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Annual or quarterly review of third-party application OAuth permissions
After a security incident involving compromised OAuth tokens or unauthorized data access
Compliance audit requiring documentation of third-party data access (GDPR Article 28, SOC 2)
Discovery of shadow IT applications accessing organizational data via OAuth grants
Migration or consolidation of SaaS applications requiring permission cleanup
Implementing least-privilege principle for API integrations
Do not use for reviewing first-party application permissions within the same trust boundary; OAuth scope minimization focuses on third-party and cross-boundary consent grants.
Prerequisites
Admin access to identity providers (Microsoft Entra ID, Okta, Google Workspace)
Microsoft Graph API permissions: Application.Read.All, OAuth2PermissionGrant.ReadWrite.All
Inventory of approved third-party integrations from procurement or IT governance
OAuth scope risk classification framework
Tools for token analysis (jwt.io for manual review, automated scripts for bulk analysis)
Workflow
Step 1: Inventory All OAuth Grants and Consent Permissions
Enumerate all OAuth application registrations and delegated permissions:
Categorize permissions based on data access sensitivity:
"""
OAuth Scope Risk Classification
Maps API scopes to risk levels based on data sensitivity and access breadth.
"""
MICROSOFT_GRAPH_SCOPE_RISK = {
# CRITICAL - Full administrative or unrestricted access"critical": {
"scopes": [
"Directory.ReadWrite.All",
"RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory",
"Application.ReadWrite.All",
"AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All",
"Mail.ReadWrite",
"Mail.Send",
"Files.ReadWrite.All",
"Sites.FullControl.All",
"User.ReadWrite.All",
"Group.ReadWrite.All",
"MailboxSettings.ReadWrite",
"full_access_as_app",
],
"risk_description": "Can read/write all data, modify directory, or impersonate users",
"review_frequency": "Monthly",
"requires_admin_consent": True
},
# HIGH - Broad read access or sensitive data write"high": {
"scopes": [
"Mail.Read",
"Mail.Read.Shared",
"Calendars.ReadWrite",
"Contacts.ReadWrite",
"Files.Read.All",
"Sites.Read.All",
"User.Read.All",
"Group.Read.All",
"Directory.Read.All",
"AuditLog.Read.All",
"SecurityEvents.ReadWrite.All",
"TeamSettings.ReadWrite.All",
],
"risk_description": "Broad read access to sensitive organizational data",
"review_frequency": "Quarterly",
"requires_admin_consent": True
},
# MEDIUM - Scoped data access"medium": {
"scopes": [
"Calendars.Read",
"Contacts.Read",
"Files.ReadWrite",
"Sites.ReadWrite.All",
"Tasks.ReadWrite",
"Notes.ReadWrite.All",
"Chat.ReadWrite",
"ChannelMessage.Send",
"Team.ReadBasic.All",
],
"risk_description": "Scoped access to specific data types with write capability",
"review_frequency": "Semi-annually"
},
# LOW - Minimal or user-profile only access"low": {
"scopes": [
"User.Read",
"openid",
"profile",
"email",
"offline_access",
"Calendars.Read.Shared",
"People.Read",
"User.ReadBasic.All",
],
"risk_description": "Basic user profile or minimal scoped access",
"review_frequency": "Annually"
}
}
defclassify_scope_risk(scope):
"""Classify a single OAuth scope by risk level."""for risk_level, config in MICROSOFT_GRAPH_SCOPE_RISK.items():
if scope in config["scopes"]:
return {
"scope": scope,
"risk_level": risk_level,
"description": config["risk_description"],
"review_frequency": config["review_frequency"]
}
# Unknown scopes default to HIGH riskreturn {
"scope": scope,
"risk_level": "high",
"description": "Unknown scope - requires manual classification",
"review_frequency": "Quarterly"
}
defanalyze_app_risk(app_permissions):
"""Calculate aggregate risk score for an application's permissions."""
risk_weights = {"critical": 40, "high": 20, "medium": 10, "low": 2}
total_score = 0
classified_scopes = []
for perm in app_permissions:
classification = classify_scope_risk(perm["scope"])
classified_scopes.append(classification)
total_score += risk_weights.get(classification["risk_level"], 10)
# Bonus risk for application (vs delegated) permissions
app_type_permissions = [p for p in app_permissions if p["permission_type"] == "Application"]
total_score += len(app_type_permissions) * 15# Bonus risk for admin-consented broad access
admin_consent = [p for p in app_permissions if p["consent_type"] == "AllPrincipals"]
total_score += len(admin_consent) * 10if total_score >= 100:
aggregate_risk = "CRITICAL"elif total_score >= 60:
aggregate_risk = "HIGH"elif total_score >= 30:
aggregate_risk = "MEDIUM"else:
aggregate_risk = "LOW"return {
"total_score": total_score,
"aggregate_risk": aggregate_risk,
"scope_count": len(app_permissions),
"critical_scopes": len([s for s in classified_scopes if s["risk_level"] == "critical"]),
"high_scopes": len([s for s in classified_scopes if s["risk_level"] == "high"]),
"classified_scopes": classified_scopes
}
Step 3: Identify Over-Permissioned Applications
Detect apps requesting more permissions than functionally needed:
"""
Over-Permission Detection
Identifies applications with excessive OAuth scopes relative to their function.
"""defdetect_over_permissions(inventory, approved_apps_catalog):
"""
Compare actual permissions against approved scope catalog
to find over-permissioned applications.
"""
findings = []
# Group permissions by application
app_permissions = defaultdict(list)
for perm in inventory:
app_permissions[perm["app_name"]].append(perm)
for app_name, permissions in app_permissions.items():
# Check against approved catalog
approved = approved_apps_catalog.get(app_name)
ifnot approved:
# Unknown/unapproved application
findings.append({
"app_name": app_name,
"finding_type": "UNAPPROVED_APPLICATION",
"severity": "HIGH",
"detail": f"Application not in approved catalog with {len(permissions)} permission grants",
"scopes": [p["scope"] for p in permissions],
"recommendation": "Review and approve or revoke all permissions"
})
continue
approved_scopes = set(approved.get("approved_scopes", []))
actual_scopes = set(p["scope"] for p in permissions)
# Find excessive scopes (granted but not approved)
excessive = actual_scopes - approved_scopes
if excessive:
risk = analyze_app_risk([p for p in permissions if p["scope"] in excessive])
findings.append({
"app_name": app_name,
"finding_type": "EXCESSIVE_SCOPES",
"severity": risk["aggregate_risk"],
"detail": f"{len(excessive)} scopes beyond approved list",
"excessive_scopes": list(excessive),
"approved_scopes": list(approved_scopes),
"recommendation": "Remove excessive scopes or update approved catalog"
})
# Find unused scopes (approved but activity logs show no API calls)# This requires API activity log correlation
unused = approved_scopes - actual_scopes
if unused:
findings.append({
"app_name": app_name,
"finding_type": "UNUSED_APPROVED_SCOPES",
"severity": "LOW",
"detail": f"{len(unused)} approved scopes not currently granted",
"unused_scopes": list(unused)
})
# Check for overly broad permissions
broad_patterns = [
("Mail.ReadWrite", "Mail.Read", "Write access to mail when only read needed"),
("Files.ReadWrite.All", "Files.Read.All", "Write access to all files when only read needed"),
("Directory.ReadWrite.All", "Directory.Read.All", "Write access to directory when only read needed"),
("User.ReadWrite.All", "User.Read.All", "Write access to users when only read needed"),
]
for broad, narrow, description in broad_patterns:
if broad in actual_scopes:
findings.append({
"app_name": app_name,
"finding_type": "OVERLY_BROAD_SCOPE",
"severity": "MEDIUM",
"detail": description,
"current_scope": broad,
"recommended_scope": narrow,
"recommendation": f"Downgrade from {broad} to {narrow}"
})
return findings
Step 4: Audit Token Usage and Detect Stale Grants
Identify OAuth tokens that are no longer actively used:
"""
Token Usage Audit
Analyzes sign-in logs and API activity to identify stale OAuth grants.
"""defaudit_token_usage(auditor, days_inactive=90):
"""Identify OAuth grants with no recent API activity."""# Get sign-in activity for service principals
url = f"{auditor.base_url}/auditLogs/signIns"
params = {
"$filter": f"createdDateTime ge {(datetime.utcnow() - timedelta(days=days_inactive)).isoformat()}Z and signInEventTypes/any(t: t eq 'servicePrincipal')",
"$top": 999
}
active_apps = set()
while url:
response = requests.get(url, headers=auditor.headers, params=params)
data = response.json()
for signin in data.get("value", []):
active_apps.add(signin.get("appId"))
url = data.get("@odata.nextLink")
params = {}
# Compare against all granted apps
all_grants = auditor.get_oauth2_permission_grants()
sp_map = {sp["id"]: sp for sp in auditor.get_all_service_principals()}
stale_grants = []
for grant in all_grants:
sp = sp_map.get(grant["clientId"], {})
app_id = sp.get("appId")
if app_id and app_id notin active_apps:
stale_grants.append({
"app_name": sp.get("displayName", "Unknown"),
"app_id": app_id,
"scopes": grant.get("scope", "").split(),
"consent_type": grant.get("consentType"),
"is_third_party": sp.get("appOwnerOrganizationId") != auditor.tenant_id,
"days_inactive": days_inactive,
"recommendation": "Revoke - no API activity in {days_inactive} days"
})
returnsorted(stale_grants, key=lambda x: len(x["scopes"]), reverse=True)
Step 5: Generate Remediation Plan and Execute Scope Reduction
Create and execute the scope minimization remediation plan:
"""
OAuth Scope Remediation
Generates and executes scope reduction actions.
"""defgenerate_remediation_plan(findings, stale_grants):
"""Create prioritized remediation plan."""
plan = []
# Priority 1: Revoke unapproved applicationsfor f in findings:
if f["finding_type"] == "UNAPPROVED_APPLICATION":
plan.append({
"priority": 1,
"action": "REVOKE_ALL_PERMISSIONS",
"app_name": f["app_name"],
"reason": "Unapproved third-party application",
"impact": f"Removes {len(f['scopes'])} permission grants",
"risk_if_not_addressed": "CRITICAL"
})
# Priority 2: Remove excessive scopes from approved appsfor f in findings:
if f["finding_type"] == "EXCESSIVE_SCOPES":
plan.append({
"priority": 2,
"action": "REMOVE_EXCESSIVE_SCOPES",
"app_name": f["app_name"],
"scopes_to_remove": f["excessive_scopes"],
"reason": "Scopes beyond approved catalog",
"risk_if_not_addressed": f["severity"]
})
# Priority 3: Downgrade overly broad scopesfor f in findings:
if f["finding_type"] == "OVERLY_BROAD_SCOPE":
plan.append({
"priority": 3,
"action": "DOWNGRADE_SCOPE",
"app_name": f["app_name"],
"current_scope": f["current_scope"],
"target_scope": f["recommended_scope"],
"reason": f["detail"],
"risk_if_not_addressed": "MEDIUM"
})
# Priority 4: Revoke stale grantsfor grant in stale_grants:
plan.append({
"priority": 4,
"action": "REVOKE_STALE_GRANT",
"app_name": grant["app_name"],
"scopes_to_revoke": grant["scopes"],
"reason": f"No API activity in {grant['days_inactive']} days",
"risk_if_not_addressed": "MEDIUM"
})
returnsorted(plan, key=lambda x: x["priority"])
defexecute_scope_reduction(auditor, grant_id, scopes_to_remove):
"""Remove specific scopes from an OAuth permission grant."""# Get current grant
url = f"{auditor.base_url}/oauth2PermissionGrants/{grant_id}"
response = requests.get(url, headers=auditor.headers)
current_grant = response.json()
current_scopes = set(current_grant.get("scope", "").split())
updated_scopes = current_scopes - set(scopes_to_remove)
ifnot updated_scopes:
# Remove entire grant
requests.delete(url, headers=auditor.headers)
return {"action": "grant_deleted", "grant_id": grant_id}
else:
# Update with reduced scopes
update_body = {"scope": " ".join(updated_scopes)}
requests.patch(url, headers=auditor.headers, json=update_body)
return {
"action": "scopes_reduced",
"grant_id": grant_id,
"removed": list(scopes_to_remove),
"remaining": list(updated_scopes)
}
Key Concepts
Term
Definition
OAuth Scope
Permission string defining the specific API access level granted to a client application (e.g., Mail.Read, Files.ReadWrite.All)
Delegated Permission
OAuth scope exercised on behalf of a signed-in user, limited by both the app's permissions and the user's own access rights
Application Permission
OAuth scope granted directly to the application without user context, providing access to all users' data (high risk)
Admin Consent
Tenant-wide permission grant made by an administrator that applies to all users without individual consent
Scope Minimization
Security principle of reducing OAuth permissions to the minimum set required for application functionality
Stale Grant
OAuth permission that remains active but has no recent API usage, indicating the integration is abandoned or deprecated
Tools & Systems
Microsoft Entra Admin Center: Portal for reviewing enterprise applications, consent permissions, and OAuth grant management
Nudge Security: SaaS security platform for discovering OAuth grants, assessing third-party risk, and automating scope reviews
Cerby: Non-SSO application management platform for auditing OAuth integrations and managing shared accounts
Microsoft Graph API: Programmatic interface for enumerating and modifying OAuth permission grants at scale
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Post-Breach OAuth Scope Audit
Context: After a phishing attack compromised an admin account, investigation reveals the attacker registered a malicious OAuth application with Mail.ReadWrite and Files.ReadWrite.All scopes, exfiltrating 6 months of email. The organization needs a comprehensive OAuth scope review.
Approach:
Immediately revoke all OAuth grants from the compromised admin session
Enumerate all service principals and permission grants across the tenant
Flag all applications registered in the last 90 days for manual review
Classify all third-party application scopes using the risk framework
Identify applications with critical scopes (Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite.All, Directory.ReadWrite.All)
Cross-reference against approved application catalog from IT procurement
Revoke all unapproved applications immediately
Downgrade over-permissioned approved applications to minimum required scopes
Implement admin consent workflow to prevent future uncontrolled OAuth grants
Enable consent policy requiring admin approval for high-risk scopes
Pitfalls:
Revoking permissions for business-critical integrations without coordination causes service disruption
Not checking for application-level permissions (vs delegated) which are higher risk and often overlooked
Missing multi-tenant applications where the publisher tenant differs from the consuming tenant
Not implementing ongoing monitoring to detect new unauthorized OAuth grants after remediation
Output Format
OAUTH SCOPE MINIMIZATION REVIEW REPORT
=========================================
Tenant: corp.onmicrosoft.com
Review Period: 2026-02-01 to 2026-02-24
Total Applications: 147
Third-Party Apps: 98
First-Party Apps: 49
PERMISSION INVENTORY
Total OAuth Grants: 487
Delegated Permissions: 312
Application Permissions: 175
Admin-Consented: 89
User-Consented: 223
RISK CLASSIFICATION
Critical Risk Apps: 7
- UnknownCRMApp (Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite.All - UNAPPROVED)
- LegacySync (Directory.ReadWrite.All - EXCESSIVE)
- DevToolX (Application.ReadWrite.All - OVERLY BROAD)
High Risk Apps: 18
Medium Risk Apps: 34
Low Risk Apps: 88
FINDINGS
Unapproved Applications: 12 (REVOKE IMMEDIATELY)
Excessive Scopes: 23 apps with scopes beyond approved list
Overly Broad Permissions: 15 apps that can be downgraded
Stale Grants (90+ days): 31 apps with no recent API activity
REMEDIATION PLAN
Priority 1 (Immediate): 12 unapproved app revocations
Priority 2 (This Week): 23 excessive scope removals
Priority 3 (This Month): 15 scope downgrades
Priority 4 (Next Quarter): 31 stale grant revocations
Estimated Scope Reduction: 34% of total permissions
