cloud-pentest

# CLOUD PENTEST — Post-Access Exploitation > Recon finds the door; this is what you do inside. A leaked `AKIA...` key or a metadata token is not a finding on its own — the finding is what that identity can DO. Enumerate the identity, find the privesc path, prove real impact. Never touch data you're not authorized to. --- ## AUTHORIZATION FIRST ``` [ ] Target cloud account/subscription is explicitly in scope [ ] You have written authorization (program scope, engagement doc) [ ] Read-only enumeration before ANY state change [ ] No exfil of real customer data — prove access with a benign canary/own-account object [ ] Discovered accounts/roles you can pivot to are NOT auto-authorized — confirm scope ``` Stop here if any box is unchecked. --- ## 0. IDENTIFY THE IDENTITY (do this first, always) | You have | First call | Tells you | |---|---|---| | AWS keys | `aws sts get-caller-identity` | account id, principal ARN, user vs role | | AWS metadata | `curl .../iam/security-credentials/<role>` | temp creds + role name | | GCP SA JSON / token | `gcloud auth ... ` / `curl metadata ...token` | project, service account, scopes | | Azure token / MI | IMDS `.../identity/oauth2/token` | tenant, object id, resource access | Never assume privilege. Enumerate what this identity actually has before planning. --- ## 1. AWS — ENUMERATE THEN ESCALATE **Enumerate (read-only):** ```bash aws sts get-caller-identity aws iam get-account-authorization-details 2>/dev/null # full policy dump if allowed aws iam list-attached-user-policies --user-name <u> aws iam list-role-policies / list-attached-role-policies # No IAM read? Brute the effective perms with enumerate-iam / then map with a policy tool ``` **Classic privesc paths (need the matching permission):** | Permission held | Escalation | |---|---| | `iam:CreatePolicyVersion` | Write a new default `*:*` version onto an attached policy | | `iam:PassRole` + `ec2:RunInstances` / `lambda:CreateFunction` | Launch compute AS an admin role | | `iam:AttachUserPolicy` / `PutUserPolicy` | Attach AdministratorAccess to yourself | | `sts:AssumeRole` (over-broad trust) | Assume a more privileged role | | `iam:CreateAccessKey` on another user | Mint keys for a privileged user | | `lambda:UpdateFunctionCode` on privileged fn | Run code with the function's role | | `iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy` | Rewrite trust policy to let you assume it | **Impact proof (benign):** list a bucket you were told is in scope, `sts assume-role` into the admin role and `get-caller-identity` to show the new ARN, or read a canary object. Don't touch real PII. --- ## 2. METADATA (IMDS) — SSRF LANDS HERE ``` IMDSv1 (no token): GET http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role> IMDSv2 (token): PUT .../latest/api/token (X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600) then GET with X-aws-ec2-metadata-token: <token> GCP: GET http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/default/token header: Metadata-Flavor: Google Azure: GET http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/ header: Metadata: true ``` Got temp creds → jump to section 1 (AWS) / 3 (GCP) / 4 (Azure) and enumerate what THAT role can do. SSRF alone is Medium; SSRF → metadata creds → data/admin is Critical. --- ## 3. GCP — IMPERSONATION IS THE PIVOT ```bash gcloud auth activate-service-account --key-file=sa.json # or use the token gcloud projects get-iam-policy <project> gcloud iam service-accounts list ``` | Permission | Escalation | |---|---| | `iam.serviceAccounts.getAccessToken` / `actAs` | Impersonate a higher-priv SA (`--impersonate-service-account`) | | `iam.serviceAccountKeys.create` | Mint a key for a privileged SA | | `iam.roles.update` on a custom role you hold | Add permissions to yourself | | `cloudfunctions.functions.update` / `deploy` | Run code as the function's SA | | `storage.objects.get` on a sensitive bucket | Read secrets/state | Owner/Editor at project level = effectively admin. Check for the default Compute SA having Editor — extremely common. --- ## 4. AZURE — MANAGED IDENTITY & RBAC ```bash az account show az role assignment list --assignee <objectId> --all az resource list ``` | Path | Escalation | |---|---| | Managed identity with Contributor | Deploy/modify resources, run commands on VMs (`az vm run-command`) | | `Microsoft.Authorization/*/write` | Assign yourself Owner | | Key Vault access policy / RBAC | Read secrets, certs, keys | | Automation Account / Runbook | Execute as the automation identity | | Storage account key read | Full blob access | --- ## 5. STORAGE — S3 / GCS / BLOB ``` [ ] List: aws s3 ls s3://<bucket> --no-sign-request (public?) [ ] Read/Write ACL: get-bucket-acl / put-object test (own canary file only) [ ] Bucket policy allows *? cross-account? [ ] Versioning / logging exposes old secrets? [ ] Website / static hosting → subdomain takeover angle (see web2-vuln-classes) ``` Writable public bucket serving a live site = Critical (content injection / takeover). Readable bucket with secrets/PII = High/Critical. --- ## 6. SECRETS HARVEST (post-access) ``` [ ] Lambda/Cloud Function/App env vars (often hold API keys, DB creds) [ ] SSM Parameter Store / Secrets Manager (if perms allow) [ ] EC2 user-data / instance tags [ ] Terraform state in the bucket you just read [ ] CI/CD variables reachable from the identity ``` Each secret → re-run "identify the identity" for the NEW credential. Chain until you hit admin or crown-jewel data, then stop and write it up. --- ## 7. REPORT LINE (per finding) ``` Entry: <leaked key | SSRF→metadata | public bucket | SA JSON> Identity: <ARN / SA / object id> — <what it could do> Escalation: <exact permission → action that raised privilege> Impact proven: <assumed admin ARN | read canary | listed in-scope resource> Blast radius: <accounts/services/data reachable> Fix: <least-privilege policy | IMDSv2 enforce | block-public-access | rotate> ``` Impact must be demonstrated with a concrete call, using benign/own-account objects. "The key might allow…" is not a finding — show `get-caller-identity` after the escalation.