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Loaded automatically when the user mentions MAX messenger mini-apps, the MAX Bridge, dev.max.ru, or asks about validating MAX launch data. Read only the reference file relevant to the current task — do not load every reference up front.
Use this skill when
Building a mini-app for the RU market that targets the MAX messenger (VK Tech's messenger product, positioned as an alternative to Telegram)
Implementing identity / authorization for a MAX mini-app — validating window.WebApp.initData server-side with HMAC-SHA256 against the bot token
Wiring the CDN script https://st.max.ru/js/max-web-app.js and typing window.WebApp for TypeScript
Building a server-side validator for WebAppData in Node.js (Fastify, Hono, Next.js) following the upstream 10-step algorithm
Auditing identity safety: ensuring initDataUnsafe is not trusted, TTL is enforced, bot token isn't shipped to the client
Do not use this skill when
Task is a Telegram Mini App or Telegram Bot — hand off to telegram-bot
Task is a VK Mini App / VKWebApp / VK Pay — hand off to vk-bridge
Task is a generic OAuth / SSO / JWT-only auth flow with no MAX surface — use better-auth or nodejs
Task is messaging on WhatsApp, Discord, Matrix, Slack, or any non-MAX platform
Task is the MAX Bot API for chat bots (server-only flow with no mini-app surface) — that is a different surface; this skill covers the mini-app bridge only
Task is pure Mini App UI/UX styling without bridge integration — use ui-ux-pro-max / tailwind / shadcn
Purpose
MAX is VK Tech's messenger platform, positioned as a Russian-market alternative to Telegram with first-party mini-app support. Its WebApp bridge follows the same conceptual model as Telegram Mini Apps and VK Mini Apps — a CDN-injected window.WebApp object that exposes platform capabilities (storage, biometry, haptic, share, NFC) and a signed initData string that is the only safe handle on user identity. The signing scheme uses a two-layer HMAC-SHA256 keyed by the bot token (with the literal string "WebAppData" as the inner key) and outputs a hex hash — distinct from VK Bridge's single-layer base64url sign and from Telegram's similarly named but constant-different scheme.
This skill encodes the upstream documentation at https://dev.max.ru/docs/webapps/bridge and https://dev.max.ru/docs/webapps/validation as of 2026-05-16, plus consolidated guidance for production use: a Node.js reference validator, a side-by-side VK Bridge comparison for teams supporting both, troubleshooting indexed by user-visible failure, recommended defaults (TTL, retry, cache, CSP), and five wrong-vs-right pairs covering the highest-stakes identity mistakes. The platform is young — capabilities published upstream are tracked verbatim under references/upstream/ so future drift is auditable via re-sync.
Capabilities
Bridge surface mapping
Every documented method, event, and type is captured in bridge-api.md (our consolidated index) and upstream/bridge.md (verbatim). The bridge exposes the window.WebApp namespace with sub-objects ScreenCapture, BackButton, DeviceStorage, SecureStorage, BiometricManager, HapticFeedback, NfcManager — each with explicit platform support gates («Не поддерживается веб-клиентом» means the Promise will reject on platform === 'web').
Server-side launch-data validation
The 10-step HMAC-SHA256 algorithm from https://dev.max.ru/docs/webapps/validation is the only safe path to trusting any user-attributed data. references/launch-data-validation.md ships a production Node.js validator (timing-safe compare, configurable TTL, structured errors) plus an Edge-runtime variant using Web Crypto for Cloudflare Workers / Vercel Edge. Common pitfalls — wrong sort, wrong separator, decoding the wrong field, treating auth_date as ms — are called out inline.
VK Bridge side-by-side comparison
references/comparison-vk-bridge.md is the key differentiator: a method-by-method mapping table for teams that need to support both VK Mini Apps and MAX, with a side-by-side breakdown of the sign-validation algorithms (different constants, different join separators, different output encodings). Architectural guidance covers how to abstract identity at the route layer without leaking platform-specific shapes into domain code.
Identity-mistake prevention
references/wrong-vs-right.md collects the five most expensive mistakes: trusting initDataUnsafe, skipping TTL, shipping bot token to client, leaving hash in launch_params, treating native methods as guaranteed-available. Each pair has a one-liner explaining why it matters, paired with the correct pattern.
Troubleshooting
references/troubleshooting.md is symptom-indexed: window.WebApp undefined, signature always fails, initData is empty, biometry openSettings closes the app, openLink does nothing without a user gesture, CSP/iframe breaks the bridge, server clock drift causes false expiry. Each entry: Symptoms → Diagnose commands → Common causes → Fix.
Recommended defaults
references/recommended-defaults.md is the single source of truth for tunable knobs: maxAgeSeconds=3600 (matches upstream guidance of 1 hour), retry policy on 5xx only, caching by sha256(initData) with bounded TTL, CSP script-src/frame-ancestors, header naming (X-Max-InitData), and 401 response shapes.
Behavioral Traits
Treats window.WebApp.initData as the only trustable identity handle; uses initDataUnsafe exclusively for UI prefill (display name, avatar)
Validates WebAppData server-side on every authenticated request via HMAC-SHA256 with "WebAppData" as the inner key and the bot token as the message
Enforces an auth_date TTL of 1 hour by default (matches upstream «Рекомендуемый интервал составляет 1 час»); tightens to 10 minutes for payment / profile-mutation endpoints
Uses timingSafeEqual (or constant-time XOR on Edge) when comparing the computed hash against the original — never === on strings
Excludes hash from launch_params before signing — signing input never contains its own would-be signature
Sorts launch_params keys by ASCII codepoint, not localeCompare(), matching the upstream TypeScript reference
Capability-checks platform !== 'web' before calling DeviceStorage, SecureStorage, BiometricManager, HapticFeedback, NfcManager — those reject on web
Calls bridge navigation methods (openLink, downloadFile, shareMaxContent) synchronously from user-gesture handlers — the bridge refuses without a recent click
Stores the MAX bot token in env (MAX_BOT_TOKEN), never in client bundles, never in git
For multi-platform projects supporting both MAX and VK: keeps validators as two focused functions (not one parameterized helper) because constants, separators, and output encodings differ
Cross-checks every claimed method name against references/upstream/bridge.md before writing code — MAX is a young platform and analogies from VK Bridge / Telegram WebApp do not transfer reliably
Important Constraints
NEVER trust initDataUnsafe for authorization — it is mutable in the client iframe; always validate the raw initData server-side
NEVER ship the bot token to the browser — it is the validation key and equivalent to a master password
NEVER skip the auth_date TTL check after a successful HMAC verification — without it, signed payloads are permanent credentials
NEVER include hash in launch_params before signing — the signature input must be the payload minus its own signature
NEVER use localeCompare() to sort launch_params keys — use raw < / > ASCII comparison to match the upstream reference
NEVER cache «validated» flags by user.id — cache by sha256(initData) with bounded TTL, never longer than the credential's remaining lifetime
NEVER call DeviceStorage / SecureStorage / BiometricManager / HapticFeedback / NfcManager without a prior platform capability check — they reject on unsupported platforms
NEVER assume MAX has feature parity with Telegram WebApp or VK Bridge — payments, theme params, viewport events, main button, and cloud storage are NOT documented as of the upstream fetch date
ALWAYS validate against the upstream-mirrored reference (references/upstream/) before quoting a method signature — analogies from sibling platforms are unreliable
ALWAYS call BiometricManager.init() and NfcManager.init() once per app session before using their other methods
Related Skills
Runtime
✓ nodejs — Node 24 LTS, AsyncLocalStorage, graceful shutdown for the validator host process
✓ typescript — TS 6.0 for typing window.WebApp and the validator surface
Sibling Mini App platforms
✓ vk-bridge — VK Mini Apps SDK (multi-platform RU teams typically ship both)
✓ telegram-bot — Telegram WebApp Mini Apps + initData HMAC (same concept, different constants)
Web frameworks for the validator
✓ fastify — production webhook / API host with preHandler validation hook
✓ hono — edge-compatible validation via Web Crypto
Frontend frameworks
✓ react — React 19 for the mini-app UI
✓ vue — Vue 3.5 alternative
✓ nuxt — Nuxt 4 with SSR / file routes
✓ nextjs — Next.js 16 with App Router
Data persistence
✓ postgresql — PostgreSQL 18 for user / order tables keyed by validated user.id
✓ redis — Redis 8 for validated-initData cache backend
✓ prisma — Prisma 7 for type-safe access
Validation
✓ zod — schema validation for request bodies after identity is established
Payments (no native MAX payments — use a separate provider)
How to use: new mini-app → setup.md + bridge-api.md. Identity / payments → launch-data-validation.md + wrong-vs-right.md. Production support → troubleshooting.md + recommended-defaults.md. Cross-platform with VK → comparison-vk-bridge.md. Diff against references/upstream/ if a method name in the wild does not match this skill — upstream is the floor.
