threat-model

name	threat-model
description	STRIDE threat modeling before implementing security-sensitive features
triggers	["threat","STRIDE","attack surface","security design","new API","new feature security","threat model"]
context_cost	medium

Threat Model Skill

Goal

Create a STRIDE threat model BEFORE implementing any security-sensitive feature. Prevents security issues at design time (cheapest point to fix) rather than after implementation (expensive) or in production (catastrophic).

When to Invoke

• Before implementing: authentication, authorization, user registration, file upload
• Before implementing: payment processing, data storage, API endpoints, admin features
• Before any feature that handles: PII, financial data, health data, secrets, files

Steps

1. Identify system components and trust boundaries

   • Reference the C4 Component diagram if it exists (docs/architecture/)
   • Draw the data flow: user → entry point → processing → storage → response
   • Mark trust boundaries (where permissions or privilege changes)
   • Identify actors: authenticated user, anonymous user, admin, external service, attacker

2. Apply STRIDE to each component

   For each component (API endpoint, service, data store), systematically ask:

   S — Spoofing (impersonation)

   • Can an attacker pretend to be another user or service?
   • Example threats: stolen JWT tokens, forged API keys, session hijacking

   T — Tampering (data modification)

   • Can an attacker modify data in transit or at rest?
   • Example threats: MITM attacks, SQL injection, parameter tampering, mass assignment

   R — Repudiation (deny actions)

   • Can an attacker deny performing an action?
   • Example threats: no audit log, no digital signature for financial transactions

   I — Information Disclosure (data leaks)

   • Can an attacker access data they shouldn't see?
   • Example threats: IDOR, verbose error messages, log injection, SSRF

   D — Denial of Service

   • Can an attacker degrade or block service availability?
   • Example threats: no rate limiting, resource exhaustion, large file uploads

   E — Elevation of Privilege

   • Can an attacker gain more permissions than they should have?
   • Example threats: JWT algorithm confusion, IDOR to admin endpoints, business logic bypass

3. Score each threat

   Factor	Low	Medium	High
   Likelihood	Attacker needs special access/skills	Known exploit pattern exists	Trivial to exploit
   Impact	Minor data exposure	User data compromised	All data, system compromise

   Priority = Likelihood × Impact (High×High = Critical)

4. Propose mitigations for High and Critical threats

   | Threat | STRIDE | L | I | Priority | Mitigation |
   |---|---|---|---|---|---|
   | Stolen JWT allows impersonation | S | H | H | Critical | Short expiry (15min), refresh token rotation, token revocation list |
   | IDOR on /users/{id} endpoint | I | M | H | High | Verify ownership: user.id === session.userId before returning |
   | No rate limit on /auth/login | D | H | M | High | Max 5 attempts/min per IP, 3 per account, exponential backoff |
   

5. Fill THREAT_MODEL_TEMPLATE.md

   • Save to: docs/security/threat-models/[feature-name]-threat-model.md

6. Update CONSTITUTION.md if new security invariants emerge

   • Example: "WHEN a user accesses /api/users/{id}, THE SYSTEM SHALL verify the requesting user owns that resource"

7. Create tasks for mitigations

   • Add each High/Critical mitigation to project/tasks.md
   • These are blocking tasks — must be implemented before the feature is complete

8. Human review required

   • Present threat model to human before implementing the feature
   • Confirm all Critical and High mitigations will be implemented

STRIDE Quick Reference

Letter	Category	Question to ask
S	Spoofing	Who is claiming to be who, and how do we verify it?
T	Tampering	What data can be modified by unauthorized parties?
R	Repudiation	Can actions be denied? Are they logged immutably?
I	Information Disclosure	What can be leaked, and to whom?
D	Denial of Service	What can be exhausted, flooded, or blocked?
E	Elevation of Privilege	How can someone gain more access than intended?

Constraints

• Threat modeling is MANDATORY before implementing: auth, payment, file storage, admin features
• All Critical threats must have implemented mitigations before feature ships
• High threats must have mitigations or documented risk acceptance by human
• Never implement a security control without documenting why it addresses a specific threat

Output Format

Completed threat model file at docs/security/threat-models/[name]-threat-model.md + tasks added for mitigations.