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macOS post-exploitation for credential harvesting, DTrace monitoring, TCC bypass, and stealth operations via native tools
Windows userland post-exploitation for credential harvesting, monitoring, AMSI/ETW bypass, and stealth operations
Kubernetes post-exploitation for container escape, secret extraction, RBAC abuse, and cluster persistence
基于 SOC 职业分类
正在显示 SKILL.md
| name | cis-aws-foundations-2.1.3 |
| description | Ensure Organizations management account is not used for workloads |
| category | cis-iam |
| version | 7.0.0 |
| author | cyberstrike-official |
| tags | ["cis","aws","iam","organizations","management-account","workload-isolation"] |
| cis_id | 2.1.3 |
| cis_benchmark | CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark v7.0.0 |
| tech_stack | ["aws"] |
| cwe_ids | [] |
| chains_with | ["cis-aws-foundations-2.1.1","cis-aws-foundations-2.1.4"] |
| prerequisites | [] |
| severity_boost | {} |
Ensure that the AWS Organizations management account is used only for organizational governance tasks and does not host production workloads, applications, or business data. The management account is the most privileged account in an AWS Organization and performs sensitive administrative functions such as creating and managing member accounts, applying service control policies (SCPs), and managing consolidated billing. Workloads, applications, and associated data should be deployed in dedicated member accounts, not in the management account.
The management account has unique privileges that cannot be restricted by SCPs, making it the highest-risk account in an organization. Deploying workloads or storing business data in the management account increases the attack surface and blast radius of a compromise. If a workload vulnerability or misconfiguration occurs in the management account, it could grant attackers access to organization-wide administrative capabilities.
Restricting the management account to governance-only use may require creating new member accounts, redesigning existing account boundaries, and migrating workloads and data out of the management account. This can introduce short-term complexity and operational overhead. However, it reduces the blast radius of a compromise, simplifies security controls in the most privileged account, and aligns the environment with AWS multi-account and workload-isolation best practices.
# List EC2 instances in the management account
aws ec2 describe-instances --query 'Reservations[*].Instances[*].[InstanceId,State.Name,Tags[?Key==`Name`].Value|[0]]' --output table
# List Lambda functions
aws lambda list-functions --query 'Functions[*].[FunctionName,Runtime]' --output table
# List RDS instances
aws rds describe-db-instances --query 'DBInstances[*].[DBInstanceIdentifier,Engine,DBInstanceStatus]' --output table
aws ecs list-clusters
aws s3api list-buckets --query --output table
For each identified resource, determine whether it is:
If any workload/business resources are present in the management account, record this as a gap and document the affected services and resource types.
The management account contains only governance and security resources. No workload or business application resources are present.
AWS does not restrict the management account from hosting workloads. By default, any AWS services can be deployed in any account including the management account.
| Controls Version | Control | IG 1 | IG 2 | IG 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v8 | 3.12 Segment Data Processing and Storage Based on Sensitivity | * | * |
Level 2 | Manual