Detecting misconfigured Azure Storage accounts including publicly accessible blob containers, missing encryption settings, overly permissive SAS tokens, disabled logging, and network access violations using Azure CLI, PowerShell, and Microsoft Defender for Storage.
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name
detecting-misconfigured-azure-storage
description
Detecting misconfigured Azure Storage accounts including publicly accessible blob containers, missing encryption settings, overly permissive SAS tokens, disabled logging, and network access violations using Azure CLI, PowerShell, and Microsoft Defender for Storage.
When performing a security audit of Azure Storage accounts across subscriptions
When responding to Microsoft Defender for Storage alerts about anonymous access or data exfiltration
When compliance requires verification of encryption, network restrictions, and access logging
When investigating potential data exposure through publicly accessible blob containers
When onboarding Azure subscriptions and establishing storage security baselines
Do not use for Azure SQL or Cosmos DB security auditing (use dedicated database security tools), for real-time threat detection on storage operations (use Defender for Storage), or for Azure Files or Data Lake Gen2 specific auditing without adapting the checks.
Detection Gaps & Validation
Where these az/PowerShell checks give false assurance:
Account-level allowBlobPublicAccess=false does not retroactively close containers. Containers already set to blob/container stay anonymous — the account flag only gates new anonymous access. You must run az storage container list --query "[?properties.publicAccess!='off']" per account.
Data-plane auth silently fails open.az storage container list --auth-mode login without the Storage Blob Data Reader role returns an error/empty set that scripts read as "no public containers." Use the account key path or grant the data-plane role.
networkRuleSet.defaultAction == Deny with bypass containing AzureServices still trusts Microsoft services; Logging/Metrics/AzureServices bypass is easy to overlook.
allowSharedKeyAccess=true means account-key and SAS still work even in "AAD-only" tenants — disabling public access does not stop key-based exfil.
Already-issued SAS tokens survive any config change until you az storage account keys renew (or revoke the stored access policy).
Validate: anonymously curl "https://<acct>.blob.core.windows.net/<container>?restype=container&comp=list" — a 200 with an XML blob list is real exposure, the flag alone is not proof; verify the principal holds Reader and Storage Blob Data Reader across all subscriptions.
Prerequisites
Azure CLI installed and authenticated (az login) with Reader and Storage Account Contributor roles
Az PowerShell module installed for advanced queries (Install-Module Az.Storage)
Microsoft Defender for Storage enabled for threat detection
Access to Azure Resource Graph for cross-subscription queries
ScoutSuite or Prowler Azure provider for automated assessment
Workflow
Step 1: Enumerate All Storage Accounts and Basic Configuration
List all storage accounts across subscriptions and assess their baseline security settings.
# List all storage accounts across all subscriptions
az storage account list \
--query "[].{Name:name, ResourceGroup:resourceGroup, Location:location, Kind:kind, Sku:sku.name, HttpsOnly:enableHttpsTrafficOnly, MinTLS:minimumTlsVersion, PublicAccess:allowBlobPublicAccess}" \
-o table
# Use Resource Graph for cross-subscription enumeration
az graph query -q "
Resources
| where type == 'microsoft.storage/storageaccounts'
| project name, resourceGroup, subscriptionId, location,
properties.allowBlobPublicAccess,
properties.enableHttpsTrafficOnly,
properties.minimumTlsVersion,
properties.networkAcls.defaultAction
" -o table
Identify storage accounts and containers allowing anonymous public access to blob data.
# Check each storage account for public blob access settingfor account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); do
public=$(az storage account show --name "$account" --query "allowBlobPublicAccess" -o tsv)
echo"$account: allowBlobPublicAccess=$public"done# List containers with public access level setfor account in $(az storage account list --query "[?allowBlobPublicAccess==true].name" -o tsv); do
key=$(az storage account keys list --account-name "$account" --query "[0].value" -o tsv)
echo"=== $account ==="
az storage container list \
--account-name "$account" \
--account-key "$key" \
--query "[?properties.publicAccess!='off' && properties.publicAccess!=null].{Container:name, PublicAccess:properties.publicAccess}" \
-o table 2>/dev/null
done# Test anonymous access to discovered public containers
curl -s "https://ACCOUNT.blob.core.windows.net/CONTAINER?restype=container&comp=list" | head -50
Step 3: Audit Network Access and Firewall Rules
Check for storage accounts accessible from all networks versus those restricted to specific VNets or IP ranges.
# Find storage accounts with default network action set to Allow (open to all networks)
az storage account list \
--query "[?networkRuleSet.defaultAction=='Allow'].{Name:name, DefaultAction:networkRuleSet.defaultAction, VNetRules:networkRuleSet.virtualNetworkRules}" \
-o table
# Detailed network rule auditfor account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); doecho"=== $account ==="
az storage account show --name "$account" \
--query "{DefaultAction:networkRuleSet.defaultAction, IPRules:networkRuleSet.ipRules[*].ipAddressOrRange, VNetRules:networkRuleSet.virtualNetworkRules[*].virtualNetworkResourceId, Bypass:networkRuleSet.bypass}" \
-o json
done# Find storage accounts with private endpoints
az network private-endpoint list \
--query "[?privateLinkServiceConnections[0].groupIds[0]=='blob'].{Name:name, Storage:privateLinkServiceConnections[0].privateLinkServiceId}" \
-o table
Step 4: Verify Encryption Settings and Key Management
Ensure all storage accounts use encryption at rest with appropriate key management (Microsoft-managed or customer-managed keys).
# Check encryption configuration for all storage accountsfor account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); doecho"=== $account ==="
az storage account show --name "$account" \
--query "{Encryption:encryption.services, KeySource:encryption.keySource, KeyVaultUri:encryption.keyVaultProperties.keyVaultUri, InfraEncryption:encryption.requireInfrastructureEncryption}" \
-o json
done# Find accounts without infrastructure encryption (double encryption)
az storage account list \
--query "[?encryption.requireInfrastructureEncryption!=true].{Name:name, KeySource:encryption.keySource}" \
-o table
# Check for accounts using TLS version below 1.2
az storage account list \
--query "[?minimumTlsVersion!='TLS1_2'].{Name:name, TLS:minimumTlsVersion}" \
-o table
Step 5: Audit Shared Access Signatures and Access Keys
Identify overly permissive SAS tokens and check for access key usage patterns.
# Check when storage account keys were last rotatedfor account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); doecho"=== $account ==="
az storage account keys list \
--account-name "$account" \
--query "[].{KeyName:keyName, CreationTime:creationTime}" \
-o table
done# Check if storage account allows shared key access (should be disabled for AAD-only)
az storage account list \
--query "[].{Name:name, AllowSharedKeyAccess:allowSharedKeyAccess}" \
-o table
# Review stored access policies on containers (SAS governance)for account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); do
key=$(az storage account keys list --account-name "$account" --query "[0].value" -o tsv 2>/dev/null)
for container in $(az storage container list --account-name "$account" --account-key "$key" --query "[].name" -o tsv 2>/dev/null); do
policies=$(az storage container policy list --container-name "$container" --account-name "$account" --account-key "$key" 2>/dev/null)
[ -n "$policies" ] && echo"$account/$container: $policies"donedone
Step 6: Check Diagnostic Logging and Monitoring
Verify that storage analytics logging and Azure Monitor diagnostic settings are enabled.
# Check diagnostic settings for storage accountsfor account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); do
rg=$(az storage account show --name "$account" --query "resourceGroup" -o tsv)
echo"=== $account ==="
az monitor diagnostic-settings list \
--resource "/subscriptions/$(az account show --query id -o tsv)/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Storage/storageAccounts/$account" \
--query "[].{Name:name, Logs:logs[*].category, Metrics:metrics[*].category}" \
-o json 2>/dev/null || echo" No diagnostic settings configured"done# Check blob service logging propertiesfor account in $(az storage account list --query "[].name" -o tsv); do
key=$(az storage account keys list --account-name "$account" --query "[0].value" -o tsv 2>/dev/null)
az storage logging show \
--account-name "$account" \
--account-key "$key" \
--services b 2>/dev/null
done
Key Concepts
Term
Definition
Blob Public Access
Storage account setting that allows anonymous read access to blob containers and their contents without authentication
Shared Access Signature
Time-limited URI with embedded authentication tokens granting delegated access to Azure Storage resources with specific permissions
Network ACL Default Action
Storage firewall setting that determines whether traffic is allowed or denied by default, with exceptions for specified IPs and VNets
Customer-Managed Key
Encryption key stored in Azure Key Vault that the customer controls for storage encryption instead of Microsoft-managed keys
Stored Access Policy
Named policy on a container that defines SAS permissions, start/expiry times, and can be revoked independently of individual SAS tokens
Defender for Storage
Microsoft Defender plan providing threat detection for anomalous storage access patterns, malware uploads, and data exfiltration
Tools & Systems
Azure CLI: Primary tool for querying storage account configuration, containers, and access policies
Azure Resource Graph: Cross-subscription query engine for efficient enumeration of storage security settings at scale
Microsoft Defender for Storage: Threat detection service identifying anomalous access patterns and potential data exfiltration
Prowler Azure: Open-source tool with automated storage security checks aligned to CIS Azure Foundations
ScoutSuite: Multi-cloud auditing tool with Azure storage-specific checks for public access, encryption, and networking
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Detecting a Storage Account Exposed by a Developer Misconfiguration
Context: A developer creates a storage account for a web application and enables blob public access to serve static files. They accidentally store API keys and database connection strings in a publicly accessible container.
Approach:
Run az storage account list filtering for allowBlobPublicAccess=true
Enumerate containers with public access level set to blob or container
List contents of public containers to identify sensitive files
Check Defender for Storage alerts for anomalous access from unexpected IPs
Immediately set allowBlobPublicAccess to false on the storage account
Rotate any exposed credentials found in public containers
Enable network ACLs restricting access to the application VNet
Configure Azure CDN or Front Door for legitimate public content delivery
Pitfalls: Disabling blob public access immediately breaks applications serving content publicly. Coordinate with the development team and implement Azure CDN before disabling public access. SAS tokens generated before a key rotation remain valid until expiry unless the underlying storage key is regenerated.
Output Format
Azure Storage Security Audit Report
======================================
Subscription: Production (SUB-ID)
Assessment Date: 2026-02-23
Storage Accounts Audited: 24
CRITICAL FINDINGS:
[STOR-001] Public Blob Access Enabled
Account: webapp-static-prod
Container: uploads (PublicAccess: blob)
Risk: Anonymous users can read all blobs in the container
Contents: 1,247 files including .env and config.json
Remediation: Disable allowBlobPublicAccess, use Azure CDN with SAS
[STOR-002] Storage Account Open to All Networks
Account: data-lake-analytics
Default Action: Allow (no network restrictions)
Risk: Accessible from any network including the internet
Remediation: Set default action to Deny, add VNet rules
SUMMARY:
Public blob access enabled: 3 / 24
Open to all networks: 8 / 24
Missing infrastructure encryption: 12 / 24
TLS version below 1.2: 2 / 24
No diagnostic logging: 10 / 24
Shared key access enabled: 18 / 24
Keys not rotated in 90+ days: 14 / 24
