vault

name

vault

description

Set up and verify the CONFIDE THREE LOCKS for storing RED (real, identifiable) session data at rest — device FileVault, a dedicated encrypted store, and per-file sops/age encryption. Use when the user says "set up confide vault", "encrypt my session data", "three locks", "secure store for transcripts", "sops/age for RED data", or asks how to store real therapy/coaching transcripts safely. NON-DESTRUCTIVE: it CHECKS each lock's status and prints the EXACT command to fix any gap; it never moves, deletes, or encrypts data, and never runs `fdesetup enable`/`hdiutil`/`age-keygen` without an explicit flag and your confirmation. Probes are read-only (`fdesetup status`, which sops/age, key path).

confide:vault — the THREE LOCKS for storing RED data

Operationalizes the defense-in-depth storage posture in confide/docs/THREE-LOCKS.md: real (RED) transcripts rest behind three independent locks, so compromising one does not expose a client. To read a real transcript an attacker needs the device password AND the encrypted-store password AND the age key — three separate secrets, ideally held in different places.

Lock	What	Protects against
1 — Device	FileVault full-disk encryption + strong login password + short auto-lock	a lost/stolen/USB-booted machine
2 — Store	RED in a dedicated ENCRYPTED store (encrypted APFS volume / AES-256 .dmg), NOT in Documents and NEVER in iCloud/Dropbox	other apps, other users, silent cloud sync
3 — Per-file	each RED file sops/age-encrypted at rest, age key stored SEPARATELY; processing in a no-network VM/container	files individually sealed; key not beside the data

NON-DESTRUCTIVE — read before running

• --check (the default) runs only read-only probes: fdesetup status, shutil.which(sops/age), and os.path.exists(...). It never moves, deletes, or encrypts data and never runs fdesetup enable, hdiutil, age-keygen, or rm.
• It reports each lock ✓/✗ and prints the exact command to fix every ✗ — for the user to review and run themselves.
• --init-age generates an age key only with that explicit flag, and never overwrites an existing key.
• --init-store PATH only prints the encrypted-store creation command; it does not execute disk-image creation. Refuses cloud-synced paths.
• Never move, encrypt, or delete the user's RED data on their behalf without explicit confirmation. There is no destructive default.

Run it

# default = read-only status check + checklist with fix commands
python3 skills/vault/scripts/vault.py --check
python3 skills/vault/scripts/vault.py --json            # structured status dict

# point at your own RED store to verify it's not cloud-synced
python3 skills/vault/scripts/vault.py --store-path ~/CONFIDE-RED.dmg

# optional, GUARDED helpers (explicit flags only)
python3 skills/vault/scripts/vault.py --init-age        # make an age key (never overwrites)
python3 skills/vault/scripts/vault.py --init-store ~/CONFIDE-RED.dmg   # prints the hdiutil command

lock_status() is importable and returns:

{
  "device":  {"filevault": bool},
  "store":   {"present": bool, "path": str|None, "cloud_synced": bool, "safe": bool},
  "perfile": {"sops": bool, "age": bool, "key": bool, "key_path": str|None}
}

How to help the user

1. Run --check and read back the ✓/✗ checklist.
2. For each ✗, show the printed fix command (e.g. sudo fdesetup enable, age-keygen -o ~/.config/confide/age.key, hdiutil create -encryption AES-256 … ~/CONFIDE-RED.dmg) and let the user run it.
3. Confirm the RED store is not inside iCloud/Dropbox (store.safe).
4. Show the sops/age encrypt+decrypt recipe (printed in the checklist) so RED stays ciphertext at rest and is decrypted only in-memory inside the isolated pipeline (confide/docs/ISOLATION.md). Only GREEN (redacted) output ever leaves the machine.

See confide/docs/THREE-LOCKS.md (the model + checklist) and confide/docs/ISOLATION.md (red/green flow, no-network VM/container).