fuzz-run

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Atualizado29 de maio de 2026 às 02:51

Low-level stage for /fuzz. Execute runnable fuzz harnesses from .kuzushi/fuzz/fuzz-plan.json in an offline sandbox. Prefer /fuzz --stage replay for normal use.

Instalação

Instalar com Codex ou Claude Copie este prompt, cole no Codex, Claude ou outro assistente e deixe que ele revise a página da skill e instale para você.

Executar no Manus

Fonte

allsmog

allsmog/kuzushi-security-plugin

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Ocupações relacionadasSOC

Baseado na classificação ocupacional SOC

Analistas de garantia de qualidade de software e testadoresInformática e Matemática·SOC 15-1253

SKILL.md

readonly

name	fuzz-run
description	Low-level stage for /fuzz. Execute runnable fuzz harnesses from .kuzushi/fuzz/fuzz-plan.json in an offline sandbox. Prefer /fuzz --stage replay for normal use.
allowed-tools	Bash
user-invocable	false

Fuzz run

Run:

node "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/cmd/fuzz-run.mjs" --target "<repo root>"

If Docker is unavailable and the user explicitly accepts local execution, rerun with --trust-local. Report the verdict counts. Only proofVerdict:"exploited" is empirical fuzz proof.

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