gauntlet-security

name	gauntlet-security
description	Security gauntlet for Remedy — unit jail/SSRF/auth suite plus controlled live red-team probes. Use when security audit, red-team, gauntlet, harden, jail, SSRF, auth bypass, or before ship after security-sensitive changes.
version	1.0.0
author	Remedy
tags	["security","gauntlet","redteam","ssrf","jail","auth","remedy"]

Security gauntlet

Goal

Prove jails, auth, SSRF, and host boundaries still hold after changes. Threat model: same Windows user ≈ owner power; harden against misconfig and agent tool abuse, not full user compromise.

Artifacts: docs/REDTEAM_*.md, docs/SECURITY_AUDIT_*.md, docs/_redteam_live_results.json, scripts/_redteam_live_probes.py.

When to use

• Security-sensitive PR (auth, shell, paths, media, computer host, webhooks)
• User says gauntlet / red-team / harden / jail check
• Before release if security surface moved

Preflight

1. Repo root = RemedyAI; venv ready (uv sync / .venv).
2. Know which API is under test (release :7400 vs isolated :7410).
3. Set env if non-default:

$env:REMEDY_API = "http://127.0.0.1:7400"   # or 7410
$env:REMEDY_HOME = "$env:USERPROFILE\.remedy"

Gate A — Unit security suite (always)

From repo root:

uv run pytest -q --tb=short `
  tests/test_api_auth.py `
  tests/test_web_fetch_ssrf.py `
  tests/test_project_write_jail.py `
  tests/test_project_scan_jail.py `
  tests/test_zip_import_security.py `
  tests/test_secret_store.py `
  tests/test_secret_acl_no_everyone.py `
  tests/test_access_scope.py `
  tests/test_agency_hardening.py `
  tests/test_tool_policy.py `
  tests/test_provider_sanitize.py

Pass: all green. Fail: fix before live probes.

Also useful neighbors when you touched them:

• tests/test_hidden_process.py, tests/test_computer_use.py (host auth)
• tests/test_media_api.py, tests/test_uninstall_wipe_paths.py

Gate B — Live probes (API must be up)

Start release or isolated API first. Then:

.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe scripts/_redteam_live_probes.py

Expect JSON summary on stdout; often writes docs/_redteam_live_results.json.

Safe by design: no disk wipe, no real destructive shell; probes auth, path jail, SSRF helpers, computer host shape, webhooks.

Gate C — Shell write jail spot checks

.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe scripts\_prove_write_jail.py
# optional multi-run:
.\.venv\Scripts\python.exe scripts\live_project_write_jail_10x.py

Gate D — Report

Summarize for the user:

Area	Result
Unit jails / auth / SSRF	pass/fail
Live probes	pass/fail + notable findings
Residual risk	honest (owner power, loopback bootstrap, etc.)

If new findings: document in docs/ dated note + fix or track; do not ship known P0 (unauth host, jail bypass).

Anti-patterns

• Live probes without unit suite green
• Probing production non-loopback hosts
• Enabling dual messengers “to test security”
• Claiming “secure” because pytest passed while live host was down

Related skills

• soak-product — broader product health after harden
• project-etiquette — ship only after gates
• change-safety — blast radius for security surfaces
• self-dev-loop — full self-dev sequence