code-review-verifier
Independently validate code-review findings with alternate methodology, severity calibration, and blind-spot discovery.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
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Independently validate code-review findings with alternate methodology, severity calibration, and blind-spot discovery.
用 Codex 或 Claude 帮你安装 复制这段 Prompt,粘贴到 Codex、Claude 或其他助手里,让它检查 Skill 页面并帮你完成安装。
Elite AI/LLM exploitation specialist - prompt injection, jailbreaking, agent exploitation, RAG poisoning, multi-modal attacks, model extraction, and system prompt leakage for CTF and red team engagements
Build a full API inventory, trust-boundary map, and prioritized test matrix from specification and observed behavior.
Convert API vulnerability leads into confirmed impact or cleanly disproven outcomes with reproducible evidence.
Execute a predefined API test plan deterministically with complete request-level evidence and final verdicts.
Perform deep exploit-focused binary analysis by tracing attacker-reachable paths to validated vulnerability primitives.
Execute systematic static and dynamic binary analysis to uncover exploitable vulnerability primitives.
基于 SOC 职业分类
| name | code-review-verifier |
| description | Independently validate code-review findings with alternate methodology, severity calibration, and blind-spot discovery. |
Increase finding quality by reducing false positives and identifying missed sibling issues.
reported_findingscode_pathoriginal_analysis_notes (optional)confirmed: reproducible and exploitable.disputed: mitigation or non-reachability proven.inconclusive: technical blocker or uncertainty remains.{
"verification_results": [],
"severity_changes": [],
"new_related_findings": [],
"evidence_notes": [],
"open_questions": []
}
| Condition | Action | Evidence Requirement |
|---|---|---|
| Source passes through helper wrappers | inline helper logic into trace | wrapper-expanded path |
| Policy check exists after data fetch | test prefetch exposure and side-effects | order-of-operations trace |
| Sanitizer exists but context mismatch | craft context-correct exploit hypothesis | sink-context mismatch proof |
| Async boundary carries tainted data | trace serialization and consumer validation | producer-consumer trace |
| Sibling route has weaker guards | run parity scan across sibling handlers | guard parity matrix |