| name | stride-threat-model |
| description | Performs a systematic STRIDE threat modeling assessment on the current project's codebase and architecture. Use this when starting a new implementation phase or reviewing existing components. |
STRIDE Threat Modeling Skill
Goal
Guide the agent to analyze the workspace directory structure, configuration files, and code files to produce a structured threat_model.md assessment.
Instructions
- Analyze System Boundaries: Map the entry points (tools, workflows, prompts) and data storage layers.
- STRIDE Evaluation: Evaluate the system against the six STRIDE pillars:
- Spoofing: Are caller identity boundaries verified before executing sensitive tool logic?
- Tampering: Can users manipulate data flows, parameters, or underlying state?
- Repudiation: Are critical transactions securely logged?
- Information Disclosure: Are we risking leakage of PII, internal tokens, or raw stack traces?
- Denial of Service: Are there rate limits on expensive database or LLM queries?
- Elevation of Privilege: Can an unauthenticated user bypass access control to reach privileged tool actions?
- Output: Generate a highly structured
threat_model.md saved directly into the workspace root.