 7 detector rules with concrete signal patterns. - `projects/rfp-3.3/task-06-attack-path-stitcher.md` — cloud-agent runtime contract.