detecting-supply-chain-attacks-in-ci-cd

name	detecting-supply-chain-attacks-in-ci-cd
description	Scans GitHub Actions workflows and CI/CD pipeline configurations for supply chain attack vectors including unpinned actions, script injection via expressions, dependency confusion, and secrets exposure. Uses PyGithub and YAML parsing for automated audit. Use when hardening CI/CD pipelines or investigating compromised build systems.
domain	cybersecurity
subdomain	security-operations
tags	["supply-chain-security","ci-cd-security","github-actions","pipeline-security","dependency-pinning","devsecops"]
version	1.0
author	mahipal
license	Apache-2.0
atlas_techniques	["AML.T0010","AML.T0104"]
nist_ai_rmf	["GOVERN-5.2","MAP-1.6","MANAGE-2.2"]
nist_csf	["DE.CM-01","RS.MA-01","GV.OV-01","DE.AE-02"]
mitre_attack	["T1195.002","T1195.001","T1199","T1554"]
source	https://github.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills
source_commit	04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d

Detecting Supply Chain Attacks in CI/CD

When to Use

• When investigating security incidents that require detecting supply chain attacks in ci cd
• When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
• When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
• When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

Prerequisites

• Familiarity with security operations concepts and tools
• Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
• Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
• Appropriate authorization for any testing activities

Instructions

Scan CI/CD workflow files for supply chain risks by parsing GitHub Actions YAML, checking for unpinned dependencies, script injection vectors, and secrets exposure.

import yaml
from pathlib import Path

for wf in Path(".github/workflows").glob("*.yml"):
    with open(wf) as f:
        workflow = yaml.safe_load(f)
    for job_name, job in workflow.get("jobs", {}).items():
        for step in job.get("steps", []):
            uses = step.get("uses", "")
            if uses and "@" in uses and not uses.split("@")[1].startswith("sha"):
                print(f"Unpinned action: {uses} in {wf.name}")

Key supply chain risks:

1. Unpinned GitHub Actions (using @main instead of SHA)
2. Script injection via ${{ github.event }} expressions