oauth2-and-oidc-from-scratch

name	oauth2-and-oidc-from-scratch
description	Use when implementing or reviewing OAuth 2.0 / OAuth 2.1 / OpenID Connect from scratch in a real codebase, choosing a flow (authorization code + PKCE, client credentials, BFF), validating ID tokens, storing tokens safely in browsers, sizing refresh-token rotation, or migrating off implicit / ROPC. Triggers: "should I use a JWT or session cookie", PKCE code_challenge/code_verifier, exact redirect_uri match, state vs nonce confusion, ID-token replay, refresh-token rotation, BFF (backend-for-frontend) pattern, token in localStorage warning. NOT for SAML / WS-Federation, building an authorization server (use a battle-tested IdP), passwordless-only flows (passkeys/WebAuthn), or session-cookie auth without a third-party IdP.
category	Backend & Infrastructure
allowed-tools	Read,Grep,Glob,Edit,Write,Bash
tags	["oauth","oauth2","oidc","openid-connect","pkce","authentication","authorization"]

OAuth 2.0 / OIDC From Scratch

OAuth is small in spec and enormous in pitfalls — most production "auth bugs" are actually one of five recurring mistakes, and the IETF has been quietly hardening the protocol for a decade to close them. As of OAuth 2.1 (current draft draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-15, March 2026), PKCE is mandatory for every client, the implicit grant is removed, the resource-owner-password-credentials grant is removed, and the authorization server MUST reject any redirect_uri that doesn't exactly match a registered URI. (IETF — OAuth 2.1 draft-15)

For browser apps the IETF's Browser-Based Apps BCP (draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-26) ranks architectures by safety: BFF (Backend-For-Frontend) > token-mediating backend > pure SPA OAuth client. The pure-SPA pattern is "vulnerable to all attack scenarios discussed earlier" and should only be used when no backend is available. (IETF — Browser-Based Apps draft-26)

If you remember nothing else: authorization code flow + PKCE, BFF pattern in the browser, HttpOnly cookies, never localStorage for tokens.

Jump to your fire:

• Choosing a flow → Pick the right grant type
• Building it for a SPA → BFF (backend-for-frontend) pattern
• "Should I store the token in localStorage?" → Token storage in the browser
• state vs nonce confusion → state (CSRF) vs nonce (replay)
• ID token validation → Validating the ID token
• Refresh token rotation → Refresh tokens
• Migrating off implicit or ROPC → Migration off deprecated flows

When to use

• Implementing user login via Google / Microsoft / Apple / Auth0 / Okta / Cognito / Keycloak.
• Service-to-service auth between your own services using client_credentials.
• Reviewing a codebase that has its own custom OAuth integration.
• Migrating from implicit flow or ROPC (both removed in OAuth 2.1).
• Designing token storage for a new SPA or mobile app.

Core capabilities

Pick the right grant type

Use case	Grant	Notes
User logs into your web app via an IdP	Authorization code + PKCE	The default. PKCE required even for confidential clients in 2.1. (oauth-2-1)
Same, but native or mobile	Authorization code + PKCE	Use a system browser (ASWebAuthenticationSession / Custom Tabs), not embedded WebView
SPA without backend	Authorization code + PKCE in the browser, but prefer BFF	The browser-based-apps BCP explicitly discourages pure-SPA. (browser-based-apps)
Service-to-service (no user)	Client credentials	mTLS or signed JWT client assertion preferred over client_secret
Device with no browser (CLI, IoT)	Device authorization grant (RFC 8628)	The "go to https://provider/code and enter ABCD-1234" flow
Implicit	Removed in 2.1 — migrate to authcode + PKCE	(oauth-2-1)
Resource Owner Password Credentials	Removed in 2.1 — there is no replacement; use a real flow	(oauth-2-1)

The OAuth 2.1 draft is explicit: "Clients MUST use code_challenge and code_verifier and authorization servers MUST enforce their use except under the conditions described in Section 7.5.1." (oauth-2-1)

BFF (backend-for-frontend) pattern

Browser  ──cookie──▶  BFF  ──tokens──▶  Resource server
                       │
                       ├─ holds access_token + refresh_token server-side
                       └─ exposes only an HttpOnly session cookie to the browser

The BCP is unambiguous: "The BFF MUST act as a confidential client by establishing credentials with the authorization server." (browser-based-apps) That makes the browser never see an access token, refresh token, or client credential. The browser holds only an opaque session cookie keyed to a server-side session record.

// Hono-style BFF, simplified.
import { Hono } from 'hono';
import { setCookie, getCookie } from 'hono/cookie';
import crypto from 'crypto';

const app = new Hono();

// Login: redirect user to IdP with state + nonce + PKCE.
app.get('/auth/login', async (c) => {
  const state = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
  const nonce = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
  const verifier = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
  const challenge = crypto.createHash('sha256').update(verifier).digest('base64url');

  await sessionStore.putPending(state, { nonce, verifier });   // server-side
  const url = new URL(`${ISSUER}/authorize`);
  url.searchParams.set('response_type', );
  url..(, );
  url..(, );  
  url..(, );
  url..(, state);
  url..(, nonce);
  url..(, challenge);
  url..(, );
   c.(url.());
});


app.(,  (c) => {
   code = c..();
   returnedState = c..();
   pending =  sessionStore.(returnedState!);
   (!pending)  c.(, );

   tokenRes =  (, {
    : ,
    : { :  },
    :  ({
      : ,
      : code!,
      : ,
      : ,
      : ,    
      : pending.,
    }),
  });
   { access_token, refresh_token, id_token } =  tokenRes.();

   idTokenClaims =  (id_token, { : , :  });
   (idTokenClaims. !== pending.)  c.(, );

   sid = crypto.().();
   sessionStore.(sid, { : idTokenClaims., access_token, refresh_token });
  (c, , sid, {
    : , : , : ,
    : , :  *  * ,
  });
   c.();
});

The BFF requirements straight from the BCP: HttpOnly cookies (MUST), Secure flag (MUST), CSRF defense on the redirect URI (MUST). (browser-based-apps)

Token storage in the browser

The BCP's hierarchy, unambiguous: (browser-based-apps)

1. No browser-side token storage at all (BFF) — best.
2. HttpOnly + Secure cookies — second best, but only for opaque session IDs in the BFF model.
3. In-memory (regenerated on refresh) — acceptable for the token-mediating-backend pattern.
4. Service Workers — with restrictions; not common.
5. localStorage / sessionStorage / IndexedDB — avoid; XSS-readable.

The browser-based-apps BCP says it directly: "localStorage, IndexedDB (vulnerable to XSS)." (browser-based-apps)

state (CSRF) vs nonce (replay)

These look similar and aren't. Both are random; both are sent in the request and checked in the response; they defend against different attacks.

Param	Defends against	Where it lives	When you check it
state	CSRF on the redirect — attacker tricks the user's browser into completing a login the user didn't initiate	URL of the auth request, returned in callback	Compare callback's state to a value bound to the user's session before redirecting back (Auth0 — state-vs-nonce-vs-pkce)
nonce	ID token replay — attacker reuses a previously-issued ID token	URL of the auth request, included as a claim in the ID token	Compare the nonce claim in the validated ID token to the value you sent (Auth0 — state-vs-nonce-vs-pkce)

// Not "either-or" — you need both for OIDC.
const state = randomBase64Url(32);   // CSRF
const nonce = randomBase64Url(32);   // ID-token replay

Auth0's writeup is blunt: the nonce "prevents attackers from reusing old authentication codes... The ID Token's nonce claim must contain the exact same value that was sent in the request. If not, authentication should be rejected." (Auth0)

Validating the ID token

An ID token is a JWT. Validation is not "decode it" — it's:

1. Verify the signature against the IdP's public keys (/.well-known/jwks.json, with key rotation).
2. iss (issuer) matches your configured issuer exactly (no trailing slash drift).
3. aud (audience) contains your client_id.
4. azp (authorized party) equals your client_id if multiple audiences.
5. exp is in the future. iat and nbf are sane. Allow ~60s clock skew.
6. nonce matches what you sent.
7. Optionally at_hash matches the hash of the access token (if you have one).

Use a vetted library — jose (Node), python-jose or authlib (Python), go-jose (Go), jjwt or nimbus-jose-jwt (JVM). Don't write JWT verification by hand; the historical CVE list is long.

Refresh tokens

OAuth 2.1 binds refresh-token semantics tightly: "If refresh tokens are issued, those refresh tokens MUST be bound to the scope and resource servers as consented by the resource owner." (oauth-2-1)

Best-current-practice rotation:

• Each /token exchange that uses a refresh token issues a new refresh token AND invalidates the old one.
• The IdP keeps a chain — if a refresh token is reused after being rotated, the IdP suspects theft and revokes the entire chain.
• Refresh tokens live in the BFF's session store, NOT the browser.

If you can't rotate (limited IdP), at minimum apply a sliding session window.

Migration off deprecated flows

If you find code using:

• Implicit grant (response_type=token or response_type=id_token token) → migrate to authcode + PKCE. (oauth-2-1)
• ROPC (sending username + password to /token) → there is no drop-in replacement; you need a real authentication UI on the IdP.

Sequence the migration: (1) add the new flow alongside the old, (2) move clients over, (3) revoke the old flow at the IdP. Don't yank it in a single deploy.

Client credentials

For service-to-service:

POST /token
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

grant_type=client_credentials&scope=orders:read
Authorization: Basic <base64(client_id:client_secret)>

Prefer client_assertion (signed JWT) or mTLS over client_secret for production: rotated client secrets are a moving target; mTLS-bound credentials are tied to a key you can keep in HSM/KMS.

Anti-patterns

Tokens in localStorage

Symptom: XSS leads to token exfiltration; attackers impersonate users. Diagnosis: Storing access or refresh tokens in localStorage makes them readable from any same-origin script. Fix: BFF + HttpOnly cookies. The browser-based-apps BCP discourages browser-side token storage entirely. (browser-based-apps)

Skipping state validation

Symptom: CSRF on the redirect — an attacker links the user's browser to their own provider login, the user lands authenticated as the attacker. Diagnosis: Redirect handler accepts the code without validating state matches a session-bound value. Fix: Always generate state, store it server-side bound to the pre-login session, and reject callbacks where it doesn't match.

Treating the access token as a user identity

Symptom: App reads sub from the access token to identify the user. Diagnosis: Access tokens are for resource servers, not for the client to introspect identity. The IdP makes no API guarantee about the access-token format. Fix: Identify users from the ID token (OIDC). Pass access tokens to APIs without parsing them.

Loose redirect_uri matching

Symptom: redirect_uri=https://app.example.com/callback?next=//evil.com ends up redirecting the auth code to an attacker. Diagnosis: Matching only the prefix or hostname, not the full URI. Fix: Exact match. OAuth 2.1 requires it: "Authorization servers MUST reject authorization requests that specify a redirect URI that doesn't exactly match one that was registered." (oauth-2-1)

One refresh token forever

Symptom: A leaked refresh token works for months; theft has no detection signal. Diagnosis: No rotation; no chain. Fix: Rotate on each exchange. The IdP detects reused-after-rotation and revokes the chain.

Custom JWT verification

Symptom: Token forgery via algorithm confusion (alg=none, RS256→HS256 swap), signature stripping. Diagnosis: Hand-rolled JWT verification missing one of the historical CVEs. Fix: Use a vetted library. Pin the expected algorithm. Verify all claims (iss, aud, exp, nonce).

Implicit flow because "it's simpler for SPAs"

Symptom: Tokens land in URL fragments and browser history; downgrade attacks possible. Diagnosis: Implicit was deprecated for exactly this reason and is removed in 2.1. (oauth-2-1) Fix: Authorization code + PKCE (browser) or BFF (best).

Storing the IdP's public key, not its JWKS endpoint

Symptom: Token validation breaks during scheduled IdP key rotation. Diagnosis: Hardcoded the public key. Fix: Fetch from /.well-known/jwks.json at startup; cache with a TTL; refetch on kid mismatch.

Quality gates

• Test: end-to-end login flow works against a real IdP (or mockoidc) in CI; assert state is checked and nonce is checked.
• Test: ID-token validator rejects tokens with: wrong iss, wrong aud, expired exp, mismatched nonce, alg=none, signature swap.
• Test: unauthenticated user trying to access a protected endpoint receives 401 (not 500, not blank 200).
• PKCE is on for every authorization code flow (no exceptions). (oauth-2-1)
• Implicit grant and ROPC are not present in the codebase. CI grep fails on response_type=token. (oauth-2-1)
• Browser app uses BFF or token-mediating-backend; no access tokens in localStorage. (browser-based-apps)
• Session cookie is HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax (or Strict); cookie attributes asserted in an integration test.
• redirect_uri is exactly registered; no wildcards or prefix matching.
• ID-token validation uses a vetted JWT library; algorithm pinned (RS256 or EdDSA); alg is checked, not just trusted.
• Refresh tokens (if used) are stored server-side and rotated on each exchange.
• JWKS fetched from /.well-known/jwks.json with TTL cache; key rotation handled.
• OTel span around token exchange with oauth.client_id, oauth.flow, oauth.outcome (see ).

NOT for

• SAML / WS-Federation — different protocol family. No dedicated skill yet.
• Building an authorization server from scratch — use Keycloak / Auth0 / Okta / WorkOS / Cognito. The spec doesn't tell you how to operate token revocation, key rotation, fraud signals, etc.
• Passwordless / passkeys / WebAuthn — adjacent. No dedicated skill yet.
• Session-cookie auth without an IdP — different problem; OAuth doesn't apply.
• Per-request signature schemes (HTTP message signatures, RFC 9421) — different layer.
• Rate limiting the auth endpoints — → rate-limiting-strategy.
• CSRF beyond the OAuth redirect — → content-security-policy-headers and a dedicated CSRF skill (none yet).

Sources

• IETF — The OAuth 2.1 Authorization Framework (draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1-15, March 2026): PKCE MUST, exact redirect_uri MUST, implicit + ROPC removed, refresh-token binding. datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-1/
• IETF — OAuth 2.0 for Browser-Based Applications BCP (draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps-26): BFF > token-mediating > pure-SPA, HttpOnly + Secure cookie MUSTs, localStorage discouraged. datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps/
• Auth0 — Demystifying OAuth Security: State vs. Nonce vs. PKCE. auth0.com/blog/demystifying-oauth-security-state-vs-nonce-vs-pkce/
• Auth0 docs — Prevent Attacks and Redirect Users with OAuth 2.0 State Parameters. auth0.com/docs/secure/attack-protection/state-parameters
• PortSwigger — OAuth 2.0 authentication vulnerabilities (anti-pattern catalog). portswigger.net/web-security/oauth