crypto-ctf-solver

name

crypto-ctf-solver

description

Solve public-key cryptography CTF challenges involving RSA, ECC, and ECDSA. Use this skill whenever the user mentions crypto challenges, RSA keys, ECDSA signatures, nonce reuse, lattice attacks, or any public-key cryptography problem. This includes CTF writeups, security research, or analyzing cryptographic implementations. Trigger on keywords like: RSA, ECC, ECDSA, nonce, private key recovery, lattice, LLL, factordb, SageMath, or any mention of cryptographic attacks.

Public-Key Crypto CTF Solver

A skill for solving public-key cryptography challenges in CTFs and security research. Focuses on RSA, ECC/ECDSA, and lattice-based attacks.

When to use this skill

Use this skill when:

• You have RSA parameters (n, e, c) and need to decrypt or factor
• You're analyzing ECDSA signatures for nonce reuse or bias
• You encounter lattice-based crypto problems
• You need to recover private keys from cryptographic artifacts
• You're working on CTF crypto challenges involving public-key algorithms

Recommended Tooling

• SageMath: For LLL/lattice attacks and modular arithmetic
• RsaCtfTool: Swiss-army knife for RSA attacks
• factordb.com: Quick factorization checks

RSA Attacks

Start here when you have n, e, c and additional hints.

Common Attack Patterns

1. Shared Modulus Attack: Same n used with different e values
2. Low Exponent Attack: Small e (e.g., e=3) with small messages
3. Partial Key Exposure: Some bits of d or p/q known
4. Related Messages: Same message encrypted with different padding
5. Small Factors: n has small prime factors (check factordb first)

Attack Workflow

1. Check factordb.com for n - instant factorization if available
2. Run RsaCtfTool for automated attack detection
3. Use SageMath for custom lattice attacks if needed

ECDSA Nonce Recovery

If two signatures reuse the same nonce k, the private key can be recovered.

Recovery Formulas

Given:

• Two messages m1, m2 with signatures (r, s1) and (r, s2)
• Same r indicates nonce reuse
• Group order n

Recovery:

k = (h(m1) - h(m2)) * (s1 - s2)^{-1} mod n
d = (s1*k - h(m1)) * r^{-1} mod n

Where:

• h(m) = hash of message
• d = private key
• k = nonce

Nonce Bias/Leakage

Even if k isn't identical, bias or leakage of nonce bits across signatures can enable lattice recovery. This is a common CTF theme.

Invalid-Curve Attacks

If a protocol fails to validate that points are on the expected curve (or subgroup), an attacker may force operations in a weak group.

Defense Checklist

• Validate points are on-curve
• Validate points are in the correct subgroup
• Check for small subgroup attacks

Attack Pattern

Many CTF tasks model this as: "server multiplies attacker-chosen point by secret scalar and returns something."

Scripts

ECDSA Nonce Recovery

Use scripts/ecdsa_nonce_recovery.py when you have two signatures with the same r value.

RSA Factorization Helper

Use scripts/rsa_factor_check.py to quickly check factordb and run basic factorization.

SageMath Patterns

For lattice attacks, use SageMath with LLL:

from sage.all import *

# Example: Lattice basis construction
n = 2  # dimension
basis = Matrix(ZZ, [[n, 0], [0, n]])
reduced = basis.LLL()

Common CTF Patterns

1. Nonce reuse in ECDSA → Direct private key recovery
2. Small RSA factors → Check factordb first
3. Invalid curve points → Force weak group operations
4. Lattice problems → Use SageMath LLL
5. Partial key exposure → Coppersmith's method

Next Steps

After identifying the attack pattern:

1. Extract relevant parameters from the challenge
2. Run the appropriate script or SageMath code
3. Verify the recovered key works
4. Document the attack for writeup