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data-source-mapper

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Atualizado5 de março de 2026 às 18:50

Map MITRE ATT&CK techniques to required data sources across Windows, Linux, cloud, network, and EDR telemetry. Includes CIM, ECS, Sigma, and KQL (Sentinel) field mapping comparisons.

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MHaggis

MHaggis/Security-Detections-MCP

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Ocupações relacionadasSOC

Baseado na classificação ocupacional SOC

Analistas de segurança da informaçãoInformática e Matemática·SOC 15-1212

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name	Data Source Mapper
description	Map MITRE ATT&CK techniques to required data sources across Windows, Linux, cloud, network, and EDR telemetry. Includes CIM, ECS, Sigma, and KQL (Sentinel) field mapping comparisons.

Data Source Mapper Skill

Configuration

$SIEM_PLATFORM - Target SIEM: splunk, sentinel, elastic, sigma
$SECURITY_CONTENT_PATH - Path to detection content repository

Overview

Every detection rule depends on specific telemetry. This skill maps ATT&CK techniques to the data sources that make detection possible, and compares field naming across common schemas (Splunk CIM, Elastic ECS, Sigma, and Sentinel/MDE).

Data Source Catalog

Windows Endpoint

Data Source	Key Events	Detects	Collection Method
Windows Security Events	4688 (Process), 4624/4625 (Logon), 4672 (Privileges)	Execution, Credential Access, Lateral Movement	Windows Event Forwarding, Splunk UF, Winlogbeat
Sysmon	1 (Process), 3 (Network), 7 (Image Load), 11 (File Create), 13 (Registry)	Nearly all endpoint techniques	Sysmon + log forwarder
PowerShell Logging	4104 (Script Block), 4103 (Module), 800/600 (Classic)	T1059.001, T1546.013, obfuscation	GPO: Script Block Logging
WMI Trace	WMI-Activity/Operational	T1047, T1546.003	Built-in ETW provider
Windows Defender	1116 (Detection), 1117 (Action)	Malware execution attempts	Windows Event Log
ETW Providers	Microsoft-Windows-DNS-Client, etc.	DNS, TLS, RPC activity	Custom ETW collection

Linux Endpoint

Data Source	Key Events	Detects	Collection Method
auditd	SYSCALL, EXECVE, PATH, USER_AUTH	Execution, File Access, Auth	auditd rules + forwarder
syslog	auth.log, secure, messages	Authentication, sudo, cron	rsyslog/syslog-ng
journald	SystemD unit events	Service persistence, execution	journalctl export
osquery	Scheduled queries	File integrity, process, network	osquery daemon
eBPF	Process, file, network events	Fine-grained kernel telemetry	Cilium Tetragon, Tracee

Cloud

Data Source	Key Events	Detects	Collection Method
AWS CloudTrail	API calls (Management + Data events)	IAM abuse, resource manipulation	S3 → log forwarder
AWS GuardDuty	Threat findings	Recon, credential compromise	EventBridge → SIEM
Azure Activity Log	ARM operations	Resource changes	Diagnostic Settings
Azure AD Sign-in Logs	Sign-in events, MFA	Credential abuse, brute force	Diagnostic Settings
GCP Audit Logs	Admin Activity, Data Access	IAM, resource access	Log Router → SIEM
O365 Unified Audit Log	Mail, SharePoint, Teams	BEC, data exfiltration	Management API

Network

Data Source	Key Events	Detects	Collection Method
Zeek	conn.log, dns.log, http.log, ssl.log, files.log	C2, exfil, lateral movement	Network tap / span port
Suricata	alert, flow, dns, http, tls	Known signatures + protocol anomalies	Inline or passive
DNS Logs	Query/response	C2 over DNS, DGA	DNS server logs, passive DNS
Firewall Logs	Allow/deny, NAT	Lateral movement, exfil	Syslog from firewall
Proxy / WAF Logs	HTTP requests, URL categories	Web-based C2, initial access	Proxy log export
NetFlow / IPFIX	Flow records	Volume anomalies, beaconing	Router/switch export

EDR / XDR

Data Source	Key Events	Detects	Collection Method
CrowdStrike Falcon	ProcessRollup2, NetworkConnect, DnsRequest	Broad endpoint coverage	Falcon Data Replicator (FDR)
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint	DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents	Broad endpoint coverage	Streaming API or Sentinel
SentinelOne	Process, File, Network telemetry	Broad endpoint coverage	API export
Carbon Black	Process, Netconn, Filemod	Broad endpoint coverage	Event Forwarder

Field Mapping Comparison: CIM vs ECS vs Sigma vs Sentinel

The same telemetry is named differently across schemas. This table maps common fields across all four platforms.

Process Creation Fields

Concept	Splunk CIM	Elastic ECS	Sigma (Generic)	Sentinel / MDE (KQL)
Process name	`process_name`	`process.name`	`Image`	`FileName`
Command line	`process`	`process.command_line`	`CommandLine`	`ProcessCommandLine`
Process ID	`process_id`	`process.pid`	`ProcessId`	`ProcessId`
Parent process name	`parent_process_name`	`process.parent.name`	`ParentImage`	`InitiatingProcessFileName`
Parent command line	`parent_process`	`process.parent.command_line`	`ParentCommandLine`	`InitiatingProcessCommandLine`
User	`user`	`user.name`	`User`	`AccountName`
Hostname	`dest`	`host.name`	`Computer`	`DeviceName`
File hash (SHA256)	`process_hash`	`process.hash.sha256`	`Hashes`	`SHA256`
Timestamp	`_time`	`@timestamp`	N/A	`Timestamp`

Network Connection Fields

Concept	Splunk CIM	Elastic ECS	Sigma	Sentinel / MDE (KQL)
Source IP	`src`	`source.ip`	`SourceIp`	`LocalIP`
Destination IP	`dest`	`destination.ip`	`DestinationIp`	`RemoteIP`
Destination port	`dest_port`	`destination.port`	`DestinationPort`	`RemotePort`
Protocol	`transport`	`network.transport`	`Protocol`	`Protocol`
Bytes out	`bytes_out`	`source.bytes`	N/A	`SentBytes`
Application	`app`	`network.application`	N/A	N/A

File Activity Fields

Concept	Splunk CIM	Elastic ECS	Sigma	Sentinel / MDE (KQL)
File path	`file_path`	`file.path`	`TargetFilename`	`FolderPath`
File name	`file_name`	`file.name`	`TargetFilename`	`FileName`
File hash	`file_hash`	`file.hash.sha256`	`Hashes`	`SHA256`
Action	`action`	`event.action`	N/A	`ActionType`

Key Sentinel / MDE Tables

Table	Data Source	Use For
`DeviceProcessEvents`	MDE agent	Process creation and execution
`DeviceNetworkEvents`	MDE agent	Network connections
`DeviceFileEvents`	MDE agent	File creation, modification, deletion
`DeviceRegistryEvents`	MDE agent	Registry modifications
`DeviceLogonEvents`	MDE agent	Authentication events
`SecurityEvent`	Azure Monitor Agent (legacy)	Windows Security Event Log
`Syslog`	Azure Monitor Agent	Linux syslog
`SigninLogs`	Azure AD connector	Azure AD authentication
`AuditLogs`	Azure AD connector	Azure AD administrative changes

Technique to Data Source Mapping

High-Priority Techniques

Technique	Required Data Source(s)	Minimum Viable
T1059.001 (PowerShell)	PowerShell 4104 + Sysmon 1	PowerShell 4104 alone
T1059.003 (cmd.exe)	Sysmon 1 / Security 4688	Security 4688 with cmd logging
T1003.001 (LSASS dump)	Sysmon 10 (ProcessAccess)	Sysmon 10
T1053.005 (Sched. Task)	Security 4698/4702 + Sysmon 1	Security 4698
T1547.001 (Registry Run)	Sysmon 13 (Registry)	Sysmon 13
T1021.001 (RDP)	Security 4624 Type 10 + Network	Security 4624
T1071.001 (HTTP C2)	Zeek http.log / Proxy logs	Proxy logs
T1078.004 (Cloud Accounts)	Azure AD / CloudTrail	Cloud auth logs

Using Data Source Mappings

For Detection Writing

Identify the technique your detection covers
Look up required data sources in the table above
Check which schema your SIEM uses (CIM, ECS, or native)
Map field names accordingly
Verify the data source is actually being collected in your environment

For Gap Analysis

If you lack a data source, you lack detection capability for techniques that depend on it. Use this mapping to:

List all techniques you want to detect
Map each to required data sources
Compare against what you actually collect
Prioritize data source onboarding by technique coverage impact

For Test Environment Planning

Use the data source mapping to determine what infrastructure your test lab needs. See the Test Environment Builder skill for building labs that produce specific data sources.